Bharatee Bhusana Dash
Biographic Data
| ID | 1534849 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Bharatee Bhusana Dash |
| GIVEN NAMES | Bharatee Bhusana |
| FAMILY NAME | Dash |
| SIGNATURE | DASH B B |
| AFFILIATIONS | SRM University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6838-5013 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 21 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Political competition, party structure and economic growth: Theory and evidence from Indian states
On the measurement of electoral volatility
Inequality, transaction costs and voter turnout: Evidence from Canadian provinces and Indian states
On the Structure of the Political Party System in Indian States, 1957 - 2018
What accounts for the large and ever-changing number of political parties that contest Indian state elections? In this paper we test an equilibrium model of political parties where the number of parties depend on the average size of state constituencies, the heterogeneity of the state’s electorate, state per capita income as well as constitutional and legislative rules that directly affect party numbers. Extending the analysis to consider the eff…
Economic performance and electoral volatility: Testing the economic voting hypothesis on Indian states, 1957–2013
The consequences of variations in economic growth for vote volatility are analyzed on a panel of 14 Indian states between 1957 and 2013. Two measures of volatility are used: changes in party vote shares at the assembly level and changes in the state average of vote volatilities constructed at the constituency level. While the results find that both vary inversely with income growth rates, volatility at the constituency level is found to be more s…
The measurement of electoral competition, with application to Indian states
Political Competition and Human Development: Evidence from the Indian States
Recently, it has been argued that political competition may have similar effects on economic performance as it does on market competition. This study empirically examines this proposition by linking political competition with the Human Development Index (HDI) of the Indian states. The findings suggest that politically-competitive governments perform well along the HDI. A more detailed analysis also shows that rural India benefits most from the in…
Economic performance and electoral volatility: Testing the economic voting hypothesis on Indian states, 1957–2013
The consequences of variations in economic growth for vote volatility are analyzed on a panel of 14 Indian states between 1957 and 2013. Two measures of volatility are used: changes in party vote shares at the assembly level and changes in the state average of vote volatilities constructed at the constituency level. While the results find that both vary inversely with income growth rates, volatility at the constituency level is found to be more s…
The measurement of electoral competition, with application to Indian states
Inequality, transaction costs and voter turnout: Evidence from Canadian provinces and Indian states
On the Structure of the Political Party System in Indian States, 1957 - 2018
What accounts for the large and ever-changing number of political parties that contest Indian state elections? In this paper we test an equilibrium model of political parties where the number of parties depend on the average size of state constituencies, the heterogeneity of the state’s electorate, state per capita income as well as constitutional and legislative rules that directly affect party numbers. Extending the analysis to consider the eff…
Political Competition and Human Development: Evidence from the Indian States
Recently, it has been argued that political competition may have similar effects on economic performance as it does on market competition. This study empirically examines this proposition by linking political competition with the Human Development Index (HDI) of the Indian states. The findings suggest that politically-competitive governments perform well along the HDI. A more detailed analysis also shows that rural India benefits most from the in…
The measurement of electoral competition, with application to Indian states
On the Structure of the Political Party System in Indian States, 1957 - 2018
What accounts for the large and ever-changing number of political parties that contest Indian state elections? In this paper we test an equilibrium model of political parties where the number of parties depend on the average size of state constituencies, the heterogeneity of the state’s electorate, state per capita income as well as constitutional and legislative rules that directly affect party numbers. Extending the analysis to consider the eff…
Economic performance and electoral volatility: Testing the economic voting hypothesis on Indian states, 1957–2013
The consequences of variations in economic growth for vote volatility are analyzed on a panel of 14 Indian states between 1957 and 2013. Two measures of volatility are used: changes in party vote shares at the assembly level and changes in the state average of vote volatilities constructed at the constituency level. While the results find that both vary inversely with income growth rates, volatility at the constituency level is found to be more s…
On the measurement of electoral volatility
Inequality, transaction costs and voter turnout: Evidence from Canadian provinces and Indian states
Political competition, party structure and economic growth: Theory and evidence from Indian states
Economics (6 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (5 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Politics (5 works) · Econometrics (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political economy (3 works) · Voting (3 works)