Monica Rendall
Biographic Data
| ID | 150969 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Monica Rendall |
| GIVEN NAMES | Monica |
| FAMILY NAME | Rendall |
| SIGNATURE | RENDALL M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Nottingham |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8610-6361 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 33 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 14 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Macrosecuritisation failure and technological lock-in
How does existentially dangerous technology get adopted and then locked in? The case of the atomic bomb offers a cautionary tale. In the long run, reliance on nuclear weapons is a recipe for catastrophe. Yet their perceived ability to reduce the frequency of war in the short term inhibits efforts to reform the international status quo. Drawing on the pioneering work of David Collingridge and Nathan Sears, this paper argues that nuclear deterrence…
Realism, reckless states, and natural selection
Why is daredevil aggression like Russia's war on Ukraine such an important factor in world politics? Neither offensive nor defensive realists give a fully satisfactory answer. This paper maintains that the problem lies in their shared assumption that states pursue security. Tracing neorealism's roots in evolutionary economics, and hence indirectly in biological theories of natural selection, I argue that many policies are compatible with state su…
Nuclear war as a predictable surprise
Like asteroids, hundred‐year floods and pandemic disease, thermonuclear war is a low‐frequency, high‐impact threat. In the long run, catastrophe is inevitable if nothing is done − yet each successive government and generation may fail to address it. Drawing on risk perception research, this paper argues that psychological biases cause the threat of nuclear war to receive less attention than it deserves. Nuclear deterrence is, moreover, a ‘front‐l…
Miroslav Šedivý, Crisis Among the Great Powers
Reason in a dark time
Climate Change and the Threat of Disaster
Is drastic action against global warming essential to avoid impoverishing our descendants? Or does it mean robbing the poor to give to the rich? We do not yet know. Yet most of us can agree on the importance of minimising expected deprivation. Because of the vast number of future generations, if there is any significant risk of catastrophe, this implies drastic and expensive carbon abatement unless we discount the future. I argue that we should n…
Non-identity, Sufficiency and Exploitation
In this article I advance a solution to the non-identity problem based on distributive justice. Drawing on a seminal article by Gregory Kavka, I argue that in our everyday decisions about creating people, we widely recognize three principles. First, we should not conceive children whose lives are not worth living. Second, we believe that children, whenever possible, should enjoy a certain minimum level of well-being. This is consistent with what …
A Qualified Success for Collective Security
Some scholars claim that collective security always fails. This article analyses a case where it succeeded. When Belgians rebelled against Dutch rule in the early 1830s, all five great powers agreed no fewer than four times to threaten or to use force against one or both sides. Why? Drawing extensively on diplomatic correspondence from Austrian, German and Russian archives, I show that the Concert of Europe functioned as a security regime, helpin…
Nuclear Weapons and Intergenerational Exploitation
Nuclear weapons’ defenders claim that they lower the risk of war, at the price of devastation if war breaks out. But sooner or later, on a realist analysis, catastrophic nuclear war is almost sure to come. Nuclear deterrence thus buys us a better chance of dying in bed, while each post-holocaust generation will have to pick up the pieces. If the nuclear optimists are wrong, hoping to spread or perpetuate nuclear deterrence is foolish. But if they…
Defensive realism and the Concert of Europe
Why do great powers expand? Offensive realist John Mearsheimer claims that states wage an eternal struggle for power, and that those strong enough to seek regional hegemony nearly always do. Mearsheimer’s evidence, however, displays a selection bias. Examining four crises between 1814 and 1840, I show that the balance of power restrained Russia, Prussia and France. Yet all three also exercised self-restraint; Russia, in particular, passed up chan…
The Sparta and the Athens of our Age at Daggers Drawn’
Restraint or Self-Restraint of Russia
observers have often considered Russia to be persistently expansionist, especially during the reign of Nicholas I (r. 1825-55). When Russian warships entered the Bosporus in 1833, to leave five months later with a Russo-Ottoman treaty of alliance, the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, they helped to turn the British foreign secretary, Viscount Palmerston, into a Russophobe.1 This view of Russia's habits, whether attributed to geography, political system…
