Judith G Kelley
Biographic Data
| ID | 150217 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Judith G Kelley |
| GIVEN NAMES | Judith G |
| FAMILY NAME | Kelley |
| SIGNATURE | KELLEY J G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Duke University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1154-2943 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 26 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 915 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 26 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 14 |
Testing for Negative Spillovers: Is Promoting Human Rights Really Part of the “Problem
The international community often seeks to promote political reforms in recalcitrant states. Recently, some scholars have argued that, rather than helping, international law and advocacy create new problems because they have negative spillovers that increase rights violations. We review three mechanisms for such spillovers: backlash, trade-offs, and counteraction and concentrate on the last of these. Some researchers assert that governments somet…
Governance by Other Means: Rankings as Regulatory Systems
This article takes the challenges of global governance and legitimacy seriously and looks at new ways in which international organizations (IOs) have attempted to ‘govern’ without explicit legal or regulatory directives. Specifically, we explore the growth of global performance indicators as a form of social control that appears to have certain advantages even as states and civil society actors push back against international regulatory authority…
Response to Mark J. C. Crescenzi’s review of Scorecard Diplomacy: Grading States to Influence their Reputation and Behavior
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
The Power of Ranking: The Ease of Doing Business Indicator and Global Regulatory Behavior
We argue that the World Bank has successfully marshaled the Ease of Doing Business (EDB) Index to amass considerable influence over business regulations worldwide. The Ease of Doing is a global performance indicator (GPI), and GPIs—especially those that rate and rank states against one another—are intended to package information to influence the views of an audience important to the target, such as foreign investors or voters, thus generating pre…
Introduction: The Power of Global Performance Indicators
In recent decades, IGOs, NGOs, private firms and even states have begun to regularly package and distribute information on the relative performance of states. From the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index to the Financial Action Task Force blacklist, global performance indicators (GPIs) are increasingly deployed to influence governance globally. We argue that GPIs derive influence from their ability to frame issues, extend the authority of t…
Scorecard Diplomacy: Grading States to Influence their Reputation and Behavior
What can the international community do when countries would rather ignore a thorny problem? Scorecard Diplomacy shows that, despite lacking traditional force, public grades are potent symbols that can evoke countries' concerns about their reputations and motivate them to address the problem. The book develops an unconventional but careful argument about the growing phenomenon of such ratings and rankings. It supports this by examining the United…
From the Trenches: A Global Survey of Anti-TIP NGOs and Their Views of U.S. Efforts
Amid the academic and policy critiques of the United States’ 15-year push to eliminate human trafficking, the perspective of the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working with anti-trafficking advocacy and services has been largely ignored. This article presents the results of a global survey of nearly 500 anti-trafficking NGOs in working in 133 countries, and is the first NGO-focused survey of its kind. Based on the results of the survey, we …
An Opportunity Cost Theory of US Treaty Behavior
The United States often leads in the creation of treaties, but it sometimes never joins those treaties or does so only after considerable delay. This presents an interesting puzzle. Most international relations theory expects states to join treaties as long as the benefits outweigh the costs. Domestic theories modify this with the constraints of institutional veto players. Yet, sometimes neither of these arguments explains the delay or absence of…
Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure in International Relations
The ability to monitor state behavior has become a critical tool of international governance. Systematic monitoring allows for the creation of numerical indicators that can be used to rank, compare, and essentially censure states. This article argues that the ability to disseminate such numerical indicators widely and instantly constitutes an exercise of social power, with the potential to change important policy outputs. It explores this argumen…
Monitoring Democracy: When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails
In recent decades, governments and NGOs—in an effort to promote democracy, freedom, fairness, and stability throughout the world—have organized teams of observers to monitor elections in a variety of countries. But when more organizations join the practice without uniform standards, are assessments reliable? When politicians nonetheless cheat and monitors must return to countries even after two decades of engagement, what is accomplished? This bo…
Monitoring Democracy: When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails
In recent decades, governments and NGOs--in an effort to promote democracy, freedom, fairness, and stability throughout the world--have organized teams of observers to monitor elections in a variety of countries. But when more organizations join the practice without uniform standards, are assessments reliable? When politicians nonetheless cheat and monitors must return to countries even after two decades of engagement, what is accomplished? Monit…
International Influences on Elections in New Multiparty States
Practitioners and politicians have long debated the wisdom of pushing countries to hold elections, with some arguing for its necessity and others warning of its futility and even danger. Yet, research on how varying types of international activities affect the conduct and structure of elections still has a long way to go to be able to inform this debate. This article discusses the myriad international forms of engagement with elections and review…
