Masaaki Higashijima
Biographic Data
| ID | 1535287 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Masaaki Higashijima |
| GIVEN NAMES | Masaaki |
| FAMILY NAME | Higashijima |
| SIGNATURE | HIGASHIJIMA M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Tohoku University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8002-7128 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 24 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 124 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 24 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
Do Muslim Citizens Welcome Fundamentalist Muslim Immigrants? Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in Kazakhstan
How do Muslim citizens respond to immigrants who hold fundamentalist interpretations of Islam? Although the social science literature has examined public perceptions of Muslim fundamentalists, it has primarily focused on Western liberal democracies. Consequently, we know relatively little about how Muslim citizens in Muslim-majority societies evaluate immigrants with extreme religious beliefs. To address this gap, this paper provides empirical ev…
Election management institutions as catalysts for autocratic transformation
Political and economic protests in authoritarian regimes
Why do some protests succeed at obtaining accommodation but other protests are repressed? The content of demands varies widely across protest events although prior research has not accounted for how the demands of protest movements influence outcomes. We construct a theoretical model to study how different types of protest demands impact whether a dictator accommodates or represses. The model explains that income levels of protesters influence th…
Tutelary Power and Autocratic Legitimacy
Partisan Reactions to Endogenous Election Timing
Unpacking political parties in autocracies
Democracy and State Development
How do core principles of modern democracy impact the development of state spending? Drawing on Dahl’s (1971) conceptualization of polyarchy, we explain that public budgets in modern states evolved according to how electoral competition and suffrage incorporated key actors within societies. Before contestation and suffrage, land-owning elites led states that focused spending on repressive capacity to maintain regime security. Contestation without…
Democratic Reforms in Dictatorships
Divisions among regime elites in autocracies are often an important step toward political liberalization. However, we know little about when such divisions contribute to initiating democratic reforms. We argue that whether elite divisions lead to liberalization depends on the historical origins of ruling parties. Using panel matching analyses, we show that the positive effects of elite divisions on political liberalization are significantly reduc…
Election Timing across Autocracy and Democracy (Etad)
The Dynamics of Electoral Manipulation and Institutional Trust in Democracies
This paper explores the dynamic relationship between electoral manipulation and popular trust in political institutions. Governments often manipulate election results by resorting to electoral fraud. They also tilt the electoral field by opportunistically deciding when to hold elections, in other words, election timing maneuvering. How do these two different types of electoral manipulation affect citizens’ trust in the government, legislature, an…
Political Regimes and Refugee Entries
s What drives refugee movements? Focusing on host countries' domestic political institutions, we argue that refugee entry is determined by the political regimes that shape the incentives of both host governments and displaced persons. Specifically, we theorize that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between political regimes and the volume of refugee entries. When the host country is autocratic, refugee volume becomes smaller due to displ…
Varieties of clientelism across political parties
Recent research on clientelism has focused on the varieties of clientelism. They suggest that clientelistic exchanges differ in terms of the expected length of iterations, whereby politicians deliver benefits to voters in exchange for political support. Using newly collected V-Party data (1,844 political parties from 165 countries, 1970–2019), we identify two prominent types of clientelism that recent studies have suggested: relational clientelis…
When Does the Honeymoon End? Electoral Cycles of Satisfaction With Democracy in Africa
Scholars have argued that multiparty elections have a profound and immediate influence on mass evaluations of political support. However, what is less clear is whether the effects of elections are short lived or long lasting. Investigating dynamic effects of elections on mass perceptions of political regimes has profound implications on popular foundations of democratic consolidation in an era of democratic backsliding. This article examines elec…
The Choice of Electoral Systems in Electoral Autocracies
This article develops a theory to account for the variation in electoral systems in electoral authoritarian regimes. We argue that resource-rich dictators are incentivized to employ proportional representation systems to alleviate the threat from the masses and pre-empt the emergence of new opposition, while resource-poor dictators tend to choose majoritarian systems to co-opt ruling elites in the legislature. Using cross-national data on elector…