Russia, the concert of Europe, and Greece, 1821–29
Rural versus urban accent as an influence on the rate of speech
Speakers of rural accents have been said to speak more slowly than speakers of urban accents. However, there would appear to have been no previous empirical investigation of such a claim. In the study reported here, recordings were made of 12 Orkney English speakers and 12 Edinburgh English speakers, during a reading task and in conversation with the experimenter. Measurements, in syllables per second, were made of both the Speaking Rate and the …
Climate Change and the Threat of Disaster
Is drastic action against global warming essential to avoid impoverishing our descendants? Or does it mean robbing the poor to give to the rich? We do not yet know. Yet most of us can agree on the importance of minimising expected deprivation. Because of the vast number of future generations, if there is any significant risk of catastrophe, this implies drastic and expensive carbon abatement unless we discount the future. I argue that we should n…
Non-identity, Sufficiency and Exploitation
In this article I advance a solution to the non-identity problem based on distributive justice. Drawing on a seminal article by Gregory Kavka, I argue that in our everyday decisions about creating people, we widely recognize three principles. First, we should not conceive children whose lives are not worth living. Second, we believe that children, whenever possible, should enjoy a certain minimum level of well-being. This is consistent with what …
Defensive realism and the Concert of Europe
Why do great powers expand? Offensive realist John Mearsheimer claims that states wage an eternal struggle for power, and that those strong enough to seek regional hegemony nearly always do. Mearsheimer’s evidence, however, displays a selection bias. Examining four crises between 1814 and 1840, I show that the balance of power restrained Russia, Prussia and France. Yet all three also exercised self-restraint; Russia, in particular, passed up chan…
Reason in a dark time
Russia, the concert of Europe, and Greece, 1821–29
Nuclear Weapons and Intergenerational Exploitation
Nuclear weapons’ defenders claim that they lower the risk of war, at the price of devastation if war breaks out. But sooner or later, on a realist analysis, catastrophic nuclear war is almost sure to come. Nuclear deterrence thus buys us a better chance of dying in bed, while each post-holocaust generation will have to pick up the pieces. If the nuclear optimists are wrong, hoping to spread or perpetuate nuclear deterrence is foolish. But if they…
A Qualified Success for Collective Security
Some scholars claim that collective security always fails. This article analyses a case where it succeeded. When Belgians rebelled against Dutch rule in the early 1830s, all five great powers agreed no fewer than four times to threaten or to use force against one or both sides. Why? Drawing extensively on diplomatic correspondence from Austrian, German and Russian archives, I show that the Concert of Europe functioned as a security regime, helpin…
Restraint or Self-Restraint of Russia
observers have often considered Russia to be persistently expansionist, especially during the reign of Nicholas I (r. 1825-55). When Russian warships entered the Bosporus in 1833, to leave five months later with a Russo-Ottoman treaty of alliance, the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, they helped to turn the British foreign secretary, Viscount Palmerston, into a Russophobe.1 This view of Russia's habits, whether attributed to geography, political system…
Rural versus urban accent as an influence on the rate of speech
Speakers of rural accents have been said to speak more slowly than speakers of urban accents. However, there would appear to have been no previous empirical investigation of such a claim. In the study reported here, recordings were made of 12 Orkney English speakers and 12 Edinburgh English speakers, during a reading task and in conversation with the experimenter. Measurements, in syllables per second, were made of both the Speaking Rate and the …
The Sparta and the Athens of our Age at Daggers Drawn’
Rural versus urban accent as an influence on the rate of speech
Speakers of rural accents have been said to speak more slowly than speakers of urban accents. However, there would appear to have been no previous empirical investigation of such a claim. In the study reported here, recordings were made of 12 Orkney English speakers and 12 Edinburgh English speakers, during a reading task and in conversation with the experimenter. Measurements, in syllables per second, were made of both the Speaking Rate and the …
