Kenneth W Abbott
Biographic Data
| ID | 1617138 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Kenneth W Abbott |
| GIVEN NAMES | Kenneth W |
| FAMILY NAME | Abbott |
| SIGNATURE | ABBOTT K W |
| AFFILIATIONS | Arizona State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5540-1683 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 35 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1547 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 32 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 3 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1972 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 14 |
Does the System Work? Transnational Crises and the Resilience of Global Governance
In recent decades, global governance has faced significant transnational crises characterized by threat, urgency, and uncertainty, from the Global Financial Crisis to the COVID-19 pandemic. Simultaneously, heterogeneous infrastate, public–private, and private governance institutions have proliferated alongside incumbent interstate institutions. As a result, contemporary global governance takes place through institutional configurations that we ca…
Informal governance in world politics
Beyond opportunism: Intermediary loyalty in regulation and governance
Regulators and other governors rely on intermediaries to set and implement policies and to regulate targets. Existing literatures focus heavily on intermediaries of a single type – Opportunists, motivated solely by self‐interest. But intermediaries can also be motivated by different types of loyalty: to leaders (Vassals), to policies (Zealots), or to institutions (Mandarins). While all three types of loyalists are resistant to the traditional pro…
The Governor's Dilemma: Indirect Governance Beyond Principals and Agents
The Governor’s Dilemma develops a general theory of indirect governance based on the tradeoff between governor control and intermediary competence; the empirical chapters apply that theory to a diverse range of cases encompassing both international relations and comparative politics. The theoretical framework paper starts from the observation that virtually all governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. But governors in indirect …
Governor's Dilemma: Indirect Governance Beyond Principals and Agents
The Governor's Dilemma develops a general theory of indirect governance based on the tradeoff between governor control and intermediary competence; the empirical chapters apply that theory to a diverse range of cases encompassing both nternational relations and comparative politics. The theoretical framework paper starts from the observation that virtually all governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. But governors in indirect g…
Competence–Control Theory: The Challenge of Governing through Intermediaries
Virtually all governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Governors prefer both to engage intermediaries that are competent and to control intermediary behavior. But governors face a pervasive tradeoff between competence and control. Competent intermediaries are difficult to control, even with complete information, because their capacity to advance or threaten the governor’s policy goals gives them power over it. At the same time,…
Choosing low-cost institutions in global governance
Contemporary global governance takes place not only throughs formal inter-governmental organizations and treaties, but increasingly through diverse institutional forms including informal inter-governmental organizations, trans-governmental networks, and transnational public–private partnerships. Although these forms differ in many ways, they are all what we call ‘low-cost institutions’ (LCIs): the costs of creating, operating, changing, and exiti…
Competence versus control: The governor's dilemma
Most governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Principal–agent theory views indirect governance primarily as a problem of information: the agent has an informational advantage over the principal, which it can exploit to evade principal control. But indirect governance creates a more fundamental problem of power. Competent intermediaries with needed expertise, credibility, legitimacy, and/or operational capacity are inherently di…
Introducing Regulatory Intermediaries
Regulation is frequently viewed as a two-party relationship between a regulator (R) and the targets of its regulation (T). This volume conceives of regulation as a three-party system, in which diverse intermediaries (I) provide assistance to regulators and/or targets, drawing on their own capabilities, authority and legitimacy. Our framework paper for the volume, Theorizing regulatory intermediaries: The RIT model, sets out a general theoretical …
Theorizing Regulatory Intermediaries: The RIT Model
Regulation is typically conceived as a two-party relationship between a rule-maker or regulator (R) and a rule-taker or target (T). We set out an agenda for the study of regulation as a three- (or more) party relationship, with intermediaries (I) at the center of the analysis. Intermediaries play major and varied roles in regulation, from providing expertise and feedback to facilitating implementation, from monitoring the behavior of regulatory t…
Enriching the RIT Framework
