François Schroeter
Biographic Data
| ID | 1607520 |
|---|---|
| NAME | François Schroeter |
| GIVEN NAMES | François |
| FAMILY NAME | Schroeter |
| SIGNATURE | SCHROETER F |
| AFFILIATIONS | The University of Melbourne |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9401-4961 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 11 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 10 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Meanings as species in communication and inquiry
Can mere conceptual competence explain the apriori? Many contemporary theorists believe that conceptual competence grounds apriori conceptual truths – and that this fact helps explain how thinkers can have apriori justification for accepting these truths and reasoning in accord with them. In this chapter, I'll examine several contemporary defenses of the conceptual approach to apriority in order to clarify their core commitments about the nature …
The Limits of Metalinguistic Negotiation
According to philosophical orthodoxy, the parties to moral or legal disputes genuinely disagree only if their uses of key normative terms in the dispute express the same meaning. Recently, however, this orthodoxy has been challenged. According to an influential alternative view, genuine moral and legal disagreements should be understood as metalinguistic negotiations over which meaning a given term should have. In this paper, we argue that the sh…
Bad News for Ardent Normative Realists
According to Ardent Normative Realists, reality favors certain ways of valuing and acting. Matti Eklund has recently argued that Ardent Normative Realists are committed to Referential Normativity, i.e., the thesis that the action-guiding and motivational roles associated with normative predicates determine their reference. In this paper, we argue that Referential Normativity should be rejected
A New Interpretivist Metasemantics for Fundamental Legal Disagreements
What does it take for lawyers and others to think or talk about the same legal topic—e.g., defamation, culpability? We argue that people are able to think or talk about the same topic not when they possess a matching substantive understanding of the topic, as traditional metasemantics says, but instead when their thoughts or utterances are related to each other in certain ways. And what determines the content of thoughts and utterances is what wo…
Inscrutability and Its Discontents
Our main focus in this paper is Herman Cappelen’s claim, defended in Fixing Language , that reference is radically inscrutable. We argue that Cappelen’s inscrutability thesis should be rejected. We also highlight how rejecting inscrutability undermines Cappelen’s most radical conclusions about conceptual engineering. In addition, we raise a worry about his positive account of topic continuity through inquiry and debate
The Many Moral Rationalisms
This volume of thirteen original essays investigates the four core theses of moral rationalism: (i) the psychological thesis that reason is the source of moral judgement; (ii) the metaphysical thesis that moral requirements are constituted by the deliverances of practical reason; (iii) the epistemological thesis that moral requirements are knowable a priori; and (iv) the normative thesis that moral requirements entail valid reasons for action. Th…
Many Moral Rationalisms
Co-deliberation, Joint Decision, and Testimony about Reasons
We defend the claim that there can be testimonial transfer of reasons against Steinig’s recent objections. In addition, we argue that the literature on testimony about moral reasons misunderstands what is at stake in the possibility of second-hand orientation towards moral reasons. A moral community faces two different but related tasks: one theoretical (working out what things are of genuine value and how to rank goods and ends) and one practica…
Moral Expertise
This paper surveys recent work on moral expertise. Much of that work defends an asymmetry thesis according to which the cognitive deference to expertise that characterizes other areas of inquiry is out of place in morality. There are two reasons why you might think asymmetry holds. The problem might lie in the existence of expertise or in deferring to it. We argue that both types of arguments for asymmetry fail. They appear to be stronger than th…
Is Gibbard a Realist
In Thinking How to Live, Allan Gibbard claims that expressivists can vindicate realism about moral discourse. This paper argues that Gibbard’s expressivism does not provide such a vindication
Endorsement and Autonomous Agency
We take self‐governance or autonomy to be a central feature of human agency: we believe that our actions normally occur under our guidance and at our command. A common criticism of the standard theory of action is that it leaves the agent out of his actions and thus mischaracterizes our autonomy. According to proponents of the endorsement model of autonomy, such as Harry Frankfurt and David Velleman, the standard theory simply needs to be supplem…
The Many Moral Rationalisms
This volume of thirteen original essays investigates the four core theses of moral rationalism: (i) the psychological thesis that reason is the source of moral judgement; (ii) the metaphysical thesis that moral requirements are constituted by the deliverances of practical reason; (iii) the epistemological thesis that moral requirements are knowable a priori; and (iv) the normative thesis that moral requirements entail valid reasons for action. Th…
Endorsement and Autonomous Agency
