Veli Mitova
Biographic Data
| ID | 1607615 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Veli Mitova |
| GIVEN NAMES | Veli |
| FAMILY NAME | Mitova |
| SIGNATURE | MITOVA V |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Johannesburg |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4181-8170 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 21 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 20 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
How Knowledge Brokers Shape the Evidence-Based Policy Landscape
Knowledge brokers, usually conceptualized as passive intermediaries between scientists and policymakers in evidence-based policymaking, are understudied in the philosophy of science. Here, we challenge that usual conceptualization. As agents in their own right, knowledge brokers have their own goals and incentives, which complicate the effects of their presence at the science–policy interface.We illustrate this in an agent-based model and suggest…
Epistemic reparations and the right to be known: Introduction
Irreparable Epistemic Wrongs
The notion of epistemic reparations has recently gained increasing attention in social epistemology. These are reparations due to victims of distinctively epistemic wrongs attaching to gross human rights violations. An example of such a wrong is not having the true story about yourself known due to being wrongfully convicted of murder (Lackey, 2022). In the last few years, several authors have proposed accounts of epistemic reparations under vari…
Hermeneutical relationships
According to a recent proposal by Cameron Boult, epistemic blame is best understood as a modification of one's epistemic relationship with the blamee. This ‘relationship modification account’ (RMA) has many welcome theoretical consequences for social epistemology. For instance, it gives us new tools for analysing cases of testimonial injustice, epistemic exploitation, and gaslighting. In this paper, I extend RMA to other kinds of epistemic injust…
Why We Cannot Separate Evidence From Values in Public Policy
Whether or not any particular policy is adequate by EBP's own standard—being evidence‐based—cannot be decided without appeal to value‐based considerations. We support this claim in two steps. First, we argue that which evidence gets used in policy‐making depends on our value commitments, which are rarely made explicit, let alone being the subject of critical and transparent reflection. In other words, value commitments are not just important at t…
De-Idealising Epistemology Through Collectivising
According to a recent argument, we should de-idealise analytic epistemology: when theorising our epistemic practices and obligations, we should stop abstracting away epistemically relevant features of knowers, such as their social identities. This paper puts in dialogue two apparently unrelated arguments for non-ideal epistemology – McKenna (2023) and Basu (2023) – focusing on the obligation to engage with challenges to our beliefs. I argue that …
A puzzle about knowledge ascriptions
Philosophers have argued that stakes affect knowledge: a given amount of evidence may suffice for knowledge if the stakes are low, but not if the stakes are high. By contrast, empirical work on the influence of stakes on ordinary knowledge ascriptions has been divided along methodological lines: “evidence‐fixed” prompts rarely find stakes effects, while “evidence‐seeking” prompts consistently find them. We present a cross‐cultural study using bot…
Knowledge brokers at the science–policy interface: Insights from biosecurity and environmental management
Can theorising epistemic injustice help us decolonise
The paper argues that some tools from the epistemic injustice literature can be fruitfully applied to the debate on epistemic decolonisation. The first step for such a project is to defuse recent misgivings about the liberatory potential of epistemic injustice scholarship. I group these misgivings under the slogan ‘Epistemic injustice is white-people stuff’, or ‘the WPS challenge’, for short, and use them to set desiderata for good theorising wit…
Science-policy research collaborations need philosophers
Motivated Irrationality, Epistemic Innocence, White Ignorance
According to the standard story, all motivated beliefs are epistemically blameworthy, because they are formed with an eye to practical benefit, rather than for the right—epistemic—reasons. Recently, Lisa Bortolotti has argued that, contra this story, some motivated beliefs are epistemically innocent. In this paper, I argue for two claims. First, Bortolotti’s account has the unfortunate implication that some paradigms of epistemically unjust belie…
Why Epistemic Decolonisation in Africa
The call to decolonise knowledge is gaining increasing popularity in African philosophy. But as scholarly attention to the topic intensifies, so do doubts about the usefulness of theorising it, especially in spaces – like Africa – that are riddled with deeper problems such as mass poverty and social disempowerment. I focus on three challenges that Bernard Matolino has recently issued. If these challenges are on the right track, they threat-en to …
A New Argument for the Non-Instrumental Value of Truth
The collective epistemic reasons of social-identity groups
In this paper, I argue that certain social-identity groups—ones that involve systematic relations of power and oppression—have distinctive epistemic reasons in virtue of constituting this group. This claim, I argue further, would potentially benefit at least three bodies of scholarship—on the epistemology of groups, on collective moral responsibility, and on epistemic injustice.