Regulation should be theorized as a three-party relationship (RIT), with intermediaries (I) playing diverse roles between the regulator (R) and the targets of regulation (T). Here we summarize and assess extensions of the basic RIT model introduced in the volume, including changes in regulatory relationships over time, chains of regulatory actors, and networks. We also draw lessons for regulatory policy from the volume as a whole, emphasizing the…
Orchestrating experimentation in non-state environmental commitments
A striking development in climate governance is the emergence of systems for non-state actors to make voluntary commitments alongside state undertakings. Because these commitments involve diverse actors carrying out diverse activities in diverse settings, they provide unprecedented opportunities for experimentation and learning. Yet voluntary commitment systems (VCS) rarely promote experimentation and provide few systematic learning mechanisms. B…
Organizational Ecology and Institutional Change in Global Governance
The institutions of global governance have changed dramatically in recent years. New organizational forms—including informal institutions, transgovernmental networks, and private transnational regulatory organizations (PTROs)—have expanded rapidly, while the growth of formal intergovernmental organizations has slowed. Organizational ecology provides an insightful framework for understanding these changing patterns of growth. Organizational ecolog…
Two Logics of Indirect Governance: Delegation and Orchestration
This article introduces the concept of orchestration as the mobilization of an intermediary by an orchestrator on a voluntary basis in pursuit of a joint governance goal. Orchestrator-Intermediary theory then provides a model of indirect governance that supplements delegation models premised on principal-agent theory. Under both theories, governors enhance their governance capacity by drawing on the capabilities of third parties. Whereas delegati…
International Organizations as Orchestrators
International Organizations as Orchestrators reveals how IOs leverage their limited authority and resources to increase their effectiveness, power, and autonomy from states. By 'orchestrating' intermediaries – including NGOs – IOs can shape and steer global governance without engaging in hard, direct regulation. This volume is organized around a theoretical model that emphasizes voluntary collaboration and support. An outstanding group of scholar…
Reinvigorating International Climate Policy: A Comprehensive Framework for Effective Nonstate Action
As countries negotiate a new climate agreement for the United Nations climate conference in December 2015, a groundswell of climate actions is emerging as cities, regions, businesses and civil society groups act on mitigation and adaptation, independently, with each other and with national governments and international organizations. The Paris conference provides a historic opportunity to establish a framework to catalyse, support, and steer thes…
Transnational business governance interactions: Conceptualization and framework for analysis
This special issue demonstrates the importance ofinteractionsin transnational business governance. The number of schemes applying non‐state authority to govern business conduct across borders has vastly expanded in numerous issue areas. As these initiatives proliferate, they increasingly interact with one another and with state‐based regimes. The key challenge is to understand the implications of these interactions for regulatory capacity and per…
Strengthening the Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change
The inadequacies of the inter-state institutions and negotiating processes central to international climate policy create a pressing need for governance innovation. This article proposes one promising and feasible approach: strengthening the existingtransnationalregime complex for climate change. Leading organizations could strengthen the regime complex by forging stronger links among institutions, increasing coordination and collaboration, suppo…
Taking responsive regulation transnational: Strategies for international organizations
Responsive Regulation(RR) introduced important new ways of thinking about regulation. ButRRwas designed for domestic settings in which a single agency had clear jurisdiction, full regulatory capacity, and extensive information, and could (contingently) deploy stringent sanctions against well‐defined targets. Under globalization, many regulatory problems have shifted to the transnational arena, characterized by multiple regulators, public and priv…
The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change
In climate change, as in other areas, recent years have produced a ‘Cambrian explosion’ of transnational institutions, standards, financing arrangements, and programs. As a result, climate governance has become complex, fragmented, and decentralized, operating without central coordination. Most studies of climate governance focus on inter state institutions. In contrast, I map a different realm of climate change governance: the diverse array of t…
Navigating the Anthropocene: Improving Earth System Governance
The United Nations conference in Rio de Janeiro in June is an important opportunity to improve the institutional framework for sustainable development.
