Emilie Pagano
Biographic Data
| ID | 1628969 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Emilie Pagano |
| GIVEN NAMES | Emilie |
| FAMILY NAME | Pagano |
| SIGNATURE | PAGANO E |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Vienna |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Being social, being socially constructed, and being fundamental relative to social reality
Although the properties of being social and of being socially constructed are indispensable to our understanding of social reality, social metaphysicians are unclear about how they're related. In this paper, I argue that whereas everything that's socially constructed is also social, not everything that's social is also socially constructed. In particular, I argue that something is what I call "fundamental relative to social reality," something th…
All socially constructed facts are social facts
Social metaphysicians agree that to be socially constructed is in some sense to depend on social goings-on. It's now common to claim that the relevant kind of dependence is grounding such that to be socially constructed is in some sense to be grounded in social goings-on. Nonetheless, grounding accounts of social construction are at risk of overgeneralizing, and, so, its's unclear what work grounding can and/or should do in accounting for it. In …
Functionalism, Pluralities, and Groups
It’s widely accepted that pluralism about groups—the view that groups are pluralities—is incompatible with the following: one group can have different individuals as members at both different times and in different worlds (Difference), and more than one group can have the same individuals as members at both the same times and in the same worlds (Sameness). As a result, it’s widely accepted that pluralism is false. In this paper, I argue that thes…
What Social Construction Isn’t
What Social Construction Isn’t
All socially constructed facts are social facts
Social metaphysicians agree that to be socially constructed is in some sense to depend on social goings-on. It's now common to claim that the relevant kind of dependence is grounding such that to be socially constructed is in some sense to be grounded in social goings-on. Nonetheless, grounding accounts of social construction are at risk of overgeneralizing, and, so, its's unclear what work grounding can and/or should do in accounting for it. In …
What Social Construction Isn’t
Functionalism, Pluralities, and Groups
It’s widely accepted that pluralism about groups—the view that groups are pluralities—is incompatible with the following: one group can have different individuals as members at both different times and in different worlds (Difference), and more than one group can have the same individuals as members at both the same times and in the same worlds (Sameness). As a result, it’s widely accepted that pluralism is false. In this paper, I argue that thes…
All socially constructed facts are social facts
Social metaphysicians agree that to be socially constructed is in some sense to depend on social goings-on. It's now common to claim that the relevant kind of dependence is grounding such that to be socially constructed is in some sense to be grounded in social goings-on. Nonetheless, grounding accounts of social construction are at risk of overgeneralizing, and, so, its's unclear what work grounding can and/or should do in accounting for it. In …
Being social, being socially constructed, and being fundamental relative to social reality
Although the properties of being social and of being socially constructed are indispensable to our understanding of social reality, social metaphysicians are unclear about how they're related. In this paper, I argue that whereas everything that's socially constructed is also social, not everything that's social is also socially constructed. In particular, I argue that something is what I call "fundamental relative to social reality," something th…
Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Monism (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Sociology (2 works) · Argument (complex analysis (1 works) · Common ground (1 works)