Erik J Wielenberg
Biographic Data
| ID | 1608138 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Erik J Wielenberg |
| GIVEN NAMES | Erik J |
| FAMILY NAME | Wielenberg |
| SIGNATURE | WIELENBERG E J |
| AFFILIATIONS | DePauw University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7843-6240 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 18 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 18 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Jesus’s Ethics of Wealth
I defend an interpretation of Jesus’s ethics of wealth according to which possession of wealth beyond what is required to satisfy minimal daily needs conflicts with the central commandment to love God with all one’s heart. On Jesus’s view, possession of (surplus) wealth inevitably leads to love of wealth – “where your treasure is, there your heart will be also.” Accordingly, Jesus lays down a set of principles regarding wealth that, if followed, …
The Psychopath Challenge to Divine Command Theory
Divine Commands Are Unnecessary for Moral Obligation
Divine command theory is experiencing something of a renaissance, inspired in large part by Robert Adams’s 1999 masterpiece Finite and Infinite Goods. I argue here that divine commands are not always necessary for actions to be morally obligatory. I make the case that the divine command theorist’s own commitments put pressure on her to concede the existence of some moral obligations that in no way depend on divine commands. Focusing on Robert Ada…
Sterba's Logical Argument from Evil and the God Who Walks Away from Omelas
The logical argument from evil, generally thought to have been defused by Alvin Plantinga's free will defense, has been reinvigorated by James Sterba's exposition and defense of a new version of the argument that draws on recent work in moral philosophy. Whereas J.L. Mackie's argument uses what can now be seen to be overly simplistic principles to try to establish a logical incompatibility between the existence of God and any evil at all, Sterba'…
Divine command theory and psychopathy
I advance a novel challenge for Divine Command Theory based on the existence of psychopaths. The challenge, in a nutshell, is that Divine Command Theory has the implausible implication that psychopaths have no moral obligations and hence their evil acts, no matter how evil, are morally permissible. After explaining this argument, I respond to three objections to it and then critically examine the prospect that Divine Command Theorists might bite …
Intrinsic value and love
I advance three challenges for the view Murphy advances in God's Own Ethics . The first two challenges target Murphy's claim that God does not have requiring reasons to prevent the suffering of rational creatures. I develop two arguments against that position, one based on the intrinsic value of human beings, the other based on the intrinsic badness of the suffering of rational creatures. My third challenge targets Murphy's account of God's conti…
Plantingian theism and the free-will defence
I advance a challenge to the coherence of Alvin Plantinga's brand of theism that focuses on Plantinga's celebrated free-will defence. This challenge draws on (but goes beyond) some ideas advanced by Wes Morriston. The central claim of my challenge is that Plantinga's free-will defence, together with certain claims that are plausible and/or to which Plantinga is committed, both requires and rules out the claim that it is possible that God is capab…
Loyal Rue. Nature is Enough
Loyal Rue. Nature is Enough: Religious Naturalism and the Meaning of Life
The Cambridge Companion to C. S. Lewis
The Failure of Brown's New Supervenience Argument
In 1998, Frank Jackson advanced an influential argument against the existence of irreducible ethical properties. Campbell Brown has recently offered what he describes as a new and improved version of this argument. Meanwhile, a metaethical view sometimes called “robust normative realism” has attracted a number of contemporary defenders. Robust normative realists maintain that at least some normative properties are not fully reducible to propertie…
Sceptical theism and divine lies
In this paper I develop a novel challenge for sceptical theists. I present a line of reasoning that appeals to sceptical theism to support scepticism about divine assertions. I claim that this reasoning is at least as plausible as one popular sceptical theistic strategy for responding to evidential arguments from evil. Thus, I seek to impale sceptical theists on the horns of a dilemma: concede that either (a) sceptical theism implies scepticism a…
Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe
A morally unsurpassable God must create the best
I present a novel argument for the position that a morally unsurpassable God must create the best world that He has the power to create. I show that grace-based considerations of the sort proposed by Robert Adams neither refute my argument nor establish that a morally unsurpassable God need not create the best. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of my argument for the ‘no-best-world’ response to the problem of evil
How to Be an Alethically Rational Naturalist
Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe
Suppose there is no God. This might imply that human life is meaningless, that there are no moral obligations and hence people can do whatever they want, and that the notions of virtue and vice and good and evil have no place. Erik J. Wielenberg believes this view to be mistaken and in this book he explains why. He argues that even if God does not exist, human life can have meaning, we do have moral obligations, and virtue is possible. Naturally,…
Many are culled but few are chosen
In his recent book Divine Providence: The Molinist Account , Thomas Flint suggests that necessarily, a world is culled iff it is chosen. I argue that there is good reason to think that this thesis is false. I further argue that the thesis is inconsistent with certain other claims that many theists will want to endorse and hence that many theists will want to reject Flint's claim. I next consider Flint's reasons for endorsing the thesis and argue …
Pleasure as a Sign of Moral Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics
Goodness without Qualification
Sterba's Logical Argument from Evil and the God Who Walks Away from Omelas
