Matthew Duncombe
Biographic Data
| ID | 1628906 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Matthew Duncombe |
| GIVEN NAMES | Matthew |
| FAMILY NAME | Duncombe |
| SIGNATURE | DUNCOMBE M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Nottingham |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1879-8650 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 10 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Conceptualising Concepts in Greek Philosophy
Diodorus Cronus on Present and Past Change
Diodorus Cronus reportedly denied that there are truths about present kinēsis (change or movement) but affirmed that there are truths about past kinēsis. Although scholars have argued that Diodorus’s atomism about bodies, place, and time supports his rejection of present spatial movement of simple bodies, I argue that Diodorus rejected a broader range of present changes, including qualitative and existential change. I also argue that Diodorus rej…
Relative Change
A relative change occurs when some item changes a relation. This Element examines how Plato, Aristotle, Stoics and Sextus Empiricus approached relative change. Relative change is puzzling because the following three propositions each seem true but cannot be true together: (1) No relative changes are intrinsic changes; (2) Only intrinsic changes are proper changes; (3) Some relative changes are proper changes. Plato's Theaetetus and Phaedo propert…
Ancient Relativity
Aristotle’s Categories 7 Adopts Plato’s View of Relativity
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Thought as Internal Speech in Plato and Aristotle
Scholars often assert that Plato and Aristotle share the view that discursive thought (dianoia) is internal speech (TIS). However, there has been little work to clarify or substantiate this reading. In this paper I show Plato and Aristotle share some core commitments about the relationship of thought and speech, but cash out TIS in different ways. Plato and Aristotle both hold that discursive thinking is a process that moves from a set of doxasti…
Thought as Internal Speech in Plato and Aristotle
Scholars often assert that Plato and Aristotle share the view that discursive thought ( dianoia ) is internal speech (TIS). However, there has been little work to clarify or substantiate this reading. In this paper I show Plato and Aristotle share some core commitments about the relationship of thought and speech, but cash out TIS in different ways. Plato and Aristotle both hold that discursive thinking is a process that moves from a set of doxas…
Aristotle’s Two Accounts of Relatives in Categories 7
At Categories 7, 6a36-7 Aristotle defines relatives (R1), but at 8a13-28 worries that the definition may include some substances. Aristotle introduces a second account of relatives (R2, at 8a31-2) to solve the problem. Recent commentators have held that Aristotle intends to solve the extensional adequacy worry by restricting the extension of relatives. That is, R2 counts fewer items as relative than R1. However, this cannot explain Aristotle’s at…
Irreflexivity and Aristotle's Syllogismos
Aristotle's definition of syllogismos at Prior Analytics 24b18-20 specifies syllogistic consequence as an irreflexive relation: the conclusion must be different from each premise and any conjunction of the premises. Typically, commentators explain this irreflexivity condition as Aristotle's attempt to brand question-begging syllogismoi illegitimate in argumentative contexts. However, this explanation faces two problems. First, it fails to conside…
Plato’s Absolute and Relative Categories at Sophist 255c14
Sophist 255c14 distinguishes καθ’ αὑτά and πρὸς ἄλλα (in relation to others). Many commentators identify this with the ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ category distinction. However, terms such as ‘same’ cannot fit into either category. Several reliable manuscripts read πρὸς ἄλληλα (in relation to each other) for πρὸς ἄλλα. I show that πρὸς ἄλληλα is a palaeographically plausible reading which accommodates the problematic terms. I then defend my reading…
Aristotle’s Two Accounts of Relatives in Categories 7
At Categories 7, 6a36-7 Aristotle defines relatives (R1), but at 8a13-28 worries that the definition may include some substances. Aristotle introduces a second account of relatives (R2, at 8a31-2) to solve the problem. Recent commentators have held that Aristotle intends to solve the extensional adequacy worry by restricting the extension of relatives. That is, R2 counts fewer items as relative than R1. However, this cannot explain Aristotle’s at…