Russia, the concert of Europe, and Greece, 1821–29
Restraint or Self-Restraint of Russia
observers have often considered Russia to be persistently expansionist, especially during the reign of Nicholas I (r. 1825-55). When Russian warships entered the Bosporus in 1833, to leave five months later with a Russo-Ottoman treaty of alliance, the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, they helped to turn the British foreign secretary, Viscount Palmerston, into a Russophobe.1 This view of Russia's habits, whether attributed to geography, political system…
The Sparta and the Athens of our Age at Daggers Drawn’
Defensive realism and the Concert of Europe
Why do great powers expand? Offensive realist John Mearsheimer claims that states wage an eternal struggle for power, and that those strong enough to seek regional hegemony nearly always do. Mearsheimer’s evidence, however, displays a selection bias. Examining four crises between 1814 and 1840, I show that the balance of power restrained Russia, Prussia and France. Yet all three also exercised self-restraint; Russia, in particular, passed up chan…
A Qualified Success for Collective Security
Some scholars claim that collective security always fails. This article analyses a case where it succeeded. When Belgians rebelled against Dutch rule in the early 1830s, all five great powers agreed no fewer than four times to threaten or to use force against one or both sides. Why? Drawing extensively on diplomatic correspondence from Austrian, German and Russian archives, I show that the Concert of Europe functioned as a security regime, helpin…
Nuclear Weapons and Intergenerational Exploitation
Nuclear weapons’ defenders claim that they lower the risk of war, at the price of devastation if war breaks out. But sooner or later, on a realist analysis, catastrophic nuclear war is almost sure to come. Nuclear deterrence thus buys us a better chance of dying in bed, while each post-holocaust generation will have to pick up the pieces. If the nuclear optimists are wrong, hoping to spread or perpetuate nuclear deterrence is foolish. But if they…
Non-identity, Sufficiency and Exploitation
In this article I advance a solution to the non-identity problem based on distributive justice. Drawing on a seminal article by Gregory Kavka, I argue that in our everyday decisions about creating people, we widely recognize three principles. First, we should not conceive children whose lives are not worth living. Second, we believe that children, whenever possible, should enjoy a certain minimum level of well-being. This is consistent with what …
Climate Change and the Threat of Disaster
Is drastic action against global warming essential to avoid impoverishing our descendants? Or does it mean robbing the poor to give to the rich? We do not yet know. Yet most of us can agree on the importance of minimising expected deprivation. Because of the vast number of future generations, if there is any significant risk of catastrophe, this implies drastic and expensive carbon abatement unless we discount the future. I argue that we should n…
Reason in a dark time
Miroslav Šedivý, Crisis Among the Great Powers
Nuclear war as a predictable surprise
Like asteroids, hundred‐year floods and pandemic disease, thermonuclear war is a low‐frequency, high‐impact threat. In the long run, catastrophe is inevitable if nothing is done − yet each successive government and generation may fail to address it. Drawing on risk perception research, this paper argues that psychological biases cause the threat of nuclear war to receive less attention than it deserves. Nuclear deterrence is, moreover, a ‘front‐l…
Realism, reckless states, and natural selection
Why is daredevil aggression like Russia's war on Ukraine such an important factor in world politics? Neither offensive nor defensive realists give a fully satisfactory answer. This paper maintains that the problem lies in their shared assumption that states pursue security. Tracing neorealism's roots in evolutionary economics, and hence indirectly in biological theories of natural selection, I argue that many policies are compatible with state su…
Macrosecuritisation failure and technological lock-in
How does existentially dangerous technology get adopted and then locked in? The case of the atomic bomb offers a cautionary tale. In the long run, reliance on nuclear weapons is a recipe for catastrophe. Yet their perceived ability to reduce the frequency of war in the short term inhibits efforts to reform the international status quo. Drawing on the pioneering work of David Collingridge and Nathan Sears, this paper argues that nuclear deterrence…
Political science (13 works) · Law (10 works) · Politics (9 works) · Law (7 works) · Economics (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Political economy (5 works) · History (4 works) · Power (physics (4 works) · Deterrence theory (3 works)