Vivekananda Mukherjee
Biographic Data
| ID | 1577774 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Vivekananda Mukherjee |
| GIVEN NAMES | Vivekananda |
| FAMILY NAME | Mukherjee |
| SIGNATURE | MUKHERJEE V |
| AFFILIATIONS | Jadavpur University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8696-8669 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 11 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Corruption, bribery, and market reform
Welfare Benefits and Personal Connections in a Democracy
We study the association between social connections of Muslim households and their access to welfare benefits distributed by local governments in rural West Bengal. Using household data from selected villages in West Bengal, we find that Muslim households with higher outdegree centrality are associated with 2 percentage points probability of receiving a higher fraction of benefits from the local government than Hindu households with similar netwo…
Does private tuition crowd out private schooling? Evidence from India
Allocation of Adaptation Aid
The paper derives an efficient allocation rule of adaptation aid from a donor to the recipient nations, which is different from the traditional development aid literature. The design of the allocation rule takes care of the optimum reaction of the nations on receipt of the aid. It suggests that the allocation rule must take care of (i) distributional weight of the recipients on the donor’s welfare, (ii) their vulnerability to climate change, (iii…
Three decades of Indian power-sector reform
Corruption, Pricing of Public Services, and Entrepreneurship in Economies with Leakage
The paper presents a theoretical model of an economy with bureaucratic corruption where bribe income can leak out of the economy. In a high-leakage economy, a welfare-maximizing government sets the price of public services above the unit cost of provision, which deters entrepreneurship, whereas in more prosperous economies the price falls to the unit cost level. In both cases, the government allows some degree of corruption. The model generates i…
Allocation of village public goods at community level
Seeking Rent in the Informal Sector
Rent seeking within the vast informal segment of the developing world is a relatively under‐explored topic in the interface of labor market policies and public economics. Moreover, how rent seeking and corruption within the informal segment gets affected by economic reforms targeted for the formal sector is rarely discussed in the literature. This paper fills the gap. We identify conditions under which economic reform in the formal segment will i…
Toxicity and profitability of rice cultivation under wastewater irrigation
A Note on Welfare Effect and Desirability of Inequality Inducing Transfers ♣
Using a general description of the preference patterns of individuals the theoretical framework developed in the paper characterizes the welfare effect of inequality-inducing transfers and the attitude of the poor to such transfers in the case of private provision of public good. Depending on the preference of the individuals, it may be true or not that if the poor do not contribute towards the public good class antagonism does not hold. Our resu…
Private Contribution for Public Projects
This paper addresses the allocation problem faced by an individual while deciding his contribution to the government and to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). A typical individual tries to evade taxes but also cares about the way the government spends its revenue. The paper characterizes the equilibrium allocation rule and the amount of evasion. It also derives some comparative-static results with respect to changes in the income of the indivi…
Private Contribution for Public Projects
This paper addresses the allocation problem faced by an individual while deciding his contribution to the government and to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). A typical individual tries to evade taxes but also cares about the way the government spends its revenue. The paper characterizes the equilibrium allocation rule and the amount of evasion. It also derives some comparative-static results with respect to changes in the income of the indivi…
A Note on Welfare Effect and Desirability of Inequality Inducing Transfers ♣
Using a general description of the preference patterns of individuals the theoretical framework developed in the paper characterizes the welfare effect of inequality-inducing transfers and the attitude of the poor to such transfers in the case of private provision of public good. Depending on the preference of the individuals, it may be true or not that if the poor do not contribute towards the public good class antagonism does not hold. Our resu…
Toxicity and profitability of rice cultivation under wastewater irrigation
Seeking Rent in the Informal Sector
Rent seeking within the vast informal segment of the developing world is a relatively under‐explored topic in the interface of labor market policies and public economics. Moreover, how rent seeking and corruption within the informal segment gets affected by economic reforms targeted for the formal sector is rarely discussed in the literature. This paper fills the gap. We identify conditions under which economic reform in the formal segment will i…
Corruption, Pricing of Public Services, and Entrepreneurship in Economies with Leakage
The paper presents a theoretical model of an economy with bureaucratic corruption where bribe income can leak out of the economy. In a high-leakage economy, a welfare-maximizing government sets the price of public services above the unit cost of provision, which deters entrepreneurship, whereas in more prosperous economies the price falls to the unit cost level. In both cases, the government allows some degree of corruption. The model generates i…
Allocation of village public goods at community level
Three decades of Indian power-sector reform
Allocation of Adaptation Aid
The paper derives an efficient allocation rule of adaptation aid from a donor to the recipient nations, which is different from the traditional development aid literature. The design of the allocation rule takes care of the optimum reaction of the nations on receipt of the aid. It suggests that the allocation rule must take care of (i) distributional weight of the recipients on the donor’s welfare, (ii) their vulnerability to climate change, (iii…
Welfare Benefits and Personal Connections in a Democracy
We study the association between social connections of Muslim households and their access to welfare benefits distributed by local governments in rural West Bengal. Using household data from selected villages in West Bengal, we find that Muslim households with higher outdegree centrality are associated with 2 percentage points probability of receiving a higher fraction of benefits from the local government than Hindu households with similar netwo…
Does private tuition crowd out private schooling? Evidence from India
Corruption, bribery, and market reform
Economics (10 works) · Public economics (7 works) · Business (6 works) · Economic growth (5 works) · Market economy (5 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Welfare (5 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (4 works) · Politics (4 works)