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Niels De Haan

Biographic Data

ID1629167
NAMENiels De Haan
GIVEN NAMESNiels
FAMILY NAMEDe Haan
SIGNATUREDE HAAN N
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Vienna
ORCID0000-0002-4021-7410
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS9
TOTAL CITATIONS1
WORKS AS AUTHOR9
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2021
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX1
  • Moral Collectivism and the Methodology of Ethical Theory

    Open Access•Niels De Haan•ARTICLE•Erkenntnis•2026

    Moral collectivists argue that certain groups can bear moral responsibility and moral duties. Moral individualists reject this. In this debate, individualists and collectivists both make a common methodological mistake when theorizing about moral agency, responsibility, and blame. Their arguments implicitly assume an all-out primacy of the individual domain. Unless groups can satisfy the exact conditions of our best theory of individual moral res…

  • In Praise of Collective Agents

    Open Access•Frank Hindriks, Niels De Haan•ARTICLE•Canadian Journal of Philosophy•2026

    Collective agents can be praiseworthy without any of their members being praiseworthy. To support this “discontinuity thesis,” we consider the role that motivation plays in the attribution of moral responsibility. An agent who is praiseworthy must have had the appropriate moral motivation. We argue that it is possible that the collective agent was appropriately motivated, while its members were not. Subsequently, we develop an account of corporat…

  • The non-compliance dilemma for team reasoning views of collective moral duties

    Open Access•Niels De Haan•ARTICLE•Inquiry•2026

    In this paper, I argue that anyone who believes that team reasoning is essential to explaining collective moral duties faces a troublesome dilemma. If the collective duty is conditional on the willingness of members, then team reasoning views generate wrong deontic moral judgments in certain cases that involve non-compliance. If the collective duty is not conditional on the willingness of members, then team reasoning views cannot provide a sound …

  • Ghosting in the Job Market

    Open Access•Niels De Haan•ARTICLE•Journal of Social Philosophy•2025

    Jenny: Jenny is an early career scholar and is searching for her next academic job in her field, as her current contract ends soon. She sees an interesting job advertisement for an assistant professorship with tenure-track at a reputable university and decides to apply. After doing some research on the department, their faculty and their curriculum, Jenny prepares her cover letter, CV, research proposal, teaching dossier, diversity statement, and…

  • Group Responsibility and Historicism

    Open Access•Collin, Niels De Haan•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2024•Cited by: 1•References: 27

    In this paper, we focus on the moral responsibility of organized groups in light of historicism. Historicism is the view that any morally responsible agent must satisfy certain historical conditions, such as not having been manipulated. We set out four examples involving morally responsible organized groups that pose problems for existing accounts of historicism. We then pose a trilemma: one can reject group responsibility, reject historicism, or…

  • Collective moral agency and self-induced moral incapacity

    Open Access•Niels De Haan•ARTICLE•Philosophical Explorations•2023

    Collective moral agents can cause their own moral incapacity. If an agent is morally incapacitated, then the agent is exempted from responsibility. Due to self-induced moral incapacity, corporate responsibility gaps resurface. To solve this problem, I first set out and defend a minimalist account of moral competence for group agents. After setting out how a collective agent can cause its own moral incapacity, I argue that self-induced temporary e…

  • Group agents, moral competence and duty-bearers

    Open Access•Niels De Haan•ARTICLE•Philosophical Studies•2023

    According to some collectivists, purposive groups that lack decision-making procedures such as riot mobs, friends walking together, or the pro-life lobby can be morally responsible and have moral duties. I focus on plural subject- and we-mode-collectivism. I argue that purposive groups do not qualify as duty-bearers even if they qualify as agents on either view. To qualify as a duty-bearer, an agent must be morally competent. I develop the Update…

  • Cooperative duties of efficiency and efficacy

    Open Access•Niels De Haan•ARTICLE•Journal of Global Ethics•2022•References: 11

    I argue that agents can have duties to cooperate with one another if this increases their combined efficiency and/or efficacy in addressing ongoing collective moral problems. I call these duties cooperative duties of efficiency and efficacy. I focus particularly on collective agents and how agents ought to reason and act in the face of global moral problems. After setting out my account, I argue that a subset of cooperative duties of efficiency a…

  • On the Relation Between Collective Responsibility and Collective Duties

    Open Access•Niels De Haan•ARTICLE•Philosophy•2021

    There is good reason to think that moral responsibility as accountability is tied to the violation of moral demands. This lends intuitive support to Type-Symmetry in the collective realm: A type of responsibility entails the violation or unfulfillment of the same type of all-things-considered duty. For example, collective responsibility necessarily entails the violation of a collective duty. But Type-Symmetry is false. In this paper I argue that …

  • Group Responsibility and Historicism

    Open Access•Collin, Niels De Haan•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2024•Cited by: 1•References: 27