Transforming governance and institutions for global sustainability: Key insights from the Earth System Governance Project
Engaging the public and the private in global sustainability governance
Journal Article Engaging the public and the private in global sustainability governance Get access KENNETH W. ABBOTT KENNETH W. ABBOTT 1Professor of Law and Professor of Global Studies, Willard H. Pedrick Distinguished Research Scholar, and Senior Sustainability Scholar at Arizona State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 88, Issue 3, May 2012, Pages 543–564, https://do…
International regulation without international government: Improving IO performance through orchestration
International Harmonization of Regulation of Nanomedicine
Nanomedicine holds enormous promise for the improved prevention, detection and treatment of disease. Yet, at the same time, countervailing concerns about the potential safety risks of nano-technologies generally, and nanomedical products specifically, threaten to derail or at least delay the introduction and commercial viability of many nanomedicine applications. All around the globe, national governments are struggling with balancing these compe…
Why States Act through Formal International Organizations
States use formal international organizations (IOs) to manage both their everyday interactions and more dramatic episodes, including international conflicts. Yet, contemporary international theory does not explain the existence or form of IOs. This article addresses the question of why states use formal organizations by investigating the functions IOs perform and the properties that enable them to perform those functions. Starting with a rational…
Hard and Soft Law in International Governance
We examine why international actors—including states, firms, and activists—seek different types of legalized arrangements to solve political and substantive problems. We show how particular forms of legalization provide superior institutional solutions in different circumstances. We begin by examining the baseline advantages of “hard” legalization (that is, precise, legally binding obligations with appropriate third-party delegation). We emphasiz…
Organizational Ecology and Institutional Change in Global Governance
The institutions of global governance have changed dramatically in recent years. New organizational forms—including informal institutions, transgovernmental networks, and private transnational regulatory organizations (PTROs)—have expanded rapidly, while the growth of formal intergovernmental organizations has slowed. Organizational ecology provides an insightful framework for understanding these changing patterns of growth. Organizational ecolog…
The Concept of Legalization
We develop an empirically based conception of international legalization to show how law and politics are intertwined across a wide range of institutional forms and to frame the analytic and empirical articles that follow in this volume. International legalization is a form of institutionalization characterized by three dimensions: obligation, precision, and delegation. Obligation means that states are legally bound by rules or commitments and th…
Theorizing Regulatory Intermediaries: The RIT Model
Regulation is typically conceived as a two-party relationship between a rule-maker or regulator (R) and a rule-taker or target (T). We set out an agenda for the study of regulation as a three- (or more) party relationship, with intermediaries (I) at the center of the analysis. Intermediaries play major and varied roles in regulation, from providing expertise and feedback to facilitating implementation, from monitoring the behavior of regulatory t…
Two Logics of Indirect Governance: Delegation and Orchestration
This article introduces the concept of orchestration as the mobilization of an intermediary by an orchestrator on a voluntary basis in pursuit of a joint governance goal. Orchestrator-Intermediary theory then provides a model of indirect governance that supplements delegation models premised on principal-agent theory. Under both theories, governors enhance their governance capacity by drawing on the capabilities of third parties. Whereas delegati…
Transnational business governance interactions: Conceptualization and framework for analysis
This special issue demonstrates the importance ofinteractionsin transnational business governance. The number of schemes applying non‐state authority to govern business conduct across borders has vastly expanded in numerous issue areas. As these initiatives proliferate, they increasingly interact with one another and with state‐based regimes. The key challenge is to understand the implications of these interactions for regulatory capacity and per…
Competence versus control: The governor's dilemma
Most governance is indirect, carried out through intermediaries. Principal–agent theory views indirect governance primarily as a problem of information: the agent has an informational advantage over the principal, which it can exploit to evade principal control. But indirect governance creates a more fundamental problem of power. Competent intermediaries with needed expertise, credibility, legitimacy, and/or operational capacity are inherently di…