Introduction to the special issue: Skepticism, relativism, pluralism
Explanatory Injustice and Epistemic Agency
Decolonising Knowledge Here and Now
The topic of epistemic decolonisation is currently the locus of lively debate both in academia and in everyday life. The aim of this piece is to isolate a few main strands in the philosophical literature on the topic, and draw some new connections amongst them through the lens of epistemic injustice. I first sketch what I take to be the core features of epistemic decolonisation. I then philosophically situate the topic. Finally, I map it in relat…
The Factive Turn in Epistemology
When you believe something for a good reason, your belief is in a position to be justified, rational, responsible, or to count as knowledge. But what is the nature of this thing that can make such a difference? Traditionally, epistemologists thought of epistemic normative notions, such as reasons, in terms of the believer's psychological perspective. Recently, however, many have started thinking of them as factive: good reasons for belief are eit…
Factive Turn in Epistemology
Clearing space for extreme psychologism about reasons
Are reasons for action facts or psychological states? There are two answers in the literature on the ontology of reasons. According to the Standard Story, normative reasons are facts, while motivating reasons are psychological states. According to the factualist, both normative and motivating reasons are facts. In this paper I argue that neither of these views is satisfactory. The Standard Story errs in thinking that the two kinds of reasons are …
Why pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms don’t work
Pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms tell us to observe these norms as the best means to attaining the things we value. I argue that such justifications do not work, because they harbour an irresolvable tension: their non-alethic character intrinsically conflicts with the truth-aiming character of the epistemic norms they are justifying. We should abandon, then, either epistemic norms or pragmatic justifications of these norms. I therefore…
Science-policy research collaborations need philosophers
Clearing space for extreme psychologism about reasons
Are reasons for action facts or psychological states? There are two answers in the literature on the ontology of reasons. According to the Standard Story, normative reasons are facts, while motivating reasons are psychological states. According to the factualist, both normative and motivating reasons are facts. In this paper I argue that neither of these views is satisfactory. The Standard Story errs in thinking that the two kinds of reasons are …
Why pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms don’t work
Pragmatic justifications of epistemic norms tell us to observe these norms as the best means to attaining the things we value. I argue that such justifications do not work, because they harbour an irresolvable tension: their non-alethic character intrinsically conflicts with the truth-aiming character of the epistemic norms they are justifying. We should abandon, then, either epistemic norms or pragmatic justifications of these norms. I therefore…
Clearing space for extreme psychologism about reasons
Are reasons for action facts or psychological states? There are two answers in the literature on the ontology of reasons. According to the Standard Story, normative reasons are facts, while motivating reasons are psychological states. According to the factualist, both normative and motivating reasons are facts. In this paper I argue that neither of these views is satisfactory. The Standard Story errs in thinking that the two kinds of reasons are …
The Factive Turn in Epistemology
When you believe something for a good reason, your belief is in a position to be justified, rational, responsible, or to count as knowledge. But what is the nature of this thing that can make such a difference? Traditionally, epistemologists thought of epistemic normative notions, such as reasons, in terms of the believer's psychological perspective. Recently, however, many have started thinking of them as factive: good reasons for belief are eit…
Factive Turn in Epistemology
Explanatory Injustice and Epistemic Agency
Decolonising Knowledge Here and Now
The topic of epistemic decolonisation is currently the locus of lively debate both in academia and in everyday life. The aim of this piece is to isolate a few main strands in the philosophical literature on the topic, and draw some new connections amongst them through the lens of epistemic injustice. I first sketch what I take to be the core features of epistemic decolonisation. I then philosophically situate the topic. Finally, I map it in relat…
The collective epistemic reasons of social-identity groups
In this paper, I argue that certain social-identity groups—ones that involve systematic relations of power and oppression—have distinctive epistemic reasons in virtue of constituting this group. This claim, I argue further, would potentially benefit at least three bodies of scholarship—on the epistemology of groups, on collective moral responsibility, and on epistemic injustice.