    In this paper, we focus on the moral responsibility of organized groups in light of historicism. Historicism is the view that any morally responsible agent must satisfy certain historical conditions, such as not having been manipulated. We set out four examples involving morally responsible organized groups that pose problems for existing accounts of historicism. We then pose a trilemma: one can reject group responsibility, reject historicism, or…

  • On the Relation Between Collective Responsibility and Collective Duties

    Open Access•Niels De Haan•ARTICLE•Philosophy•2021

    There is good reason to think that moral responsibility as accountability is tied to the violation of moral demands. This lends intuitive support to Type-Symmetry in the collective realm: A type of responsibility entails the violation or unfulfillment of the same type of all-things-considered duty. For example, collective responsibility necessarily entails the violation of a collective duty. But Type-Symmetry is false. In this paper I argue that …

  • Cooperative duties of efficiency and efficacy

    Open Access•Niels De Haan•ARTICLE•Journal of Global Ethics•2022•References: 11

    I argue that agents can have duties to cooperate with one another if this increases their combined efficiency and/or efficacy in addressing ongoing collective moral problems. I call these duties cooperative duties of efficiency and efficacy. I focus particularly on collective agents and how agents ought to reason and act in the face of global moral problems. After setting out my account, I argue that a subset of cooperative duties of efficiency a…

  • Collective moral agency and self-induced moral incapacity

    Open Access•Niels De Haan•ARTICLE•Philosophical Explorations•2023

    Collective moral agents can cause their own moral incapacity. If an agent is morally incapacitated, then the agent is exempted from responsibility. Due to self-induced moral incapacity, corporate responsibility gaps resurface. To solve this problem, I first set out and defend a minimalist account of moral competence for group agents. After setting out how a collective agent can cause its own moral incapacity, I argue that self-induced temporary e…

  • Group agents, moral competence and duty-bearers

    Open Access•Niels De Haan•ARTICLE•Philosophical Studies•2023

    According to some collectivists, purposive groups that lack decision-making procedures such as riot mobs, friends walking together, or the pro-life lobby can be morally responsible and have moral duties. I focus on plural subject- and we-mode-collectivism. I argue that purposive groups do not qualify as duty-bearers even if they qualify as agents on either view. To qualify as a duty-bearer, an agent must be morally competent. I develop the Update…

  • Group Responsibility and Historicism

    Open Access•Collin, Niels De Haan•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•2024•Cited by: 1•References: 27

    In this paper, we focus on the moral responsibility of organized groups in light of historicism. Historicism is the view that any morally responsible agent must satisfy certain historical conditions, such as not having been manipulated. We set out four examples involving morally responsible organized groups that pose problems for existing accounts of historicism. We then pose a trilemma: one can reject group responsibility, reject historicism, or…

  • Ghosting in the Job Market

    Open Access•Niels De Haan•ARTICLE•Journal of Social Philosophy•2025

    Jenny: Jenny is an early career scholar and is searching for her next academic job in her field, as her current contract ends soon. She sees an interesting job advertisement for an assistant professorship with tenure-track at a reputable university and decides to apply. After doing some research on the department, their faculty and their curriculum, Jenny prepares her cover letter, CV, research proposal, teaching dossier, diversity statement, and…

  • Moral Collectivism and the Methodology of Ethical Theory

    Open Access•Niels De Haan•ARTICLE•Erkenntnis•2026

    Moral collectivists argue that certain groups can bear moral responsibility and moral duties. Moral individualists reject this. In this debate, individualists and collectivists both make a common methodological mistake when theorizing about moral agency, responsibility, and blame. Their arguments implicitly assume an all-out primacy of the individual domain. Unless groups can satisfy the exact conditions of our best theory of individual moral res…

  • In Praise of Collective Agents

    Open Access•Frank Hindriks, Niels De Haan•ARTICLE•Canadian Journal of Philosophy•2026

    Collective agents can be praiseworthy without any of their members being praiseworthy. To support this “discontinuity thesis,” we consider the role that motivation plays in the attribution of moral responsibility. An agent who is praiseworthy must have had the appropriate moral motivation. We argue that it is possible that the collective agent was appropriately motivated, while its members were not. Subsequently, we develop an account of corporat…

  • The non-compliance dilemma for team reasoning views of collective moral duties

    Open Access•Niels De Haan•ARTICLE•Inquiry•2026

    In this paper, I argue that anyone who believes that team reasoning is essential to explaining collective moral duties faces a troublesome dilemma. If the collective duty is conditional on the willingness of members, then team reasoning views generate wrong deontic moral judgments in certain cases that involve non-compliance. If the collective duty is not conditional on the willingness of members, then team reasoning views cannot provide a sound …

Free Will and Agency (7 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (5 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (5 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Law and economics (4 works) · Moral disengagement (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Political science (4 works)

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