The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box
Contrary to our stereotypical views, dictators often introduce elections in which they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud. Why do electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box argues that strong autocrats who can garner popular support become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, electio…
The Perils of Parliamentarism
Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box
Political liberalization and human development
It has been long debated among comparativists whether democratic states advance human development. By regressing infant mortality rates on a cumulative score of democracy, recent studies have suggested that a long tradition of democracy is of greater importance than the present degree of democracy to explain human development. This approach, however, faces several issues and also fails to pinpoint the effect of a democratic reform at a certain po…
Blatant electoral fraud and the value of a vote
This paper explores the relationship between malapportionment and blatant electoral fraud. Although blatant electoral fraud enables incumbents to win elections, it may undermine legitimacy and provoke protests. Malapportionment also helps the incumbent succeed by assigning larger portions of seats to party strongholds, yet its key features differ from electoral fraud. Because malapportionment neither involves coercion nor overt fraud, it is less …
Economic Institutions and Autocratic Breakdown
In dominant-party regimes, party cadres' participation in decision making constrains dictators from arbitrarily changing policy. Dominant-party regimes are also better at mobilizing supporters in exchange for extensive patronage. The conventional wisdom is that these two mechanisms work together to prolong dominant-party regimes. However, under certain conditions, the elite-level constraints restrict autocratic leaders' ability to engage in patro…
Ethnic Inequality and the Strength of Ethnic Identities in Sub-Saharan Africa
Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy
Independent central banks prefer balanced budgets due to the long-run connection between deficits and inflation, and can enforce their preference through interest rate increases and denial of credit to the government. This article argues that legal central bank independence (CBI) deters fiscal deficits predominantly in countries with rule of law and impartial contract enforcement, a free press and constraints on executive power. It further sugges…
Elections, Ethnic Parties, and Ethnic Identification in New Democracies
Oil and Civil Conflict
Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy
Independent central banks prefer balanced budgets due to the long-run connection between deficits and inflation, and can enforce their preference through interest rate increases and denial of credit to the government. This article argues that legal central bank independence (CBI) deters fiscal deficits predominantly in countries with rule of law and impartial contract enforcement, a free press and constraints on executive power. It further sugges…
Economic Institutions and Autocratic Breakdown
In dominant-party regimes, party cadres' participation in decision making constrains dictators from arbitrarily changing policy. Dominant-party regimes are also better at mobilizing supporters in exchange for extensive patronage. The conventional wisdom is that these two mechanisms work together to prolong dominant-party regimes. However, under certain conditions, the elite-level constraints restrict autocratic leaders' ability to engage in patro…
Ethnic Inequality and the Strength of Ethnic Identities in Sub-Saharan Africa
Oil and Civil Conflict
The Choice of Electoral Systems in Electoral Autocracies
This article develops a theory to account for the variation in electoral systems in electoral authoritarian regimes. We argue that resource-rich dictators are incentivized to employ proportional representation systems to alleviate the threat from the masses and pre-empt the emergence of new opposition, while resource-poor dictators tend to choose majoritarian systems to co-opt ruling elites in the legislature. Using cross-national data on elector…
Varieties of clientelism across political parties
Recent research on clientelism has focused on the varieties of clientelism. They suggest that clientelistic exchanges differ in terms of the expected length of iterations, whereby politicians deliver benefits to voters in exchange for political support. Using newly collected V-Party data (1,844 political parties from 165 countries, 1970–2019), we identify two prominent types of clientelism that recent studies have suggested: relational clientelis…
Elections, Ethnic Parties, and Ethnic Identification in New Democracies
When Does the Honeymoon End? Electoral Cycles of Satisfaction With Democracy in Africa
Scholars have argued that multiparty elections have a profound and immediate influence on mass evaluations of political support. However, what is less clear is whether the effects of elections are short lived or long lasting. Investigating dynamic effects of elections on mass perceptions of political regimes has profound implications on popular foundations of democratic consolidation in an era of democratic backsliding. This article examines elec…
Democracy and State Development
