Helen Frowe
Biographic Data
| ID | 1628923 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Helen Frowe |
| GIVEN NAMES | Helen |
| FAMILY NAME | Frowe |
| SIGNATURE | FROWE H |
| AFFILIATIONS | Stockholm University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4754-6847 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 14 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 10 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 2 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Heritage and War
Assisting the Assisters
The recent withdrawal of Western states from Afghanistan saw widespread endorsement of the view that these states owe especially stringent duties of rescue to Afghans who assisted their armed forces during the 20 years of Western intervention and occupation.1 Although concern has been expressed for those who worked with Western states quite broadly, it is the treatment of those who directly assisted Western forces—for example, by working alongsid…
Liability for Wrongful Assistance
Several states, including the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, have recently engaged in the high‐profile supporting of foreign rebel fighters, providing them with training, weapons, and financial resources. Justifications for providing this assistance usually invoke, at least in part, our obligations to prevent harm to the citizens of oppressive and violent regimes. Providing such assistance is often presented as a morally safe ‘mid…
Introduction
Intervention in foreign conflicts is, undoubtedly, one of the most urgent and controversial issues in modern politics. After NATO interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo during the 1990s, which were widely regarded as reasonably successful, states were comparatively receptive to the idea of using military force abroad for humanitarian ends. There followed a flurry of academic literature on the normative implications of intervention, wi…
‘The moral irrelevance of moral coercion’
An agent A morally coerces another agent, B, when A manipulates non-epistemological facts in order that B’s moral commitments enjoin B to do what A wants B to do, and B is motivated by these commitments. It is widely argued that forced choices arising from moral coercion are morally distinct from forced choices arising from moral duress or happenstance. On these accounts, the fact of being coerced bears on what an agent may do, the voluntariness …
Introduction
This article links to the Symposium on Causation in War by Carolina Sartorio , Helen Beebee and Alex Kaiserman , and Lars Christie
On the Redundancy of Jus ad vim
Wrongful Observation
According to common-sense morality, agents can become morally connected to the wrongdoing of others, such that they are rendered liable to bear costs to prevent or rectify the wrongs committed by the primary wrongdoer.Various possible grounds of this connection have been proposed, such as causally contributing to another's wrongdoing 1 , sharing particular kinds of intentions with the primary wrongdoer 2 , and shared membership in certain types o…
The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War
Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest-among philosophers, legal scholars, and military experts-in the ethics of war. This resurgence of interest has multiple causes: escalating and persistent conflicts around the globe over the last 20 years; the growth of new forms of unconventional and asymmetrical warfare; and the appearance of new issues like targeted killings and drones. Much of the most exciting theoretical and applied research ov…
Lesser-Evil Justifications for Harming
Much philosophical attention has been paid to the question of whether, and why, one may divert a runaway trolley away from where it will kill five people to where it will kill one. But little attention has been paid to whether the reasons that ground a permission to divert thereby ground a duty to divert. This paper defends the Requirement Thesis, which holds that one is, ordinarily, required to act on lesser-evil justifications for harming for t…
On the Redundancy of Jus ad Vim
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Defensive Killing
Helen Frowe offers a new account of when and why it is morally permissible for a person to use force to defend herself or others against harm. She explores the use of force between individuals before extending the enquiry to war, to argue that we should judge the ethics of killing in war by the moral rules that govern killing between individuals.
Lesser-Evil Justifications for Harming
Much philosophical attention has been paid to the question of whether, and why, one may divert a runaway trolley away from where it will kill five people to where it will kill one. But little attention has been paid to whether the reasons that ground a permission to divert thereby ground a duty to divert. This paper defends the Requirement Thesis, which holds that one is, ordinarily, required to act on lesser-evil justifications for harming for t…
On the Redundancy of Jus ad Vim
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Wrongful Observation
According to common-sense morality, agents can become morally connected to the wrongdoing of others, such that they are rendered liable to bear costs to prevent or rectify the wrongs committed by the primary wrongdoer.Various possible grounds of this connection have been proposed, such as causally contributing to another's wrongdoing 1 , sharing particular kinds of intentions with the primary wrongdoer 2 , and shared membership in certain types o…
Defensive Killing
Helen Frowe offers a new account of when and why it is morally permissible for a person to use force to defend herself or others against harm. She explores the use of force between individuals before extending the enquiry to war, to argue that we should judge the ethics of killing in war by the moral rules that govern killing between individuals.
On the Redundancy of Jus ad Vim
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War
Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest-among philosophers, legal scholars, and military experts-in the ethics of war. This resurgence of interest has multiple causes: escalating and persistent conflicts around the globe over the last 20 years; the growth of new forms of unconventional and asymmetrical warfare; and the appearance of new issues like targeted killings and drones. Much of the most exciting theoretical and applied research ov…
Lesser-Evil Justifications for Harming
Much philosophical attention has been paid to the question of whether, and why, one may divert a runaway trolley away from where it will kill five people to where it will kill one. But little attention has been paid to whether the reasons that ground a permission to divert thereby ground a duty to divert. This paper defends the Requirement Thesis, which holds that one is, ordinarily, required to act on lesser-evil justifications for harming for t…
On the Redundancy of Jus ad vim
Wrongful Observation
According to common-sense morality, agents can become morally connected to the wrongdoing of others, such that they are rendered liable to bear costs to prevent or rectify the wrongs committed by the primary wrongdoer.Various possible grounds of this connection have been proposed, such as causally contributing to another's wrongdoing 1 , sharing particular kinds of intentions with the primary wrongdoer 2 , and shared membership in certain types o…
Introduction
This article links to the Symposium on Causation in War by Carolina Sartorio , Helen Beebee and Alex Kaiserman , and Lars Christie
‘The moral irrelevance of moral coercion’
An agent A morally coerces another agent, B, when A manipulates non-epistemological facts in order that B’s moral commitments enjoin B to do what A wants B to do, and B is motivated by these commitments. It is widely argued that forced choices arising from moral coercion are morally distinct from forced choices arising from moral duress or happenstance. On these accounts, the fact of being coerced bears on what an agent may do, the voluntariness …
Liability for Wrongful Assistance
Several states, including the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, have recently engaged in the high‐profile supporting of foreign rebel fighters, providing them with training, weapons, and financial resources. Justifications for providing this assistance usually invoke, at least in part, our obligations to prevent harm to the citizens of oppressive and violent regimes. Providing such assistance is often presented as a morally safe ‘mid…
Introduction
Intervention in foreign conflicts is, undoubtedly, one of the most urgent and controversial issues in modern politics. After NATO interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo during the 1990s, which were widely regarded as reasonably successful, states were comparatively receptive to the idea of using military force abroad for humanitarian ends. There followed a flurry of academic literature on the normative implications of intervention, wi…
Heritage and War
Assisting the Assisters
The recent withdrawal of Western states from Afghanistan saw widespread endorsement of the view that these states owe especially stringent duties of rescue to Afghans who assisted their armed forces during the 20 years of Western intervention and occupation.1 Although concern has been expressed for those who worked with Western states quite broadly, it is the treatment of those who directly assisted Western forces—for example, by working alongsid…
War, Ethics, and Justification (9 works) · Sociology (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Political science (7 works) · Free Will and Agency (5 works) · Harm (5 works) · Torture, Ethics, and Law (5 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Criminology (3 works)