Oliver Huwyler
Biographic Data
| ID | 1534745 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Oliver Huwyler |
| GIVEN NAMES | Oliver |
| FAMILY NAME | Huwyler |
| SIGNATURE | HUWYLER O |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Basel |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5475-3348 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 46 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 12 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Transparency matters
Voters are frustrated by the influence of money in politics. They cannot be certain whether politicians follow the money or the will of the people. Disclosing side income may therefore serve as a means to increase trust in politicians. To investigate whether this mechanism works, we analyze data from a vignette survey experiment on parliamentarians’ side jobs with respondents from seven European countries ( N $ \approx $ 14,100). Our results show…
Constituency references in social media
Social media platforms offer MPs the opportunity to directly signal attention to their local voters in the constituency. And while previous research has linked the strategic use of such local cues in social media posts to electoral motives, we know very little about their effectiveness. In this study, we trace the impact of local cues in social media posts in three steps. First, we revisit the claim that MPs are electorally motivated in their use…
Linking individual electoral performance to the composition of elected bodies
Politicians with day jobs
No Representation Without Compensation
Interest groups seek to influence parliamentarians’ actions by establishing exchange relationships. We scrutinize the role of exchange by investigating how interest groups impact parliamentarians’ use of individual parliamentary instruments such as questions, motions, and bills. We utilize a new longitudinal dataset (2000–2015) with 524 Swiss parliamentarians, their 6342 formal ties to interest groups (i.e., board seats), and a variety of 23,750 …
Interest Groups’ Recruitment of Incumbent Parliamentarians to Their Boards
Interest groups (IGs) recruit incumbent parliamentarians to their boards to influence policy, improve their resources and signal political connectedness. To detect parliamentarians’ characteristics that drive recruitment, this study analyses three decades of annual data (1985–2016) of 903 Swiss parliamentarians and their board seats. It compares 5249 cases of parliamentarians’ successful recruitment by 3291 different organisations to counterfactu…
Parliaments Day‐by‐Day
Reliably answering questions about representation and parliamentary behavior requires data about which parliamentarian was where, and at what time. However, parliament membership is not stable over time. For example, it is common for politicians to change office (we find up to 40% turnover between elections). Consequently, parliament membership, as well as party and party group composition change on a daily basis. To address the challenges that t…
Interest group tactics and legislative behaviour
Interest groups often seek to influence legislators and legislative behaviour. We argue that the likelihood of legislators taking interest group requests and preferences into account is shaped by how - with what tactic - they are conveyed. We expect that more direct, real-time, contact increases legislators' receptiveness to interest group demands. To test this argument, we introduce and take advantage of uniquely nuanced lobbying data that provi…
Interest groups in the European Union and their hiring of political consultancies
Interest groups do not only attempt to influence European legislation by devising and executing their own strategies, or relying on their allies. Almost 50% have also experience in hiring political consultants. Using novel survey data from the policy formulation stage, this study shows that business interest groups are more likely to hire consultancies than non-business interest groups. It suggests that business associations’ higher likelihood of…
Political or Financial Benefits? Ideology, Tenure, and Parliamentarians’ Choice of Interest Group Ties
This article develops and tests a parliamentarian‐centred decision model of the collaboration between interest groups (IGs) and parliamentarians. We posit that parliamentarians face a trade‐off when deciding on IG ties that offer them either political (policy support and votes) or financial benefits (additional income). We theorise the balance in this trade‐off to be moderated by ideology and tenure because both introduce variations in IG ties’ u…
Party politics, institutions, and identity
With deepening European integration, domestic interest groups have increasingly engaged in multi-level venue shopping. Regional authorities are no different and have represented their interests through both intra- and extra-state channels. There is some disagreement, however, over which of these channels are most frequently used. Similarly, there is little consensus on the ways in which partisan, institutional, and identity logics can affect the …
With, without, or against the state
With, without, or against the state?: How European regions play the Brussels game." Regional Studies, 51(9), pp. 1440–1441
Party politics, institutions, and identity
With deepening European integration, domestic interest groups have increasingly engaged in multi-level venue shopping. Regional authorities are no different and have represented their interests through both intra- and extra-state channels. There is some disagreement, however, over which of these channels are most frequently used. Similarly, there is little consensus on the ways in which partisan, institutional, and identity logics can affect the …
No Representation Without Compensation
Interest groups seek to influence parliamentarians’ actions by establishing exchange relationships. We scrutinize the role of exchange by investigating how interest groups impact parliamentarians’ use of individual parliamentary instruments such as questions, motions, and bills. We utilize a new longitudinal dataset (2000–2015) with 524 Swiss parliamentarians, their 6342 formal ties to interest groups (i.e., board seats), and a variety of 23,750 …
Parliaments Day‐by‐Day
Reliably answering questions about representation and parliamentary behavior requires data about which parliamentarian was where, and at what time. However, parliament membership is not stable over time. For example, it is common for politicians to change office (we find up to 40% turnover between elections). Consequently, parliament membership, as well as party and party group composition change on a daily basis. To address the challenges that t…
Interest group tactics and legislative behaviour
Interest groups often seek to influence legislators and legislative behaviour. We argue that the likelihood of legislators taking interest group requests and preferences into account is shaped by how - with what tactic - they are conveyed. We expect that more direct, real-time, contact increases legislators' receptiveness to interest group demands. To test this argument, we introduce and take advantage of uniquely nuanced lobbying data that provi…
Political or Financial Benefits? Ideology, Tenure, and Parliamentarians’ Choice of Interest Group Ties