Taking responsive regulation transnational: Strategies for international organizations
Responsive Regulation(RR) introduced important new ways of thinking about regulation. ButRRwas designed for domestic settings in which a single agency had clear jurisdiction, full regulatory capacity, and extensive information, and could (contingently) deploy stringent sanctions against well‐defined targets. Under globalization, many regulatory problems have shifted to the transnational arena, characterized by multiple regulators, public and priv…
Transforming governance and institutions for global sustainability: Key insights from the Earth System Governance Project
International 'standards' and international governance
Standards' are central mechanisms of international governance, but have different roles in various circumstances. These can be analyzed in terms of a simple typology. One key distinction is analytic: Contrasting the Prisoners' Dilemma structure of traditional Pigovian externalities with the Coordination structure of network externalities. The second distinction is substantive: contrasting physical or technological externalities with externalities…
Introducing Regulatory Intermediaries
Regulation is frequently viewed as a two-party relationship between a regulator (R) and the targets of its regulation (T). This volume conceives of regulation as a three-party system, in which diverse intermediaries (I) provide assistance to regulators and/or targets, drawing on their own capabilities, authority and legitimacy. Our framework paper for the volume, Theorizing regulatory intermediaries: The RIT model, sets out a general theoretical …
Enriching the RIT Framework
Regulation should be theorized as a three-party relationship (RIT), with intermediaries (I) playing diverse roles between the regulator (R) and the targets of regulation (T). Here we summarize and assess extensions of the basic RIT model introduced in the volume, including changes in regulatory relationships over time, chains of regulatory actors, and networks. We also draw lessons for regulatory policy from the volume as a whole, emphasizing the…
Strengthening the Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change
The inadequacies of the inter-state institutions and negotiating processes central to international climate policy create a pressing need for governance innovation. This article proposes one promising and feasible approach: strengthening the existingtransnationalregime complex for climate change. Leading organizations could strengthen the regime complex by forging stronger links among institutions, increasing coordination and collaboration, suppo…
Choosing low-cost institutions in global governance
Contemporary global governance takes place not only throughs formal inter-governmental organizations and treaties, but increasingly through diverse institutional forms including informal inter-governmental organizations, trans-governmental networks, and transnational public–private partnerships. Although these forms differ in many ways, they are all what we call ‘low-cost institutions’ (LCIs): the costs of creating, operating, changing, and exiti…
Orchestrating experimentation in non-state environmental commitments
A striking development in climate governance is the emergence of systems for non-state actors to make voluntary commitments alongside state undertakings. Because these commitments involve diverse actors carrying out diverse activities in diverse settings, they provide unprecedented opportunities for experimentation and learning. Yet voluntary commitment systems (VCS) rarely promote experimentation and provide few systematic learning mechanisms. B…
International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts
Over the last ten years, international relations (IR) theory, a branch of political science, has animated some of the most exciting scholarship in international law.1 If a true joint discipline has not yet emerged,2 scholars in both fields have clearly established the value of interdisciplinary cross-fertilization. Yet IR—like international law—comprises several distinct theoretical approaches or “methods.” While this complexity makes interaction…
Beyond opportunism: Intermediary loyalty in regulation and governance
Regulators and other governors rely on intermediaries to set and implement policies and to regulate targets. Existing literatures focus heavily on intermediaries of a single type – Opportunists, motivated solely by self‐interest. But intermediaries can also be motivated by different types of loyalty: to leaders (Vassals), to policies (Zealots), or to institutions (Mandarins). While all three types of loyalists are resistant to the traditional pro…
Engaging the public and the private in global sustainability governance
Journal Article Engaging the public and the private in global sustainability governance Get access KENNETH W. ABBOTT KENNETH W. ABBOTT 1Professor of Law and Professor of Global Studies, Willard H. Pedrick Distinguished Research Scholar, and Senior Sustainability Scholar at Arizona State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 88, Issue 3, May 2012, Pages 543–564, https://do…