Irreflexivity and Aristotle's Syllogismos
Aristotle's definition of syllogismos at Prior Analytics 24b18-20 specifies syllogistic consequence as an irreflexive relation: the conclusion must be different from each premise and any conjunction of the premises. Typically, commentators explain this irreflexivity condition as Aristotle's attempt to brand question-begging syllogismoi illegitimate in argumentative contexts. However, this explanation faces two problems. First, it fails to conside…
Plato’s Absolute and Relative Categories at Sophist 255c14
Sophist 255c14 distinguishes καθ’ αὑτά and πρὸς ἄλλα (in relation to others). Many commentators identify this with the ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ category distinction. However, terms such as ‘same’ cannot fit into either category. Several reliable manuscripts read πρὸς ἄλληλα (in relation to each other) for πρὸς ἄλλα. I show that πρὸς ἄλληλα is a palaeographically plausible reading which accommodates the problematic terms. I then defend my reading…
Irreflexivity and Aristotle's Syllogismos
Aristotle's definition of syllogismos at Prior Analytics 24b18-20 specifies syllogistic consequence as an irreflexive relation: the conclusion must be different from each premise and any conjunction of the premises. Typically, commentators explain this irreflexivity condition as Aristotle's attempt to brand question-begging syllogismoi illegitimate in argumentative contexts. However, this explanation faces two problems. First, it fails to conside…
Aristotle’s Two Accounts of Relatives in Categories 7
At Categories 7, 6a36-7 Aristotle defines relatives (R1), but at 8a13-28 worries that the definition may include some substances. Aristotle introduces a second account of relatives (R2, at 8a31-2) to solve the problem. Recent commentators have held that Aristotle intends to solve the extensional adequacy worry by restricting the extension of relatives. That is, R2 counts fewer items as relative than R1. However, this cannot explain Aristotle’s at…
Thought as Internal Speech in Plato and Aristotle
Scholars often assert that Plato and Aristotle share the view that discursive thought (dianoia) is internal speech (TIS). However, there has been little work to clarify or substantiate this reading. In this paper I show Plato and Aristotle share some core commitments about the relationship of thought and speech, but cash out TIS in different ways. Plato and Aristotle both hold that discursive thinking is a process that moves from a set of doxasti…
Thought as Internal Speech in Plato and Aristotle
Scholars often assert that Plato and Aristotle share the view that discursive thought ( dianoia ) is internal speech (TIS). However, there has been little work to clarify or substantiate this reading. In this paper I show Plato and Aristotle share some core commitments about the relationship of thought and speech, but cash out TIS in different ways. Plato and Aristotle both hold that discursive thinking is a process that moves from a set of doxas…
Aristotle’s Categories 7 Adopts Plato’s View of Relativity
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Relative Change
A relative change occurs when some item changes a relation. This Element examines how Plato, Aristotle, Stoics and Sextus Empiricus approached relative change. Relative change is puzzling because the following three propositions each seem true but cannot be true together: (1) No relative changes are intrinsic changes; (2) Only intrinsic changes are proper changes; (3) Some relative changes are proper changes. Plato's Theaetetus and Phaedo propert…
Ancient Relativity
Diodorus Cronus on Present and Past Change
Diodorus Cronus reportedly denied that there are truths about present kinēsis (change or movement) but affirmed that there are truths about past kinēsis. Although scholars have argued that Diodorus’s atomism about bodies, place, and time supports his rejection of present spatial movement of simple bodies, I argue that Diodorus rejected a broader range of present changes, including qualitative and existential change. I also argue that Diodorus rej…
Conceptualising Concepts in Greek Philosophy
Classical Philosophy and Thought (10 works) · Philosophy (10 works) · Epistemology (9 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Historical, Religious, and Philosophical Studies (4 works) · Art (3 works) · Literature (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Ancient Philosophy (2 works)