Mattias Gunnemyr
Biographic Data
| ID | 1634382 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Mattias Gunnemyr |
| GIVEN NAMES | Mattias |
| FAMILY NAME | Gunnemyr |
| SIGNATURE | GUNNEMYR M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Lund University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9060-1242 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Carolina Sartorio’s Causalism: Unifying Action and Free Action
From footprints to impact and back again: Calculating corporate climate contributions
Measuring corporate contributions to climate change is often crucial for investors, policymakers and legal frameworks. Current methods use attributional carbon footprint metrics, which quantify emissions linked to a company's activities. Despite its widespread use, this approach faces challenges like ‘brown spinning’ and fails to account for substitution effects. In response, some advocate for consequential metrics, which consider alternative sce…
Estimating degrees of causal contribution
How do we best measure degrees of causal contribution? Dependence theorists argue that causal strength is determined by the difference it makes, but this approach yields counterintuitive results in cases of overdetermination and pre-emption. Production theorists propose measuring an event’s causal contribution by the number of sets of actual events sufficient for the effect where the cause is necessary, yet they face challenges in pre-emption and…
Making a vague difference: Kagan, Nefsky and the Sorites Paradox
In collective harm cases, bad consequences follow if enough people act in a certain way even though no such individual act makes a difference for the worse. Global warming, overfishing and Derek Parfit’s famous case of the harmless torturers are some examples of such harm. Shelly Kagan argues that there is a threshold such that one single act might trigger harm in all collective harm cases. Julia Nefsky points to serious shortcomings in Kagan’s a…
Reasons for action: Making a difference to the security of outcomes
In this paper, we present a new account of teleological reasons, i.e. reasons to perform a particular action because of the outcomes it promotes. Our account gives the desired verdict in a number of difficult cases, including cases of overdetermination and non-threshold cases like Parfit’s famous Drops of water. The key to our account is to look more closely at the metaphysics of causation. According to Touborg ( The dual nature of causation , 20…
You Just Didn't Care Enough: Quality of Will, Causation, and Blameworthiness for Actions, Omissions, and Outcomes
We refine the intuitively appealing idea that you are blameworthy for something if it happened because you did not care enough. More formally: you are blameworthy for X (where X may be an action, omission, or outcome) just in case there is the right causal-explanatory relation between your poor quality of will and X. First, we argue that blameworthiness for actions, omissions, and outcomes is concerned with negative differences: you are blamewort…
Why the Social Connection Model Fails: Participation is Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Political Responsibility
Iris Marion Young presents a social connection model on which those, and only those, who participate in structural processes that produce injustice have a forward-looking responsibility to redress the resulting injustice by challenging the structures that produce it (she sometimes calls this a political responsibility [Young 2011]). In Young's view, this is an all-things-considered, albeit discretionary, responsibility. I argue that participation…
Why the Social Connection Model Fails: Participation is Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Political Responsibility
Iris Marion Young presents a social connection model on which those, and only those, who participate in structural processes that produce injustice have a forward-looking responsibility to redress the resulting injustice by challenging the structures that produce it (she sometimes calls this a political responsibility [Young 2011]). In Young's view, this is an all-things-considered, albeit discretionary, responsibility. I argue that participation…
Why the Social Connection Model Fails: Participation is Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Political Responsibility
Iris Marion Young presents a social connection model on which those, and only those, who participate in structural processes that produce injustice have a forward-looking responsibility to redress the resulting injustice by challenging the structures that produce it (she sometimes calls this a political responsibility [Young 2011]). In Young's view, this is an all-things-considered, albeit discretionary, responsibility. I argue that participation…
Reasons for action: Making a difference to the security of outcomes
In this paper, we present a new account of teleological reasons, i.e. reasons to perform a particular action because of the outcomes it promotes. Our account gives the desired verdict in a number of difficult cases, including cases of overdetermination and non-threshold cases like Parfit’s famous Drops of water. The key to our account is to look more closely at the metaphysics of causation. According to Touborg ( The dual nature of causation , 20…
You Just Didn't Care Enough: Quality of Will, Causation, and Blameworthiness for Actions, Omissions, and Outcomes
We refine the intuitively appealing idea that you are blameworthy for something if it happened because you did not care enough. More formally: you are blameworthy for X (where X may be an action, omission, or outcome) just in case there is the right causal-explanatory relation between your poor quality of will and X. First, we argue that blameworthiness for actions, omissions, and outcomes is concerned with negative differences: you are blamewort…
Making a vague difference: Kagan, Nefsky and the Sorites Paradox
In collective harm cases, bad consequences follow if enough people act in a certain way even though no such individual act makes a difference for the worse. Global warming, overfishing and Derek Parfit’s famous case of the harmless torturers are some examples of such harm. Shelly Kagan argues that there is a threshold such that one single act might trigger harm in all collective harm cases. Julia Nefsky points to serious shortcomings in Kagan’s a…
Estimating degrees of causal contribution
How do we best measure degrees of causal contribution? Dependence theorists argue that causal strength is determined by the difference it makes, but this approach yields counterintuitive results in cases of overdetermination and pre-emption. Production theorists propose measuring an event’s causal contribution by the number of sets of actual events sufficient for the effect where the cause is necessary, yet they face challenges in pre-emption and…
Carolina Sartorio’s Causalism: Unifying Action and Free Action
From footprints to impact and back again: Calculating corporate climate contributions
Measuring corporate contributions to climate change is often crucial for investors, policymakers and legal frameworks. Current methods use attributional carbon footprint metrics, which quantify emissions linked to a company's activities. Despite its widespread use, this approach faces challenges like ‘brown spinning’ and fails to account for substitution effects. In response, some advocate for consequential metrics, which consider alternative sce…
Free Will and Agency (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Causation (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Harm (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Philosophy of language (2 works) · Physics (2 works)