Mark Lebar
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 1629201 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Mark Lebar |
| NOMBRES | Mark |
| APELLIDO | Lebar |
| FIRMA | LEBAR M |
| AFILIACIONES | Ohio University |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 13 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 10 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 12 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1999 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2023 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Response-Dependent Realism
Writers on metaethics divide over two conceptions of what moral realism comes to. The first of these—the “Modest” conception—commits only to the truth-aptness of moral judgments. The second—the “Robust” conception—commits to the mind- or stance- or response-independence of such judgments. In this chapter, I take up the relationship of response-dependent (RD) metaethical theories to these two conceptions of realism. While some proponents of RD vie…
Equality of Authority as the Aristotelian Common Good
Justice
From its earliest roots in Greek philosophy, among the most prominent virtues—and arguably the most important of the social virtues—has been justice. While during this same period political philosophy focused intense energy on understanding justice as a property or quality of societies, discussion of justice as a virtue of individuals mostly disappeared. But justice as a virtue of individual character has, along with the other virtues, regained f…
Should Epistemic Injustices Be Redressed by the “Corrective Virtues”
This chapter examines the kind of wronging of a person involved in cases of epistemic injustice and whether or not epistemic injustice, so understood, is better remedied by state action or by what Miranda Fricker calls the “corrective virtues.” It is argued that there is a trade off between arguing that such injustices are very pervasive, or identifying what it is distinctively to wrong a person in their capacity as a knower. Focusing on the idea…
Constructivism and particularism
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
The Value of Living Well
In this text, Mark LeBar develops Virtue Eudaimonism, which brings the philosophy of the ancient Greeks to bear on contemporary problems in metaethics, especially the metaphysics of norms and the nature of practical rationality.
Constructivism in Ethics
Are there such things as moral truths? How do we know what we should do? And does it matter? Constructivism states that moral truths are neither invented nor discovered, but rather are constructed by rational agents in order to solve practical problems. While constructivism has become the focus of many philosophical debates in normative ethics, meta-ethics and action theory, its importance is still to be fully appreciated. These new essays writte…
Virtue Ethics and Deontic Constraints
Development and Reasons
Journal Article Development and Reasons Get access What is Good and Why: the Ethics of Well‐Being. Richard Kraut, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007. Pp. xi + 286. Price £22.95.) Mark LeBar Mark LeBar University of North Carolina Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 58, Issue 233, October 2008, Pages 711–719, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.541.x Published: 1…
Ends
Korsgaard, Wittgenstein, and the Mafioso
Tara Smith, Viable Values
Kant on Welfare
Contemporary debate over public welfare policy is often cast in Kantian terms. It is argued, for example, that respect for the dignity of the poor requires public aid, or that respect for their autonomy forbids it. In some recent political discourse, the views of Kant himself have been invoked in defense of public welfare provision. Some have argued that his moral theory mandates welfare as an expression of our duty to be beneficent, or that Kant…
Kant on Welfare
Contemporary debate over public welfare policy is often cast in Kantian terms. It is argued, for example, that respect for the dignity of the poor requires public aid, or that respect for their autonomy forbids it. In some recent political discourse, the views of Kant himself have been invoked in defense of public welfare provision. Some have argued that his moral theory mandates welfare as an expression of our duty to be beneficent, or that Kant…
Korsgaard, Wittgenstein, and the Mafioso
Tara Smith, Viable Values
Ends
Development and Reasons
Journal Article Development and Reasons Get access What is Good and Why: the Ethics of Well‐Being. Richard Kraut, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007. Pp. xi + 286. Price £22.95.) Mark LeBar Mark LeBar University of North Carolina Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 58, Issue 233, October 2008, Pages 711–719, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.541.x Published: 1…
Virtue Ethics and Deontic Constraints
Constructivism and particularism
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
The Value of Living Well
In this text, Mark LeBar develops Virtue Eudaimonism, which brings the philosophy of the ancient Greeks to bear on contemporary problems in metaethics, especially the metaphysics of norms and the nature of practical rationality.
Constructivism in Ethics
Are there such things as moral truths? How do we know what we should do? And does it matter? Constructivism states that moral truths are neither invented nor discovered, but rather are constructed by rational agents in order to solve practical problems. While constructivism has become the focus of many philosophical debates in normative ethics, meta-ethics and action theory, its importance is still to be fully appreciated. These new essays writte…
Justice
From its earliest roots in Greek philosophy, among the most prominent virtues—and arguably the most important of the social virtues—has been justice. While during this same period political philosophy focused intense energy on understanding justice as a property or quality of societies, discussion of justice as a virtue of individuals mostly disappeared. But justice as a virtue of individual character has, along with the other virtues, regained f…
Should Epistemic Injustices Be Redressed by the “Corrective Virtues”
This chapter examines the kind of wronging of a person involved in cases of epistemic injustice and whether or not epistemic injustice, so understood, is better remedied by state action or by what Miranda Fricker calls the “corrective virtues.” It is argued that there is a trade off between arguing that such injustices are very pervasive, or identifying what it is distinctively to wrong a person in their capacity as a knower. Focusing on the idea…
Equality of Authority as the Aristotelian Common Good
Response-Dependent Realism
Writers on metaethics divide over two conceptions of what moral realism comes to. The first of these—the “Modest” conception—commits only to the truth-aptness of moral judgments. The second—the “Robust” conception—commits to the mind- or stance- or response-independence of such judgments. In this chapter, I take up the relationship of response-dependent (RD) metaethical theories to these two conceptions of realism. While some proponents of RD vie…
Epistemology (7 obras) · Philosophy (7 obras) · Political science (7 obras) · Law (5 obras) · Sociology (5 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 obras) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (4 obras) · Politics (4 obras) · Free Will and Agency (3 obras) · Autonomy (2 obras)