We take self‐governance or autonomy to be a central feature of human agency: we believe that our actions normally occur under our guidance and at our command. A common criticism of the standard theory of action is that it leaves the agent out of his actions and thus mischaracterizes our autonomy. According to proponents of the endorsement model of autonomy, such as Harry Frankfurt and David Velleman, the standard theory simply needs to be supplem…
Moral Expertise
This paper surveys recent work on moral expertise. Much of that work defends an asymmetry thesis according to which the cognitive deference to expertise that characterizes other areas of inquiry is out of place in morality. There are two reasons why you might think asymmetry holds. The problem might lie in the existence of expertise or in deferring to it. We argue that both types of arguments for asymmetry fail. They appear to be stronger than th…
Endorsement and Autonomous Agency
We take self‐governance or autonomy to be a central feature of human agency: we believe that our actions normally occur under our guidance and at our command. A common criticism of the standard theory of action is that it leaves the agent out of his actions and thus mischaracterizes our autonomy. According to proponents of the endorsement model of autonomy, such as Harry Frankfurt and David Velleman, the standard theory simply needs to be supplem…
Is Gibbard a Realist
In Thinking How to Live, Allan Gibbard claims that expressivists can vindicate realism about moral discourse. This paper argues that Gibbard’s expressivism does not provide such a vindication
Moral Expertise
This paper surveys recent work on moral expertise. Much of that work defends an asymmetry thesis according to which the cognitive deference to expertise that characterizes other areas of inquiry is out of place in morality. There are two reasons why you might think asymmetry holds. The problem might lie in the existence of expertise or in deferring to it. We argue that both types of arguments for asymmetry fail. They appear to be stronger than th…
Co-deliberation, Joint Decision, and Testimony about Reasons
We defend the claim that there can be testimonial transfer of reasons against Steinig’s recent objections. In addition, we argue that the literature on testimony about moral reasons misunderstands what is at stake in the possibility of second-hand orientation towards moral reasons. A moral community faces two different but related tasks: one theoretical (working out what things are of genuine value and how to rank goods and ends) and one practica…
The Many Moral Rationalisms
This volume of thirteen original essays investigates the four core theses of moral rationalism: (i) the psychological thesis that reason is the source of moral judgement; (ii) the metaphysical thesis that moral requirements are constituted by the deliverances of practical reason; (iii) the epistemological thesis that moral requirements are knowable a priori; and (iv) the normative thesis that moral requirements entail valid reasons for action. Th…
Many Moral Rationalisms
A New Interpretivist Metasemantics for Fundamental Legal Disagreements
What does it take for lawyers and others to think or talk about the same legal topic—e.g., defamation, culpability? We argue that people are able to think or talk about the same topic not when they possess a matching substantive understanding of the topic, as traditional metasemantics says, but instead when their thoughts or utterances are related to each other in certain ways. And what determines the content of thoughts and utterances is what wo…
Inscrutability and Its Discontents
Our main focus in this paper is Herman Cappelen’s claim, defended in Fixing Language , that reference is radically inscrutable. We argue that Cappelen’s inscrutability thesis should be rejected. We also highlight how rejecting inscrutability undermines Cappelen’s most radical conclusions about conceptual engineering. In addition, we raise a worry about his positive account of topic continuity through inquiry and debate
Bad News for Ardent Normative Realists
According to Ardent Normative Realists, reality favors certain ways of valuing and acting. Matti Eklund has recently argued that Ardent Normative Realists are committed to Referential Normativity, i.e., the thesis that the action-guiding and motivational roles associated with normative predicates determine their reference. In this paper, we argue that Referential Normativity should be rejected
The Limits of Metalinguistic Negotiation
According to philosophical orthodoxy, the parties to moral or legal disputes genuinely disagree only if their uses of key normative terms in the dispute express the same meaning. Recently, however, this orthodoxy has been challenged. According to an influential alternative view, genuine moral and legal disagreements should be understood as metalinguistic negotiations over which meaning a given term should have. In this paper, we argue that the sh…
Meanings as species in communication and inquiry
Can mere conceptual competence explain the apriori? Many contemporary theorists believe that conceptual competence grounds apriori conceptual truths – and that this fact helps explain how thinkers can have apriori justification for accepting these truths and reasoning in accord with them. In this chapter, I'll examine several contemporary defenses of the conceptual approach to apriority in order to clarify their core commitments about the nature …
Epistemology (10 works) · Philosophy (10 works) · Sociology (8 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Free Will and Agency (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Action (physics (3 works)