Toshio Yamagishi
Biographic Data
| ID | 164674 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Toshio Yamagishi |
| GIVEN NAMES | Toshio |
| FAMILY NAME | Yamagishi |
| SIGNATURE | YAMAGISHI T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Hokkaido University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8890-1115 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 53 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1152 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 51 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 2 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1980 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 15 |
Life history strategy and human cooperation in economic games
Parochial trust and cooperation across 17 societies
Significance In a study including 17 societies, we found that people are motivated to trust and cooperate more with their ingroup, than harm the outgroup. Reputation-based indirect reciprocity may offset this ingroup favoritism, because we found that reputational concern universally increases cooperation with both ingroup and outgroup members. We also found that people who are dispositionally cooperative are less parochial and more universal in t…
Trust in Social Dilemmas
Trust is one of the most classic themes across the social and behavioral sciences. It is also a topic is that is strongly intertwined with cooperation and social dilemmas, and there is little doubt that trust is an effective tool to promote cooperation, even if cooperation without trust is possible under certain circumstances. The past decade has also increasingly revealed emerging themes, new theoretical developments, intriguing questions, and a…
Physical attractiveness and cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma game
From a Measurement Model to a Dynamic Causal Model Commentary on Schwartz
Schwartz (2013) uses the measurement model of latent aptitudes to explain why the large variance in individuals’ values does not pose a problem for the use of the country mean as a proxy of the societal culture as a macro property. I propose that the multi-level causal model provides a more appropriate view of societal culture as a macro property, according to which individuals in each country are like students in a class who are taught by an ins…
Preemptive strike: An experimental study of fear-based aggression
The mere presence of a potential threat of attack was found to be sufficient to lead a significant proportion of participants to engage in preemptive attacks toward potential threats; this response occurred even without an incentive for either party to attack the other. We developed a new experimental game—the preemptive strike game (PSG)—to demonstrate this tendency for defensive aggression. We also found that the rate at which participants atta…
Two experimental tests of trust in in‐group strangers: The moderating role of common knowledge of group membership
The role that shared group membership plays in decisions to trust others is now well established within social psychology. A close reading of this literature, however, shows that this process is often moderated by other variables. Currently, we examined one potential moderator of this process. In particular, we evaluated the role that common knowledge of a shared social group membership between self and a to‐be‐trusted stranger provides as a basi…
Stadtluft Macht Frei (City Air Brings Freedom)
This study tested the "city air" hypothesis, which posits that the social constraints prevalent in rural life are weaker in metropolitan areas, freeing metropolitan residents from pressure to suppress their pursuit of individual goals. To do so, we replicated Yamagishi et al.'s vignette study of pen choice. In the first study using a web-based survey of 821 respondents from all prefectures in Japan, choice of a unique color pen was the highest am…
Trust: The Evolutionary Game of Mind and Society
Evolution, Culture, and the Human Mind
An enormous amount of scientific research compels two fundamental conclusions about the human mind: The mind is the product of evolution; and the mind is shaped by culture. These two perspectives on the human mind are not incompatible, but, until recently, their compatibility has resisted rigorous scholarly inquiry. Evolutionary psychology documents many ways in which genetic adaptations govern the operations of the human mind. But evolutionary i…
Unbalanced triangle in the social dilemma of trust: Internet studies of real‐time, real money social exchange between China, Japan, and Taiwan
Using a dyadic game theory paradigm, three experiments on the social dilemma of trust were conducted over the Internet in real time, involving real money. It was predicted and found that in‐group favouritism in trusting behaviour was contingent on historical relationships between societies. In the China–Japan experiment, mainland Chinese but not Japanese trusted and made fair allocations to in‐group members more than out‐group members, and out‐gr…
Emotional expressivity as a signal of cooperation
Altruism toward in-group members as a reputation mechanism
Intersubjective Culture: The Role of Intersubjective Perceptions in Cross-Cultural Research
Intersubjective perceptions refer to shared perceptions of the psychological characteristics that are widespread within a culture. In this article, we propose the intersubjective approach as a new approach to understanding the role that culture plays in human behavior. In this approach, intersubjective perceptions, which are distinct from personal values and beliefs, mediate the effect of the ecology on individuals’ responses and adaptations. We …
Social exchange and solidarity: In-group love or out-group hate?
