Matthias Haber
Biographic Data
| ID | 1534459 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Matthias Haber |
| GIVEN NAMES | Matthias |
| FAMILY NAME | Haber |
| SIGNATURE | HABER M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Mannheim |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1000-1448 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 165 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Governance Indicators
As difficult as it might seem to define governance, it appears to be that much more difficult to measure it. Since the World Bank Institute launched the Worldwide Governance Indicators in the late 1990s, the governance indicators field has flourished and experienced significant advances in terms of methodology, data coverage and quality, and policy relevance. Other major initiatives have added to a momentum that propelled research on governance i…
A Comparative Classification and Assessment of Governance Indices
For decades, academic scholars and multinational organisations have been assessing how ready governments are to meet the various political and socioeconomic challenges they face. These benchmarks of good governance have led to the creation of well-known composite indices such as the Human Development Index and the Rule of Law Index. Today, there are dozens of different governance indices, but few attempts have been made to properly classify them.…
Innovations in Objectively Measuring Corruption in Public Procurement
While there is continued interest in measuring governance, disagreement on how best to do so has only grown over time. To provide pointers at innovative and rigorous indicator building, this chapter documents innovations in measuring a particularly challenging governance dimension: corruption in public procurement. In hopes of inspiring future research, the chapter critically reviews objective corruption proxies using administrative data on gover…
Maintaining Partisan ties
Parties coordinate on a range of activities. They invite leaders from other parties to their national meetings, run joint electoral platforms and even form parliamentary factions and coalition governments. The implications of regular cooperation such as the case of pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) for party positioning are unexplored. Parties form PECs to reduce competition for voters with ideologically close competitors and to signal their abilit…
Leadership Competition and Disagreement at Party National Congresses
Theories often explain intraparty competition based on electoral conditions and intraparty rules. This article further opens this black box by considering intraparty statements of preferences. In particular, it predicts that intraparty preference heterogeneity increases after electoral losses, but that candidates deviating from the party’s median receive fewer intraparty votes. Party members grant candidates greater leeway to accommodate competin…
The legislative consequences of internal conflict and inter-party divisions
Governments must respond quickly to pressing economic and societal problems. However, institutional rules, public opinion and unanticipated world events often delay the legislative process. Building on theories of legislative decision-making and intra-party politics, this paper shows that the speed at which bills pass is also driven by the governing party’s internal cohesiveness and its ideological distance to the opposition. Governing parties th…
The consequences of appearing divided
The consequences of appearing divided
Leadership Competition and Disagreement at Party National Congresses
Theories often explain intraparty competition based on electoral conditions and intraparty rules. This article further opens this black box by considering intraparty statements of preferences. In particular, it predicts that intraparty preference heterogeneity increases after electoral losses, but that candidates deviating from the party’s median receive fewer intraparty votes. Party members grant candidates greater leeway to accommodate competin…
Maintaining Partisan ties
Parties coordinate on a range of activities. They invite leaders from other parties to their national meetings, run joint electoral platforms and even form parliamentary factions and coalition governments. The implications of regular cooperation such as the case of pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) for party positioning are unexplored. Parties form PECs to reduce competition for voters with ideologically close competitors and to signal their abilit…
The legislative consequences of internal conflict and inter-party divisions
Governments must respond quickly to pressing economic and societal problems. However, institutional rules, public opinion and unanticipated world events often delay the legislative process. Building on theories of legislative decision-making and intra-party politics, this paper shows that the speed at which bills pass is also driven by the governing party’s internal cohesiveness and its ideological distance to the opposition. Governing parties th…
The legislative consequences of internal conflict and inter-party divisions
Governments must respond quickly to pressing economic and societal problems. However, institutional rules, public opinion and unanticipated world events often delay the legislative process. Building on theories of legislative decision-making and intra-party politics, this paper shows that the speed at which bills pass is also driven by the governing party’s internal cohesiveness and its ideological distance to the opposition. Governing parties th…
The consequences of appearing divided
Leadership Competition and Disagreement at Party National Congresses
Theories often explain intraparty competition based on electoral conditions and intraparty rules. This article further opens this black box by considering intraparty statements of preferences. In particular, it predicts that intraparty preference heterogeneity increases after electoral losses, but that candidates deviating from the party’s median receive fewer intraparty votes. Party members grant candidates greater leeway to accommodate competin…
Maintaining Partisan ties
Parties coordinate on a range of activities. They invite leaders from other parties to their national meetings, run joint electoral platforms and even form parliamentary factions and coalition governments. The implications of regular cooperation such as the case of pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) for party positioning are unexplored. Parties form PECs to reduce competition for voters with ideologically close competitors and to signal their abilit…
Governance Indicators
As difficult as it might seem to define governance, it appears to be that much more difficult to measure it. Since the World Bank Institute launched the Worldwide Governance Indicators in the late 1990s, the governance indicators field has flourished and experienced significant advances in terms of methodology, data coverage and quality, and policy relevance. Other major initiatives have added to a momentum that propelled research on governance i…
A Comparative Classification and Assessment of Governance Indices
For decades, academic scholars and multinational organisations have been assessing how ready governments are to meet the various political and socioeconomic challenges they face. These benchmarks of good governance have led to the creation of well-known composite indices such as the Human Development Index and the Rule of Law Index. Today, there are dozens of different governance indices, but few attempts have been made to properly classify them.…
Innovations in Objectively Measuring Corruption in Public Procurement
While there is continued interest in measuring governance, disagreement on how best to do so has only grown over time. To provide pointers at innovative and rigorous indicator building, this chapter documents innovations in measuring a particularly challenging governance dimension: corruption in public procurement. In hopes of inspiring future research, the chapter critically reviews objective corruption proxies using administrative data on gover…
Political science (7 works) · Politics (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Political economy (4 works) · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies (4 works) · Sociology (4 works)