Do International Election Monitors Increase or Decrease Opposition Boycotts
Election boycotts are over twice as common when international observers are present. Do international observers increase election boycotts as this correlation and past research suggest? This article argues not. Observers tend to go to elections with many problems, and it is primarily these, rather than monitors, that drive boycotts. Furthermore, opposition parties have reasons to hope that observers can improve the quality of the election or that…
Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives
This detailed account of ethnic minority politics explains when and how European institutions successfully used norms and incentives to shape domestic policy toward ethnic minorities and why those measures sometimes failed. Going beyond traditional analyses, Kelley examines the pivotal engagement by the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Council for Europe in the creation of such policies. Following l…
Lee Feinstein and Tod Lindberg, Means to an End: US Interests in the International Criminal Court
Election Observers and Their Biases
Why do election monitors sometimes issue contradictory statements or endorse flawed elections? The answers are not always straightforward; in some cases, the monitors’ good intentions may undermine their credibility
The More the Merrier? The Effects of Having Multiple International Election Monitoring Organizations
As the pressure to invite international election monitors rose at the end of the Cold War, states refused to grant the United Nations a dominant role. Thus, today multiple intergovernmental, regional, and international non-governmental organizations often monitor the same elections with equal authority. This article examines the costs and benefits of this complex regime to highlight some possible broader implications of regime complexity. It argu…
D-Minus Elections: The Politics and Norms of International Election Observation
As international election monitors have grown active worldwide, their announcements have gained influence. Sometimes, however, they endorse highly flawed elections. Because their leverage rests largely on their credibility, this is puzzling. Understanding the behavior of election monitors is important because they help the international community to evaluate the legitimacy of governments and because their assessments inform the data used by schol…
Talk of the Nation: Language and Conflict in Romania and Slovakia by Zsuzsa Csergo
Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring
Given that states have long considered elections a purely domestic matter, the dramatic growth of international election monitoring in the 1990s was remarkable. Why did states allow international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to interfere and why did international election monitoring spread so quickly? Why did election monitoring become institutionalized in so many organizations? Perhaps most puzzling, why do countries in…
Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements
What do countries do when they have committed to a treaty, but then find that commitment challenged? After the creation of the International Criminal Court, the United States tried to get countries, regardless of whether they were parties to the Court or not, to sign agreements not to surrender Americans to the Court. Why did some states sign and others not? Given United States power and threats of military sanctions, some states did sign. Howeve…
New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy
The EU's newly launched European neighbourhood policy (ENP) is a fascinating case study in organizational management theory of how the Commission strategically adapted enlargement policies to expand its foreign policy domain. From the use of action plans, regular reports and negotiations to the larger conceptualization and use of socialization and conditionality, the development of the policy shows significant mechanical borrowing from the enlarg…
Strategic Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq was not Just about Iraq
Procedural Politics: Issues, Influence, and Institutional Choice in the European Union
Journal Article Procedural Politics: Issues, Influence, and Institutional Choice in the European Union Get access Procedural Politics: Issues, Influence, and Institutional Choice in the European Union by Joseph Jupille. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004. 294 pp. $80.00. Judith Kelley Judith Kelley Duke University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quarterly, Volume 120, Issue 2, Sum…
International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions
International relations scholars increasingly debate when and how international institutions influence domestic policy. This examination of ethnic politics in four Baltic and East European countries during the 1990s shows how European institutions shaped domestic policy, and why these institutions sometimes failed. Comparing traditional rational choice mechanisms such as membership conditionality with more socialization-based efforts, I argue tha…
Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure in International Relations
The ability to monitor state behavior has become a critical tool of international governance. Systematic monitoring allows for the creation of numerical indicators that can be used to rank, compare, and essentially censure states. This article argues that the ability to disseminate such numerical indicators widely and instantly constitutes an exercise of social power, with the potential to change important policy outputs. It explores this argumen…
International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions
International relations scholars increasingly debate when and how international institutions influence domestic policy. This examination of ethnic politics in four Baltic and East European countries during the 1990s shows how European institutions shaped domestic policy, and why these institutions sometimes failed. Comparing traditional rational choice mechanisms such as membership conditionality with more socialization-based efforts, I argue tha…
New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy
The EU's newly launched European neighbourhood policy (ENP) is a fascinating case study in organizational management theory of how the Commission strategically adapted enlargement policies to expand its foreign policy domain. From the use of action plans, regular reports and negotiations to the larger conceptualization and use of socialization and conditionality, the development of the policy shows significant mechanical borrowing from the enlarg…
Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring
Given that states have long considered elections a purely domestic matter, the dramatic growth of international election monitoring in the 1990s was remarkable. Why did states allow international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to interfere and why did international election monitoring spread so quickly? Why did election monitoring become institutionalized in so many organizations? Perhaps most puzzling, why do countries in…
D-Minus Elections: The Politics and Norms of International Election Observation
As international election monitors have grown active worldwide, their announcements have gained influence. Sometimes, however, they endorse highly flawed elections. Because their leverage rests largely on their credibility, this is puzzling. Understanding the behavior of election monitors is important because they help the international community to evaluate the legitimacy of governments and because their assessments inform the data used by schol…
Introduction: The Power of Global Performance Indicators
In recent decades, IGOs, NGOs, private firms and even states have begun to regularly package and distribute information on the relative performance of states. From the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index to the Financial Action Task Force blacklist, global performance indicators (GPIs) are increasingly deployed to influence governance globally. We argue that GPIs derive influence from their ability to frame issues, extend the authority of t…
Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives
This detailed account of ethnic minority politics explains when and how European institutions successfully used norms and incentives to shape domestic policy toward ethnic minorities and why those measures sometimes failed. Going beyond traditional analyses, Kelley examines the pivotal engagement by the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Council for Europe in the creation of such policies. Following l…
Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements
What do countries do when they have committed to a treaty, but then find that commitment challenged? After the creation of the International Criminal Court, the United States tried to get countries, regardless of whether they were parties to the Court or not, to sign agreements not to surrender Americans to the Court. Why did some states sign and others not? Given United States power and threats of military sanctions, some states did sign. Howeve…
The Power of Ranking: The Ease of Doing Business Indicator and Global Regulatory Behavior
We argue that the World Bank has successfully marshaled the Ease of Doing Business (EDB) Index to amass considerable influence over business regulations worldwide. The Ease of Doing is a global performance indicator (GPI), and GPIs—especially those that rate and rank states against one another—are intended to package information to influence the views of an audience important to the target, such as foreign investors or voters, thus generating pre…
The More the Merrier? The Effects of Having Multiple International Election Monitoring Organizations
As the pressure to invite international election monitors rose at the end of the Cold War, states refused to grant the United Nations a dominant role. Thus, today multiple intergovernmental, regional, and international non-governmental organizations often monitor the same elections with equal authority. This article examines the costs and benefits of this complex regime to highlight some possible broader implications of regime complexity. It argu…
Election Observers and Their Biases
Why do election monitors sometimes issue contradictory statements or endorse flawed elections? The answers are not always straightforward; in some cases, the monitors’ good intentions may undermine their credibility
An Opportunity Cost Theory of US Treaty Behavior
The United States often leads in the creation of treaties, but it sometimes never joins those treaties or does so only after considerable delay. This presents an interesting puzzle. Most international relations theory expects states to join treaties as long as the benefits outweigh the costs. Domestic theories modify this with the constraints of institutional veto players. Yet, sometimes neither of these arguments explains the delay or absence of…
Do International Election Monitors Increase or Decrease Opposition Boycotts
Election boycotts are over twice as common when international observers are present. Do international observers increase election boycotts as this correlation and past research suggest? This article argues not. Observers tend to go to elections with many problems, and it is primarily these, rather than monitors, that drive boycotts. Furthermore, opposition parties have reasons to hope that observers can improve the quality of the election or that…
International Influences on Elections in New Multiparty States
Practitioners and politicians have long debated the wisdom of pushing countries to hold elections, with some arguing for its necessity and others warning of its futility and even danger. Yet, research on how varying types of international activities affect the conduct and structure of elections still has a long way to go to be able to inform this debate. This article discusses the myriad international forms of engagement with elections and review…
Strategic Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq was not Just about Iraq
Testing for Negative Spillovers: Is Promoting Human Rights Really Part of the “Problem
The international community often seeks to promote political reforms in recalcitrant states. Recently, some scholars have argued that, rather than helping, international law and advocacy create new problems because they have negative spillovers that increase rights violations. We review three mechanisms for such spillovers: backlash, trade-offs, and counteraction and concentrate on the last of these. Some researchers assert that governments somet…