How do core principles of modern democracy impact the development of state spending? Drawing on Dahl’s (1971) conceptualization of polyarchy, we explain that public budgets in modern states evolved according to how electoral competition and suffrage incorporated key actors within societies. Before contestation and suffrage, land-owning elites led states that focused spending on repressive capacity to maintain regime security. Contestation without…
The Dynamics of Electoral Manipulation and Institutional Trust in Democracies
This paper explores the dynamic relationship between electoral manipulation and popular trust in political institutions. Governments often manipulate election results by resorting to electoral fraud. They also tilt the electoral field by opportunistically deciding when to hold elections, in other words, election timing maneuvering. How do these two different types of electoral manipulation affect citizens’ trust in the government, legislature, an…
Political liberalization and human development
It has been long debated among comparativists whether democratic states advance human development. By regressing infant mortality rates on a cumulative score of democracy, recent studies have suggested that a long tradition of democracy is of greater importance than the present degree of democracy to explain human development. This approach, however, faces several issues and also fails to pinpoint the effect of a democratic reform at a certain po…
Democratic Reforms in Dictatorships
Divisions among regime elites in autocracies are often an important step toward political liberalization. However, we know little about when such divisions contribute to initiating democratic reforms. We argue that whether elite divisions lead to liberalization depends on the historical origins of ruling parties. Using panel matching analyses, we show that the positive effects of elite divisions on political liberalization are significantly reduc…
Political Regimes and Refugee Entries
s What drives refugee movements? Focusing on host countries' domestic political institutions, we argue that refugee entry is determined by the political regimes that shape the incentives of both host governments and displaced persons. Specifically, we theorize that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between political regimes and the volume of refugee entries. When the host country is autocratic, refugee volume becomes smaller due to displ…
Unpacking political parties in autocracies
Election Timing across Autocracy and Democracy (Etad)
Blatant electoral fraud and the value of a vote
This paper explores the relationship between malapportionment and blatant electoral fraud. Although blatant electoral fraud enables incumbents to win elections, it may undermine legitimacy and provoke protests. Malapportionment also helps the incumbent succeed by assigning larger portions of seats to party strongholds, yet its key features differ from electoral fraud. Because malapportionment neither involves coercion nor overt fraud, it is less …
Oil and Civil Conflict
Elections, Ethnic Parties, and Ethnic Identification in New Democracies
Central Bank Independence and Fiscal Policy
Independent central banks prefer balanced budgets due to the long-run connection between deficits and inflation, and can enforce their preference through interest rate increases and denial of credit to the government. This article argues that legal central bank independence (CBI) deters fiscal deficits predominantly in countries with rule of law and impartial contract enforcement, a free press and constraints on executive power. It further sugges…
Ethnic Inequality and the Strength of Ethnic Identities in Sub-Saharan Africa
Economic Institutions and Autocratic Breakdown
In dominant-party regimes, party cadres' participation in decision making constrains dictators from arbitrarily changing policy. Dominant-party regimes are also better at mobilizing supporters in exchange for extensive patronage. The conventional wisdom is that these two mechanisms work together to prolong dominant-party regimes. However, under certain conditions, the elite-level constraints restrict autocratic leaders' ability to engage in patro…
Political liberalization and human development
It has been long debated among comparativists whether democratic states advance human development. By regressing infant mortality rates on a cumulative score of democracy, recent studies have suggested that a long tradition of democracy is of greater importance than the present degree of democracy to explain human development. This approach, however, faces several issues and also fails to pinpoint the effect of a democratic reform at a certain po…
Blatant electoral fraud and the value of a vote
This paper explores the relationship between malapportionment and blatant electoral fraud. Although blatant electoral fraud enables incumbents to win elections, it may undermine legitimacy and provoke protests. Malapportionment also helps the incumbent succeed by assigning larger portions of seats to party strongholds, yet its key features differ from electoral fraud. Because malapportionment neither involves coercion nor overt fraud, it is less …
The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box
Contrary to our stereotypical views, dictators often introduce elections in which they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud. Why do electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator’s Dilemma at the Ballot Box argues that strong autocrats who can garner popular support become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, electio…