Not again! Public perception, regulation, and nanotechnology
It is often argued that immediate government action regarding nanotechnology is needed to ensure that public opinion does not mistakenly view nanotechnology as dangerous, to restore public trust in government, and to increase the legitimacy of government action through increased public participation. This article questions whether governments can achieve these goals. As the world lurches toward regulation of nanotechnology, we should ask Why the …
Risk Management Principles for Nanotechnology
United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Chinese-American Society
United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Why States Act through Formal International Organizations
States use formal international organizations (IOs) to manage both their everyday interactions and more dramatic episodes, including international conflicts. Yet, contemporary international theory does not explain the existence or form of IOs. This article addresses the question of why states use formal organizations by investigating the functions IOs perform and the properties that enable them to perform those functions. Starting with a rational…
International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts
Over the last ten years, international relations (IR) theory, a branch of political science, has animated some of the most exciting scholarship in international law.1 If a true joint discipline has not yet emerged,2 scholars in both fields have clearly established the value of interdisciplinary cross-fertilization. Yet IR—like international law—comprises several distinct theoretical approaches or “methods.” While this complexity makes interaction…
The Concept of Legalization
We develop an empirically based conception of international legalization to show how law and politics are intertwined across a wide range of institutional forms and to frame the analytic and empirical articles that follow in this volume. International legalization is a form of institutionalization characterized by three dimensions: obligation, precision, and delegation. Obligation means that states are legally bound by rules or commitments and th…
Hard and Soft Law in International Governance
We examine why international actors—including states, firms, and activists—seek different types of legalized arrangements to solve political and substantive problems. We show how particular forms of legalization provide superior institutional solutions in different circumstances. We begin by examining the baseline advantages of “hard” legalization (that is, precise, legally binding obligations with appropriate third-party delegation). We emphasiz…
International 'standards' and international governance
Standards' are central mechanisms of international governance, but have different roles in various circumstances. These can be analyzed in terms of a simple typology. One key distinction is analytic: Contrasting the Prisoners' Dilemma structure of traditional Pigovian externalities with the Coordination structure of network externalities. The second distinction is substantive: contrasting physical or technological externalities with externalities…
Risk Management Principles for Nanotechnology
CHAPTER TWO. The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State
Not again! Public perception, regulation, and nanotechnology
It is often argued that immediate government action regarding nanotechnology is needed to ensure that public opinion does not mistakenly view nanotechnology as dangerous, to restore public trust in government, and to increase the legitimacy of government action through increased public participation. This article questions whether governments can achieve these goals. As the world lurches toward regulation of nanotechnology, we should ask Why the …
International regulation without international government: Improving IO performance through orchestration
International Harmonization of Regulation of Nanomedicine
Nanomedicine holds enormous promise for the improved prevention, detection and treatment of disease. Yet, at the same time, countervailing concerns about the potential safety risks of nano-technologies generally, and nanomedical products specifically, threaten to derail or at least delay the introduction and commercial viability of many nanomedicine applications. All around the globe, national governments are struggling with balancing these compe…
The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change
In climate change, as in other areas, recent years have produced a ‘Cambrian explosion’ of transnational institutions, standards, financing arrangements, and programs. As a result, climate governance has become complex, fragmented, and decentralized, operating without central coordination. Most studies of climate governance focus on inter state institutions. In contrast, I map a different realm of climate change governance: the diverse array of t…
Navigating the Anthropocene: Improving Earth System Governance
The United Nations conference in Rio de Janeiro in June is an important opportunity to improve the institutional framework for sustainable development.