This article develops and tests a parliamentarian‐centred decision model of the collaboration between interest groups (IGs) and parliamentarians. We posit that parliamentarians face a trade‐off when deciding on IG ties that offer them either political (policy support and votes) or financial benefits (additional income). We theorise the balance in this trade‐off to be moderated by ideology and tenure because both introduce variations in IG ties’ u…
Interest Groups’ Recruitment of Incumbent Parliamentarians to Their Boards
Interest groups (IGs) recruit incumbent parliamentarians to their boards to influence policy, improve their resources and signal political connectedness. To detect parliamentarians’ characteristics that drive recruitment, this study analyses three decades of annual data (1985–2016) of 903 Swiss parliamentarians and their board seats. It compares 5249 cases of parliamentarians’ successful recruitment by 3291 different organisations to counterfactu…
Interest groups in the European Union and their hiring of political consultancies
Interest groups do not only attempt to influence European legislation by devising and executing their own strategies, or relying on their allies. Almost 50% have also experience in hiring political consultants. Using novel survey data from the policy formulation stage, this study shows that business interest groups are more likely to hire consultancies than non-business interest groups. It suggests that business associations’ higher likelihood of…
Constituency references in social media
Social media platforms offer MPs the opportunity to directly signal attention to their local voters in the constituency. And while previous research has linked the strategic use of such local cues in social media posts to electoral motives, we know very little about their effectiveness. In this study, we trace the impact of local cues in social media posts in three steps. First, we revisit the claim that MPs are electorally motivated in their use…
Politicians with day jobs
With, without, or against the state
With, without, or against the state?: How European regions play the Brussels game." Regional Studies, 51(9), pp. 1440–1441
With, without, or against the state
With, without, or against the state?: How European regions play the Brussels game." Regional Studies, 51(9), pp. 1440–1441
Party politics, institutions, and identity
With deepening European integration, domestic interest groups have increasingly engaged in multi-level venue shopping. Regional authorities are no different and have represented their interests through both intra- and extra-state channels. There is some disagreement, however, over which of these channels are most frequently used. Similarly, there is little consensus on the ways in which partisan, institutional, and identity logics can affect the …
Interest groups in the European Union and their hiring of political consultancies
Interest groups do not only attempt to influence European legislation by devising and executing their own strategies, or relying on their allies. Almost 50% have also experience in hiring political consultants. Using novel survey data from the policy formulation stage, this study shows that business interest groups are more likely to hire consultancies than non-business interest groups. It suggests that business associations’ higher likelihood of…
Political or Financial Benefits? Ideology, Tenure, and Parliamentarians’ Choice of Interest Group Ties
This article develops and tests a parliamentarian‐centred decision model of the collaboration between interest groups (IGs) and parliamentarians. We posit that parliamentarians face a trade‐off when deciding on IG ties that offer them either political (policy support and votes) or financial benefits (additional income). We theorise the balance in this trade‐off to be moderated by ideology and tenure because both introduce variations in IG ties’ u…
Interest Groups’ Recruitment of Incumbent Parliamentarians to Their Boards
Interest groups (IGs) recruit incumbent parliamentarians to their boards to influence policy, improve their resources and signal political connectedness. To detect parliamentarians’ characteristics that drive recruitment, this study analyses three decades of annual data (1985–2016) of 903 Swiss parliamentarians and their board seats. It compares 5249 cases of parliamentarians’ successful recruitment by 3291 different organisations to counterfactu…
Parliaments Day‐by‐Day
Reliably answering questions about representation and parliamentary behavior requires data about which parliamentarian was where, and at what time. However, parliament membership is not stable over time. For example, it is common for politicians to change office (we find up to 40% turnover between elections). Consequently, parliament membership, as well as party and party group composition change on a daily basis. To address the challenges that t…
Interest group tactics and legislative behaviour
Interest groups often seek to influence legislators and legislative behaviour. We argue that the likelihood of legislators taking interest group requests and preferences into account is shaped by how - with what tactic - they are conveyed. We expect that more direct, real-time, contact increases legislators' receptiveness to interest group demands. To test this argument, we introduce and take advantage of uniquely nuanced lobbying data that provi…
No Representation Without Compensation
Interest groups seek to influence parliamentarians’ actions by establishing exchange relationships. We scrutinize the role of exchange by investigating how interest groups impact parliamentarians’ use of individual parliamentary instruments such as questions, motions, and bills. We utilize a new longitudinal dataset (2000–2015) with 524 Swiss parliamentarians, their 6342 formal ties to interest groups (i.e., board seats), and a variety of 23,750 …
Transparency matters
Voters are frustrated by the influence of money in politics. They cannot be certain whether politicians follow the money or the will of the people. Disclosing side income may therefore serve as a means to increase trust in politicians. To investigate whether this mechanism works, we analyze data from a vignette survey experiment on parliamentarians’ side jobs with respondents from seven European countries ( N $ \approx $ 14,100). Our results show…
Constituency references in social media
Social media platforms offer MPs the opportunity to directly signal attention to their local voters in the constituency. And while previous research has linked the strategic use of such local cues in social media posts to electoral motives, we know very little about their effectiveness. In this study, we trace the impact of local cues in social media posts in three steps. First, we revisit the claim that MPs are electorally motivated in their use…
Linking individual electoral performance to the composition of elected bodies
Politicians with day jobs
Political science (11 works) · Law (9 works) · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies (9 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (8 works) · Law (8 works) · Politics (8 works) · Economics (7 works) · Sociology (7 works) · Public Administration (5 works) · Public relations (5 works)