The Perils of Parliamentarism
Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box
When Does the Honeymoon End? Electoral Cycles of Satisfaction With Democracy in Africa
Scholars have argued that multiparty elections have a profound and immediate influence on mass evaluations of political support. However, what is less clear is whether the effects of elections are short lived or long lasting. Investigating dynamic effects of elections on mass perceptions of political regimes has profound implications on popular foundations of democratic consolidation in an era of democratic backsliding. This article examines elec…
The Choice of Electoral Systems in Electoral Autocracies
This article develops a theory to account for the variation in electoral systems in electoral authoritarian regimes. We argue that resource-rich dictators are incentivized to employ proportional representation systems to alleviate the threat from the masses and pre-empt the emergence of new opposition, while resource-poor dictators tend to choose majoritarian systems to co-opt ruling elites in the legislature. Using cross-national data on elector…
The Dynamics of Electoral Manipulation and Institutional Trust in Democracies
This paper explores the dynamic relationship between electoral manipulation and popular trust in political institutions. Governments often manipulate election results by resorting to electoral fraud. They also tilt the electoral field by opportunistically deciding when to hold elections, in other words, election timing maneuvering. How do these two different types of electoral manipulation affect citizens’ trust in the government, legislature, an…
Political Regimes and Refugee Entries
s What drives refugee movements? Focusing on host countries' domestic political institutions, we argue that refugee entry is determined by the political regimes that shape the incentives of both host governments and displaced persons. Specifically, we theorize that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between political regimes and the volume of refugee entries. When the host country is autocratic, refugee volume becomes smaller due to displ…
Varieties of clientelism across political parties
Recent research on clientelism has focused on the varieties of clientelism. They suggest that clientelistic exchanges differ in terms of the expected length of iterations, whereby politicians deliver benefits to voters in exchange for political support. Using newly collected V-Party data (1,844 political parties from 165 countries, 1970–2019), we identify two prominent types of clientelism that recent studies have suggested: relational clientelis…
Tutelary Power and Autocratic Legitimacy
Partisan Reactions to Endogenous Election Timing
Unpacking political parties in autocracies
Democracy and State Development
How do core principles of modern democracy impact the development of state spending? Drawing on Dahl’s (1971) conceptualization of polyarchy, we explain that public budgets in modern states evolved according to how electoral competition and suffrage incorporated key actors within societies. Before contestation and suffrage, land-owning elites led states that focused spending on repressive capacity to maintain regime security. Contestation without…
Democratic Reforms in Dictatorships
Divisions among regime elites in autocracies are often an important step toward political liberalization. However, we know little about when such divisions contribute to initiating democratic reforms. We argue that whether elite divisions lead to liberalization depends on the historical origins of ruling parties. Using panel matching analyses, we show that the positive effects of elite divisions on political liberalization are significantly reduc…
Election Timing across Autocracy and Democracy (Etad)
Do Muslim Citizens Welcome Fundamentalist Muslim Immigrants? Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in Kazakhstan
How do Muslim citizens respond to immigrants who hold fundamentalist interpretations of Islam? Although the social science literature has examined public perceptions of Muslim fundamentalists, it has primarily focused on Western liberal democracies. Consequently, we know relatively little about how Muslim citizens in Muslim-majority societies evaluate immigrants with extreme religious beliefs. To address this gap, this paper provides empirical ev…
Election management institutions as catalysts for autocratic transformation
Political and economic protests in authoritarian regimes
Why do some protests succeed at obtaining accommodation but other protests are repressed? The content of demands varies widely across protest events although prior research has not accounted for how the demands of protest movements influence outcomes. We construct a theoretical model to study how different types of protest demands impact whether a dictator accommodates or represses. The model explains that income levels of protesters influence th…
Political science (20 works) · Politics (20 works) · Economics (17 works) · Political economy (17 works) · Democracy (16 works) · Law (16 works) · Law (16 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (12 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (11 works) · Autocracy (8 works)