Transforming governance and institutions for global sustainability: Key insights from the Earth System Governance Project
Engaging the public and the private in global sustainability governance
Journal Article Engaging the public and the private in global sustainability governance Get access KENNETH W. ABBOTT KENNETH W. ABBOTT 1Professor of Law and Professor of Global Studies, Willard H. Pedrick Distinguished Research Scholar, and Senior Sustainability Scholar at Arizona State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 88, Issue 3, May 2012, Pages 543–564, https://do…
Taking responsive regulation transnational: Strategies for international organizations
Responsive Regulation(RR) introduced important new ways of thinking about regulation. ButRRwas designed for domestic settings in which a single agency had clear jurisdiction, full regulatory capacity, and extensive information, and could (contingently) deploy stringent sanctions against well‐defined targets. Under globalization, many regulatory problems have shifted to the transnational arena, characterized by multiple regulators, public and priv…
Transnational business governance interactions: Conceptualization and framework for analysis
This special issue demonstrates the importance ofinteractionsin transnational business governance. The number of schemes applying non‐state authority to govern business conduct across borders has vastly expanded in numerous issue areas. As these initiatives proliferate, they increasingly interact with one another and with state‐based regimes. The key challenge is to understand the implications of these interactions for regulatory capacity and per…
Strengthening the Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change
The inadequacies of the inter-state institutions and negotiating processes central to international climate policy create a pressing need for governance innovation. This article proposes one promising and feasible approach: strengthening the existingtransnationalregime complex for climate change. Leading organizations could strengthen the regime complex by forging stronger links among institutions, increasing coordination and collaboration, suppo…
International Organizations as Orchestrators
International Organizations as Orchestrators reveals how IOs leverage their limited authority and resources to increase their effectiveness, power, and autonomy from states. By 'orchestrating' intermediaries – including NGOs – IOs can shape and steer global governance without engaging in hard, direct regulation. This volume is organized around a theoretical model that emphasizes voluntary collaboration and support. An outstanding group of scholar…
Reinvigorating International Climate Policy: A Comprehensive Framework for Effective Nonstate Action
As countries negotiate a new climate agreement for the United Nations climate conference in December 2015, a groundswell of climate actions is emerging as cities, regions, businesses and civil society groups act on mitigation and adaptation, independently, with each other and with national governments and international organizations. The Paris conference provides a historic opportunity to establish a framework to catalyse, support, and steer thes…
Organizational Ecology and Institutional Change in Global Governance
The institutions of global governance have changed dramatically in recent years. New organizational forms—including informal institutions, transgovernmental networks, and private transnational regulatory organizations (PTROs)—have expanded rapidly, while the growth of formal intergovernmental organizations has slowed. Organizational ecology provides an insightful framework for understanding these changing patterns of growth. Organizational ecolog…
Two Logics of Indirect Governance: Delegation and Orchestration
This article introduces the concept of orchestration as the mobilization of an intermediary by an orchestrator on a voluntary basis in pursuit of a joint governance goal. Orchestrator-Intermediary theory then provides a model of indirect governance that supplements delegation models premised on principal-agent theory. Under both theories, governors enhance their governance capacity by drawing on the capabilities of third parties. Whereas delegati…
Introducing Regulatory Intermediaries
Regulation is frequently viewed as a two-party relationship between a regulator (R) and the targets of its regulation (T). This volume conceives of regulation as a three-party system, in which diverse intermediaries (I) provide assistance to regulators and/or targets, drawing on their own capabilities, authority and legitimacy. Our framework paper for the volume, Theorizing regulatory intermediaries: The RIT model, sets out a general theoretical …
Theorizing Regulatory Intermediaries: The RIT Model
Regulation is typically conceived as a two-party relationship between a rule-maker or regulator (R) and a rule-taker or target (T). We set out an agenda for the study of regulation as a three- (or more) party relationship, with intermediaries (I) at the center of the analysis. Intermediaries play major and varied roles in regulation, from providing expertise and feedback to facilitating implementation, from monitoring the behavior of regulatory t…
Political science (28 works) · Business (25 works) · Corporate governance (21 works) · Law (18 works) · Economics (15 works) · Computer Science (13 works) · Law (12 works) · Finance (10 works) · Public Administration (10 works) · Sociology (10 works)