Nicholas J J Smith
Biographic Data
| ID | 1607722 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nicholas J J Smith |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nicholas J J |
| FAMILY NAME | Smith |
| SIGNATURE | SMITH N J J |
| AFFILIATIONS | The University of Sydney |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2632-1032 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 10 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Interpreting imprecise probabilities
It is essential that formal models come with interpretations: accounts of how the models relate to the phenomena. The traditional representation of degrees of belief as mathematical probabilities comes with a clear and simple interpretative story. This paper argues that the model of degrees of belief as imprecise probabilities (sets of probabilities) lacks a workable interpretation: The standard interpretative story given in the literature leads …
Acting on belief functions
The degrees of belief of rational agents should be guided by the evidence available to them. This paper takes as a starting point the view—argued elsewhere—that the formal model best able to capture this idea is one that represents degrees of belief using Dempster–Shafer belief functions. However, degrees of belief should not only respect evidence; they also guide decision and action. Whatever formal model of degrees of belief we adopt, we need a…
Respecting evidence
The received model of degrees of belief represents them as probabilities. Over the last half century, many philosophers have been convinced that this model fails because it cannot make room for the idea that an agent’s degrees of belief should respect the available evidence. In its place they have advocated a model that represents degrees of belief using imprecise probabilities (sets of probability functions). This paper presents a model of degre…
These degrees go to eleven
Undead argument
Frege's Judgement Stroke and the Conception of Logic as the Study of Inference not Consequence
One of the most striking differences between Frege's Begriffsschrift (logical system) and standard contemporary systems of logic is the inclusion in the former of the judgement stroke: a symbol which marks those propositions which are being asserted, that is, which are being used to express judgements. There has been considerable controversy regarding both the exact purpose of the judgement stroke, and whether a system of logic should include suc…
Bananas Enough for Time Travel
This paper argues that the most famous objection to backward time travel can carry no weight. In its classic form, the objection is that backward time travel entails the occurrence of impossible things, such as auto-infanticide—and hence is itself impossible. David Lewis has rebutted the classic version of the objection: auto-infanticide is prevented by coincidences, such as time travellers slipping on banana peels as they attempt to murder their…
Bananas Enough for Time Travel
This paper argues that the most famous objection to backward time travel can carry no weight. In its classic form, the objection is that backward time travel entails the occurrence of impossible things, such as auto-infanticide—and hence is itself impossible. David Lewis has rebutted the classic version of the objection: auto-infanticide is prevented by coincidences, such as time travellers slipping on banana peels as they attempt to murder their…
Undead argument
Frege's Judgement Stroke and the Conception of Logic as the Study of Inference not Consequence
One of the most striking differences between Frege's Begriffsschrift (logical system) and standard contemporary systems of logic is the inclusion in the former of the judgement stroke: a symbol which marks those propositions which are being asserted, that is, which are being used to express judgements. There has been considerable controversy regarding both the exact purpose of the judgement stroke, and whether a system of logic should include suc…
Bananas Enough for Time Travel
This paper argues that the most famous objection to backward time travel can carry no weight. In its classic form, the objection is that backward time travel entails the occurrence of impossible things, such as auto-infanticide—and hence is itself impossible. David Lewis has rebutted the classic version of the objection: auto-infanticide is prevented by coincidences, such as time travellers slipping on banana peels as they attempt to murder their…
Frege's Judgement Stroke and the Conception of Logic as the Study of Inference not Consequence
One of the most striking differences between Frege's Begriffsschrift (logical system) and standard contemporary systems of logic is the inclusion in the former of the judgement stroke: a symbol which marks those propositions which are being asserted, that is, which are being used to express judgements. There has been considerable controversy regarding both the exact purpose of the judgement stroke, and whether a system of logic should include suc…
Undead argument
Respecting evidence
The received model of degrees of belief represents them as probabilities. Over the last half century, many philosophers have been convinced that this model fails because it cannot make room for the idea that an agent’s degrees of belief should respect the available evidence. In its place they have advocated a model that represents degrees of belief using imprecise probabilities (sets of probability functions). This paper presents a model of degre…
These degrees go to eleven
Acting on belief functions
The degrees of belief of rational agents should be guided by the evidence available to them. This paper takes as a starting point the view—argued elsewhere—that the formal model best able to capture this idea is one that represents degrees of belief using Dempster–Shafer belief functions. However, degrees of belief should not only respect evidence; they also guide decision and action. Whatever formal model of degrees of belief we adopt, we need a…
Interpreting imprecise probabilities
It is essential that formal models come with interpretations: accounts of how the models relate to the phenomena. The traditional representation of degrees of belief as mathematical probabilities comes with a clear and simple interpretative story. This paper argues that the model of degrees of belief as imprecise probabilities (sets of probabilities) lacks a workable interpretation: The standard interpretative story given in the literature leads …
Computer Science (7 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (5 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works) · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference (3 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · Mathematical economics (3 works)