The logical argument from evil, generally thought to have been defused by Alvin Plantinga's free will defense, has been reinvigorated by James Sterba's exposition and defense of a new version of the argument that draws on recent work in moral philosophy. Whereas J.L. Mackie's argument uses what can now be seen to be overly simplistic principles to try to establish a logical incompatibility between the existence of God and any evil at all, Sterba'…
How to Be an Alethically Rational Naturalist
Goodness without Qualification
Many are culled but few are chosen
In his recent book Divine Providence: The Molinist Account , Thomas Flint suggests that necessarily, a world is culled iff it is chosen. I argue that there is good reason to think that this thesis is false. I further argue that the thesis is inconsistent with certain other claims that many theists will want to endorse and hence that many theists will want to reject Flint's claim. I next consider Flint's reasons for endorsing the thesis and argue …
Pleasure as a Sign of Moral Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics
Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe
Suppose there is no God. This might imply that human life is meaningless, that there are no moral obligations and hence people can do whatever they want, and that the notions of virtue and vice and good and evil have no place. Erik J. Wielenberg believes this view to be mistaken and in this book he explains why. He argues that even if God does not exist, human life can have meaning, we do have moral obligations, and virtue is possible. Naturally,…
How to Be an Alethically Rational Naturalist
A morally unsurpassable God must create the best
I present a novel argument for the position that a morally unsurpassable God must create the best world that He has the power to create. I show that grace-based considerations of the sort proposed by Robert Adams neither refute my argument nor establish that a morally unsurpassable God need not create the best. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of my argument for the ‘no-best-world’ response to the problem of evil
Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe
Sceptical theism and divine lies
In this paper I develop a novel challenge for sceptical theists. I present a line of reasoning that appeals to sceptical theism to support scepticism about divine assertions. I claim that this reasoning is at least as plausible as one popular sceptical theistic strategy for responding to evidential arguments from evil. Thus, I seek to impale sceptical theists on the horns of a dilemma: concede that either (a) sceptical theism implies scepticism a…
The Failure of Brown's New Supervenience Argument
In 1998, Frank Jackson advanced an influential argument against the existence of irreducible ethical properties. Campbell Brown has recently offered what he describes as a new and improved version of this argument. Meanwhile, a metaethical view sometimes called “robust normative realism” has attracted a number of contemporary defenders. Robust normative realists maintain that at least some normative properties are not fully reducible to propertie…
Loyal Rue. Nature is Enough
Loyal Rue. Nature is Enough: Religious Naturalism and the Meaning of Life
The Cambridge Companion to C. S. Lewis
Plantingian theism and the free-will defence
I advance a challenge to the coherence of Alvin Plantinga's brand of theism that focuses on Plantinga's celebrated free-will defence. This challenge draws on (but goes beyond) some ideas advanced by Wes Morriston. The central claim of my challenge is that Plantinga's free-will defence, together with certain claims that are plausible and/or to which Plantinga is committed, both requires and rules out the claim that it is possible that God is capab…
Intrinsic value and love
I advance three challenges for the view Murphy advances in God's Own Ethics . The first two challenges target Murphy's claim that God does not have requiring reasons to prevent the suffering of rational creatures. I develop two arguments against that position, one based on the intrinsic value of human beings, the other based on the intrinsic badness of the suffering of rational creatures. My third challenge targets Murphy's account of God's conti…
Divine command theory and psychopathy
I advance a novel challenge for Divine Command Theory based on the existence of psychopaths. The challenge, in a nutshell, is that Divine Command Theory has the implausible implication that psychopaths have no moral obligations and hence their evil acts, no matter how evil, are morally permissible. After explaining this argument, I respond to three objections to it and then critically examine the prospect that Divine Command Theorists might bite …
Divine Commands Are Unnecessary for Moral Obligation
Divine command theory is experiencing something of a renaissance, inspired in large part by Robert Adams’s 1999 masterpiece Finite and Infinite Goods. I argue here that divine commands are not always necessary for actions to be morally obligatory. I make the case that the divine command theorist’s own commitments put pressure on her to concede the existence of some moral obligations that in no way depend on divine commands. Focusing on Robert Ada…
Sterba's Logical Argument from Evil and the God Who Walks Away from Omelas
The logical argument from evil, generally thought to have been defused by Alvin Plantinga's free will defense, has been reinvigorated by James Sterba's exposition and defense of a new version of the argument that draws on recent work in moral philosophy. Whereas J.L. Mackie's argument uses what can now be seen to be overly simplistic principles to try to establish a logical incompatibility between the existence of God and any evil at all, Sterba'…
The Psychopath Challenge to Divine Command Theory
Jesus’s Ethics of Wealth
I defend an interpretation of Jesus’s ethics of wealth according to which possession of wealth beyond what is required to satisfy minimal daily needs conflicts with the central commandment to love God with all one’s heart. On Jesus’s view, possession of (surplus) wealth inevitably leads to love of wealth – “where your treasure is, there your heart will be also.” Accordingly, Jesus lays down a set of principles regarding wealth that, if followed, …
Epistemology (13 works) · Philosophy (13 works) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (9 works) · Theism (5 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (4 works) · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Philosophy of religion (4 works) · Law (3 works) · Medieval Philosophy and Theology (3 works)