Governance by Other Means: Rankings as Regulatory Systems
This article takes the challenges of global governance and legitimacy seriously and looks at new ways in which international organizations (IOs) have attempted to ‘govern’ without explicit legal or regulatory directives. Specifically, we explore the growth of global performance indicators as a form of social control that appears to have certain advantages even as states and civil society actors push back against international regulatory authority…
Monitoring Democracy: When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails
In recent decades, governments and NGOs--in an effort to promote democracy, freedom, fairness, and stability throughout the world--have organized teams of observers to monitor elections in a variety of countries. But when more organizations join the practice without uniform standards, are assessments reliable? When politicians nonetheless cheat and monitors must return to countries even after two decades of engagement, what is accomplished? Monit…
From the Trenches: A Global Survey of Anti-TIP NGOs and Their Views of U.S. Efforts
Amid the academic and policy critiques of the United States’ 15-year push to eliminate human trafficking, the perspective of the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working with anti-trafficking advocacy and services has been largely ignored. This article presents the results of a global survey of nearly 500 anti-trafficking NGOs in working in 133 countries, and is the first NGO-focused survey of its kind. Based on the results of the survey, we …
Does domestic politics limit the influence of external actors on ethnic politics
Does domestic politics limit the influence of external actors on ethnic politics
International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions
International relations scholars increasingly debate when and how international institutions influence domestic policy. This examination of ethnic politics in four Baltic and East European countries during the 1990s shows how European institutions shaped domestic policy, and why these institutions sometimes failed. Comparing traditional rational choice mechanisms such as membership conditionality with more socialization-based efforts, I argue tha…
Strategic Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq was not Just about Iraq
Procedural Politics: Issues, Influence, and Institutional Choice in the European Union
Journal Article Procedural Politics: Issues, Influence, and Institutional Choice in the European Union Get access Procedural Politics: Issues, Influence, and Institutional Choice in the European Union by Joseph Jupille. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004. 294 pp. $80.00. Judith Kelley Judith Kelley Duke University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quarterly, Volume 120, Issue 2, Sum…
New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy
The EU's newly launched European neighbourhood policy (ENP) is a fascinating case study in organizational management theory of how the Commission strategically adapted enlargement policies to expand its foreign policy domain. From the use of action plans, regular reports and negotiations to the larger conceptualization and use of socialization and conditionality, the development of the policy shows significant mechanical borrowing from the enlarg…
Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements
What do countries do when they have committed to a treaty, but then find that commitment challenged? After the creation of the International Criminal Court, the United States tried to get countries, regardless of whether they were parties to the Court or not, to sign agreements not to surrender Americans to the Court. Why did some states sign and others not? Given United States power and threats of military sanctions, some states did sign. Howeve…
Talk of the Nation: Language and Conflict in Romania and Slovakia by Zsuzsa Csergo
Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International Election Monitoring
Given that states have long considered elections a purely domestic matter, the dramatic growth of international election monitoring in the 1990s was remarkable. Why did states allow international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to interfere and why did international election monitoring spread so quickly? Why did election monitoring become institutionalized in so many organizations? Perhaps most puzzling, why do countries in…
The More the Merrier? The Effects of Having Multiple International Election Monitoring Organizations
As the pressure to invite international election monitors rose at the end of the Cold War, states refused to grant the United Nations a dominant role. Thus, today multiple intergovernmental, regional, and international non-governmental organizations often monitor the same elections with equal authority. This article examines the costs and benefits of this complex regime to highlight some possible broader implications of regime complexity. It argu…
D-Minus Elections: The Politics and Norms of International Election Observation
As international election monitors have grown active worldwide, their announcements have gained influence. Sometimes, however, they endorse highly flawed elections. Because their leverage rests largely on their credibility, this is puzzling. Understanding the behavior of election monitors is important because they help the international community to evaluate the legitimacy of governments and because their assessments inform the data used by schol…
Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives
This detailed account of ethnic minority politics explains when and how European institutions successfully used norms and incentives to shape domestic policy toward ethnic minorities and why those measures sometimes failed. Going beyond traditional analyses, Kelley examines the pivotal engagement by the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Council for Europe in the creation of such policies. Following l…
Lee Feinstein and Tod Lindberg, Means to an End: US Interests in the International Criminal Court
Election Observers and Their Biases