Introduction to the special issue: Skepticism, relativism, pluralism
Motivated Irrationality, Epistemic Innocence, White Ignorance
According to the standard story, all motivated beliefs are epistemically blameworthy, because they are formed with an eye to practical benefit, rather than for the right—epistemic—reasons. Recently, Lisa Bortolotti has argued that, contra this story, some motivated beliefs are epistemically innocent. In this paper, I argue for two claims. First, Bortolotti’s account has the unfortunate implication that some paradigms of epistemically unjust belie…
Why Epistemic Decolonisation in Africa
The call to decolonise knowledge is gaining increasing popularity in African philosophy. But as scholarly attention to the topic intensifies, so do doubts about the usefulness of theorising it, especially in spaces – like Africa – that are riddled with deeper problems such as mass poverty and social disempowerment. I focus on three challenges that Bernard Matolino has recently issued. If these challenges are on the right track, they threat-en to …
A New Argument for the Non-Instrumental Value of Truth
Can theorising epistemic injustice help us decolonise
The paper argues that some tools from the epistemic injustice literature can be fruitfully applied to the debate on epistemic decolonisation. The first step for such a project is to defuse recent misgivings about the liberatory potential of epistemic injustice scholarship. I group these misgivings under the slogan ‘Epistemic injustice is white-people stuff’, or ‘the WPS challenge’, for short, and use them to set desiderata for good theorising wit…
Science-policy research collaborations need philosophers
De-Idealising Epistemology Through Collectivising
According to a recent argument, we should de-idealise analytic epistemology: when theorising our epistemic practices and obligations, we should stop abstracting away epistemically relevant features of knowers, such as their social identities. This paper puts in dialogue two apparently unrelated arguments for non-ideal epistemology – McKenna (2023) and Basu (2023) – focusing on the obligation to engage with challenges to our beliefs. I argue that …
A puzzle about knowledge ascriptions
Philosophers have argued that stakes affect knowledge: a given amount of evidence may suffice for knowledge if the stakes are low, but not if the stakes are high. By contrast, empirical work on the influence of stakes on ordinary knowledge ascriptions has been divided along methodological lines: “evidence‐fixed” prompts rarely find stakes effects, while “evidence‐seeking” prompts consistently find them. We present a cross‐cultural study using bot…
Knowledge brokers at the science–policy interface: Insights from biosecurity and environmental management
How Knowledge Brokers Shape the Evidence-Based Policy Landscape
Knowledge brokers, usually conceptualized as passive intermediaries between scientists and policymakers in evidence-based policymaking, are understudied in the philosophy of science. Here, we challenge that usual conceptualization. As agents in their own right, knowledge brokers have their own goals and incentives, which complicate the effects of their presence at the science–policy interface.We illustrate this in an agent-based model and suggest…
Epistemic reparations and the right to be known: Introduction
Irreparable Epistemic Wrongs
The notion of epistemic reparations has recently gained increasing attention in social epistemology. These are reparations due to victims of distinctively epistemic wrongs attaching to gross human rights violations. An example of such a wrong is not having the true story about yourself known due to being wrongfully convicted of murder (Lackey, 2022). In the last few years, several authors have proposed accounts of epistemic reparations under vari…
Hermeneutical relationships
According to a recent proposal by Cameron Boult, epistemic blame is best understood as a modification of one's epistemic relationship with the blamee. This ‘relationship modification account’ (RMA) has many welcome theoretical consequences for social epistemology. For instance, it gives us new tools for analysing cases of testimonial injustice, epistemic exploitation, and gaslighting. In this paper, I extend RMA to other kinds of epistemic injust…
Why We Cannot Separate Evidence From Values in Public Policy
Whether or not any particular policy is adequate by EBP's own standard—being evidence‐based—cannot be decided without appeal to value‐based considerations. We support this claim in two steps. First, we argue that which evidence gets used in policy‐making depends on our value commitments, which are rarely made explicit, let alone being the subject of critical and transparent reflection. In other words, value commitments are not just important at t…
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (16 works) · Epistemology (14 works) · Philosophy (14 works) · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies (11 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (9 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Political science (7 works) · Sociology (7 works) · Law (6 works) · Psychology (6 works)