Till Requate
Biographic Data
| ID | 1579355 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Till Requate |
| GIVEN NAMES | Till |
| FAMILY NAME | Requate |
| SIGNATURE | REQUATE T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2874-4437 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 11 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The efficacy of (self-)verification instruments in risky investments
Liability and the incentive to improve information about risk when injurers may be judgment-proof
We analyze an injurer’s incentives to improve her information about accident risk. In contrast to the preceding literature, injurers can continuously improve their understanding of the expected harm their activity will impose on others. Regarding social incentives, the marginal benefit from improved risk information is increasing, possibly making either no or a perfect understanding of risk socially optimal. Turning to private incentives when the…
The regulation of non-point source pollution and risk preferences
Alternative use systems for the remaining Ethiopian cloud forest and the role of Arabica coffee — A cost-benefit analysis
Fishing industry borrows from natural capital at high shadow interest rates
Climate Policy between Activism and Rationalism
This article discusses German and European climate policy, inquiring mainly whether the ambitious goals the EU has set itself can be achieved via the instruments presently employed for the purpose and whether these instruments are efficient. In particular we discuss shortcomings of the European emission trading system, we further level criticism at energy policy measures, notably subsidization for renewable energy sources and the overlap with emi…
The dynamics of optimal abatement strategies for multiple pollutants—An illustration in the Greenhouse
Dynamic incentives by environmental policy instruments—a survey
On the Incentives Created by Policy Instruments to Adopt Advanced Abatement Technology if Firms are Asymmetric
The paper investigates the incentives created by environmental policy instruments to adopt cleaner technology. In a framework with many asymmetric firms we show that, if the regulator has committed to a certain aggregate emission level before the new technology was available, taxes lead to overinvestment, while both auctioned and free permits lead to underinvestment. If, however, the regulator knows the new technology, he is able to induce the so…
How to win the political contest
Population size and environmental quality
Population size and environmental quality
On the Incentives Created by Policy Instruments to Adopt Advanced Abatement Technology if Firms are Asymmetric
The paper investigates the incentives created by environmental policy instruments to adopt cleaner technology. In a framework with many asymmetric firms we show that, if the regulator has committed to a certain aggregate emission level before the new technology was available, taxes lead to overinvestment, while both auctioned and free permits lead to underinvestment. If, however, the regulator knows the new technology, he is able to induce the so…
How to win the political contest
Dynamic incentives by environmental policy instruments—a survey
The dynamics of optimal abatement strategies for multiple pollutants—An illustration in the Greenhouse
Climate Policy between Activism and Rationalism
This article discusses German and European climate policy, inquiring mainly whether the ambitious goals the EU has set itself can be achieved via the instruments presently employed for the purpose and whether these instruments are efficient. In particular we discuss shortcomings of the European emission trading system, we further level criticism at energy policy measures, notably subsidization for renewable energy sources and the overlap with emi…
The regulation of non-point source pollution and risk preferences
Alternative use systems for the remaining Ethiopian cloud forest and the role of Arabica coffee — A cost-benefit analysis
Fishing industry borrows from natural capital at high shadow interest rates
Liability and the incentive to improve information about risk when injurers may be judgment-proof
We analyze an injurer’s incentives to improve her information about accident risk. In contrast to the preceding literature, injurers can continuously improve their understanding of the expected harm their activity will impose on others. Regarding social incentives, the marginal benefit from improved risk information is increasing, possibly making either no or a perfect understanding of risk socially optimal. Turning to private incentives when the…
The efficacy of (self-)verification instruments in risky investments
Economics (9 works) · Economic and Environmental Valuation (7 works) · Climate Change Policy and Economics (6 works) · Business (5 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Environmental Science (4 works) · Natural resource economics (4 works) · Biology (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Ecology (3 works)