Why do election monitors sometimes issue contradictory statements or endorse flawed elections? The answers are not always straightforward; in some cases, the monitors’ good intentions may undermine their credibility
Do International Election Monitors Increase or Decrease Opposition Boycotts
Election boycotts are over twice as common when international observers are present. Do international observers increase election boycotts as this correlation and past research suggest? This article argues not. Observers tend to go to elections with many problems, and it is primarily these, rather than monitors, that drive boycotts. Furthermore, opposition parties have reasons to hope that observers can improve the quality of the election or that…
Monitoring Democracy: When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails
In recent decades, governments and NGOs—in an effort to promote democracy, freedom, fairness, and stability throughout the world—have organized teams of observers to monitor elections in a variety of countries. But when more organizations join the practice without uniform standards, are assessments reliable? When politicians nonetheless cheat and monitors must return to countries even after two decades of engagement, what is accomplished? This bo…
Monitoring Democracy: When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails
In recent decades, governments and NGOs--in an effort to promote democracy, freedom, fairness, and stability throughout the world--have organized teams of observers to monitor elections in a variety of countries. But when more organizations join the practice without uniform standards, are assessments reliable? When politicians nonetheless cheat and monitors must return to countries even after two decades of engagement, what is accomplished? Monit…
International Influences on Elections in New Multiparty States
Practitioners and politicians have long debated the wisdom of pushing countries to hold elections, with some arguing for its necessity and others warning of its futility and even danger. Yet, research on how varying types of international activities affect the conduct and structure of elections still has a long way to go to be able to inform this debate. This article discusses the myriad international forms of engagement with elections and review…
An Opportunity Cost Theory of US Treaty Behavior
The United States often leads in the creation of treaties, but it sometimes never joins those treaties or does so only after considerable delay. This presents an interesting puzzle. Most international relations theory expects states to join treaties as long as the benefits outweigh the costs. Domestic theories modify this with the constraints of institutional veto players. Yet, sometimes neither of these arguments explains the delay or absence of…
Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure in International Relations
The ability to monitor state behavior has become a critical tool of international governance. Systematic monitoring allows for the creation of numerical indicators that can be used to rank, compare, and essentially censure states. This article argues that the ability to disseminate such numerical indicators widely and instantly constitutes an exercise of social power, with the potential to change important policy outputs. It explores this argumen…
Scorecard Diplomacy: Grading States to Influence their Reputation and Behavior
What can the international community do when countries would rather ignore a thorny problem? Scorecard Diplomacy shows that, despite lacking traditional force, public grades are potent symbols that can evoke countries' concerns about their reputations and motivate them to address the problem. The book develops an unconventional but careful argument about the growing phenomenon of such ratings and rankings. It supports this by examining the United…
From the Trenches: A Global Survey of Anti-TIP NGOs and Their Views of U.S. Efforts
Amid the academic and policy critiques of the United States’ 15-year push to eliminate human trafficking, the perspective of the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working with anti-trafficking advocacy and services has been largely ignored. This article presents the results of a global survey of nearly 500 anti-trafficking NGOs in working in 133 countries, and is the first NGO-focused survey of its kind. Based on the results of the survey, we …
Response to Mark J. C. Crescenzi’s review of Scorecard Diplomacy: Grading States to Influence their Reputation and Behavior
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
The Power of Ranking: The Ease of Doing Business Indicator and Global Regulatory Behavior
We argue that the World Bank has successfully marshaled the Ease of Doing Business (EDB) Index to amass considerable influence over business regulations worldwide. The Ease of Doing is a global performance indicator (GPI), and GPIs—especially those that rate and rank states against one another—are intended to package information to influence the views of an audience important to the target, such as foreign investors or voters, thus generating pre…
Introduction: The Power of Global Performance Indicators
In recent decades, IGOs, NGOs, private firms and even states have begun to regularly package and distribute information on the relative performance of states. From the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index to the Financial Action Task Force blacklist, global performance indicators (GPIs) are increasingly deployed to influence governance globally. We argue that GPIs derive influence from their ability to frame issues, extend the authority of t…
Governance by Other Means: Rankings as Regulatory Systems
This article takes the challenges of global governance and legitimacy seriously and looks at new ways in which international organizations (IOs) have attempted to ‘govern’ without explicit legal or regulatory directives. Specifically, we explore the growth of global performance indicators as a form of social control that appears to have certain advantages even as states and civil society actors push back against international regulatory authority…
Political science (26 works) · Law (23 works) · Politics (21 works) · Law (19 works) · Economics (15 works) · Political economy (14 works) · Sociology (14 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (9 works) · International Development and Aid (8 works) · Public Administration (8 works)