Frank Grundig
Biographic Data
| ID | 1616861 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Frank Grundig |
| GIVEN NAMES | Frank |
| FAMILY NAME | Grundig |
| SIGNATURE | GRUNDIG F |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Kent |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 47 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Structural Group Leadership and Regime Effectiveness
Usually the provision of international environmental public goods cannot be secured by a single state. Rather, a group of major powers has to pool its resources to provide structural leadership in order to achieve an effective regime. Such a group of pushers uses its structural power to achieve its goal. However, it faces two challenges. First, it may have to overcome the opposition of a group of laggards that desires less environmental protectio…
Dealing with the temporal domain of regime effectiveness
Political strategy and climate policy
Rational choice models are employed to explain both the formation of states' domestically derived negotiation positions on climate change and the dynamics of these international negotiations. This analysis leads to the identification of a number of promising political strategies: taking steps to enlarge the membership of environmental non-governmental organisations; assessing whether the resources of these organisations would be more effectively …
Patterns of International Cooperation and the Explanatory Power of Relative Gains
This article brings together the relative gains argument and the analysis of global environmental problems such as ozone depletion and global climate change. We develop an n-actor relative gains model for the provision of nonexcludable goods. In order to derive testable hypotheses we also develop a comparable n-actor specification for excludable goods such as international trade and derive hypotheses concerning the expected level of cooperation b…
Marching at the Pace of the Slowest
We model international negotiations on climate change. Leaders such as the European Union and the US can make proposals and influence veto players, including other countries and domestic lobbies, who must choose whether to accept or reject proposals. We explain why policy change has been minimal in this issue area, which veto-players receive the greatest and least attention and why leader actors wishing to see less progress are in such a strong b…
Marching at the Pace of the Slowest
We model international negotiations on climate change. Leaders such as the European Union and the US can make proposals and influence veto players, including other countries and domestic lobbies, who must choose whether to accept or reject proposals. We explain why policy change has been minimal in this issue area, which veto-players receive the greatest and least attention and why leader actors wishing to see less progress are in such a strong b…
Patterns of International Cooperation and the Explanatory Power of Relative Gains
This article brings together the relative gains argument and the analysis of global environmental problems such as ozone depletion and global climate change. We develop an n-actor relative gains model for the provision of nonexcludable goods. In order to derive testable hypotheses we also develop a comparable n-actor specification for excludable goods such as international trade and derive hypotheses concerning the expected level of cooperation b…
Structural Group Leadership and Regime Effectiveness
Usually the provision of international environmental public goods cannot be secured by a single state. Rather, a group of major powers has to pool its resources to provide structural leadership in order to achieve an effective regime. Such a group of pushers uses its structural power to achieve its goal. However, it faces two challenges. First, it may have to overcome the opposition of a group of laggards that desires less environmental protectio…
Dealing with the temporal domain of regime effectiveness
Political strategy and climate policy
Rational choice models are employed to explain both the formation of states' domestically derived negotiation positions on climate change and the dynamics of these international negotiations. This analysis leads to the identification of a number of promising political strategies: taking steps to enlarge the membership of environmental non-governmental organisations; assessing whether the resources of these organisations would be more effectively …
Marching at the Pace of the Slowest
We model international negotiations on climate change. Leaders such as the European Union and the US can make proposals and influence veto players, including other countries and domestic lobbies, who must choose whether to accept or reject proposals. We explain why policy change has been minimal in this issue area, which veto-players receive the greatest and least attention and why leader actors wishing to see less progress are in such a strong b…
Patterns of International Cooperation and the Explanatory Power of Relative Gains
This article brings together the relative gains argument and the analysis of global environmental problems such as ozone depletion and global climate change. We develop an n-actor relative gains model for the provision of nonexcludable goods. In order to derive testable hypotheses we also develop a comparable n-actor specification for excludable goods such as international trade and derive hypotheses concerning the expected level of cooperation b…
Political strategy and climate policy
Rational choice models are employed to explain both the formation of states' domestically derived negotiation positions on climate change and the dynamics of these international negotiations. This analysis leads to the identification of a number of promising political strategies: taking steps to enlarge the membership of environmental non-governmental organisations; assessing whether the resources of these organisations would be more effectively …
Dealing with the temporal domain of regime effectiveness
Structural Group Leadership and Regime Effectiveness
Usually the provision of international environmental public goods cannot be secured by a single state. Rather, a group of major powers has to pool its resources to provide structural leadership in order to achieve an effective regime. Such a group of pushers uses its structural power to achieve its goal. However, it faces two challenges. First, it may have to overcome the opposition of a group of laggards that desires less environmental protectio…
Economics (5 works) · Climate Change Policy and Economics (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Climate change (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · International trade (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Negotiation (3 works)