Group-Based Trust in Strangers: The Role of Stereotypes and Expectations
Across two studies, we provide evidence for group-based trust in strangers. Specifically, when we offered participants a choice between an unknown monetary allocation made by an in-group (university or major) or an out-group allocator, both of whom had total control over the distribution of an identical sum of money, participants strongly preferred the in-group allocator. This preference occurred regardless of whether the stereotype of the in-gro…
Preferences Versus Strategies as Explanations for Culture-Specific Behavior
In this article, we present a new framework for interpreting cultural differences in behavior—what we call the institutional approach. In this framework, individuals' behaviors are conceptualized as strategies adapted to various incentive structures. Cultural differences in behavior are thus viewed as differences in the default adaptive strategies that individuals come to rely on in unclear situations. Through two studies, we demonstrate that the…
A Defense of Deception on Scientific Grounds
debate is emerging concerning the useof deception in social science research(especially when it employs experimen-tal methods), driven primarily by the relative-ly recent move by many economists intoexperimental work. These economists general-ly argue that deception should be banned.Deception includes a variety of practices insocial science research and is not limited toexperimental research. Most often it involvesproviding limited information ab…
The intercultural trust paradigm: Studying joint cultural interaction and social exchange in real time over the Internet
Does Shared Group Membership Promote Altruism: Fear, Greed, and Reputation
Two explanations of why shared group membership promotes cooperation in social dilemmas were compared. According to the fear-greed model of social identity proposed by Simpson (2006), shared group membership reduces greed but not fear and, thus, should promote altruistic behavior toward in-group members in the absence of fear. According to the group heuristic model proposed by Yamagishi and colleagues, altruistic behavior toward in-group members …
Punishing free riders: Direct and indirect promotion of cooperation
Culture, Identity, and Structure in Social Exchange: A Web-based Trust Experiment in the United States and Japan
Cross-cultural trust and cooperation are important concerns for international markets, political cooperation, and cultural exchange. Until recently, this problem was difficult to study under controlled conditions due to the inability to conduct experiments involving interaction between participants located in physically distant locations. We report results of an experiment using a Web-based “virtual lab” to study trust and trustworthiness between…
The Social Exchange Heuristic: Managing Errors in Social Exchange
We extend the logic of Haselton and Buss's (2000) error management theory to the domain of social exchange and propose that a psychological mechanism, referred to as the social exchange heuristic (SEH), produces certain cognitive biases that affect how individuals manage these errors. We predicted that the SEH would remain dormant in individuals who failed to realize that they were in a situation that involved social exchange. In the first experi…
Does Trust Beget Trustworthiness? Trust and Trustworthiness in Two Games and Two Cultures: A Research Note
An important unanswered question in the empirical literature on trust is whether trusting begets trustworthiness. In two experimental games, with Japanese and American participants, respectively, we compared trust and trustworthiness to provide an answer to this question. The trustee in the standard Trust Game knows that he or she is trusted, whereas the trustee in the Faith Game does not know whether or not this is the case. Except for this fact…
Why Do People Reject Unintended Inequity? Responders' Rejection in a Truncated Ultimatum Game
Rejection of an inequitable and yet unintended outcome in a truncated ultimatum game was examined in an experiment with 46 undergraduate students (27 men and 19 women) from a large national university in Japan. In an ultimatum game, one of two players, the proposer, makes an offer to divide a fixed-sum of money. The other player, the responder, decides whether to accept or reject the offer. When the responder rejects the proposer's offer, neither…
The Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Theory and Experimental Results
This paper presents a theoretical analysis of the structural determinants of power in exchange networks, along with research findings from laboratory experiments and a computer simulation of bargaining in network structures. Two theoretical traditions are dealth with: (1) point centrality in graph-theoretic representations of structure, as an approach to power distributions; and (2) power dependence principles applied to exchange networks. Measur…
The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good
Uncertainty, Trust, and Commitment Formation in the United States and Japan
A theory of trust proposed by Yamagishi and Yamagishi provides the basis for the prediction that (1) social uncertainty promotes commitment formation between particular partners and (2) high trusters tend to form committed relations less frequently than would low trusters when facing social uncertainty. These predictions receive support in two experiments conducted in the United States and Japan. The findings provide empirical support for the the…
Generalized Exchange and Social Dilemmas
In generalized exchange, the rewards that an actor receives usually are not directly contingent on the resources provided by that actor; therefore free riding can occur. The actor can receive benefit without contributing. Scholars interested in generalized exchange systems have often overlooked this inherent free-riding problem and thus have been overoptimistic in concluding that generalized exchange promotes mutual trust and solidarity among the…
The Group as the Container of Generalized Reciprocity
The results of an experiment with 91 Japanese participants confirmed the hypothesis that players of a Prisoner's Dilemma game would cooperate more with an in-group member than with an out-group member in the simultaneous game but not in the sequential game. The game used in the experiment was constructed such that each player gave his or her partner a portion of his or her own endowment of 300 yen. The group membership was created on the basis of…
Trust, Gullibility, and Social Intelligence
A series of experiments conducted in Japan by Yamagishi and his associates are presented, all consistently showing that high trusters (as measured with a general trust scale) are more sensitive than low trusters to information potentially revealing lack of trustworthiness in others and judge other people's choice in a one‐shot prisoner's dilemma more accurately. Based on these findings, a new theoretical twist is introduced to the “emancipation t…
The Provision of a Sanctioning System in the United States and Japan
Yamagishi's (1986a) experiment, which tested hypotheses derived from the structural goal/expectation approach to the problem of social dilemmas, was replicated using North American subjects. The results of the current experiment, using 48 same-sex, four-person groups, replicated the major findings of the original study. In addition, American subjects had a higher level of trust and cooperated more in the absence of a sanctioning system than did J…
Exit from the group as an individualistic solution to the free rider problem in the United States and Japan
Motivational bases of the public goods problem
Seriousness of Social Dilemmas and the Provision of a Sanctioning System
Two types of cooperation can be distinguished in social dilemmas. Elementary cooperation occurs when members cooperate for the benefit of the collectivity. Instrumental cooperation occurs when members cooperate to introduce a change in the incentive structure (such as the provision of a sanctioning system) so as to eliminate the dilemma from the original situation. The results of a social dilemma experiment, using 48 same-sex four-person groups, …
Reciprocity, Trust, and the Sense of Control: A Cross-Societal Study
Most cognitive approaches for explaining cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games include the view that many people believe that mutual cooperation is generally a gainful strategy to all parties and will cooperate when they think their partner cooperates. Proceeding along these lines, we argue that many participants treat a Prisoner's Dilemma game as an assurance game, and respond in a reciprocal manner to the choice or expected choice of their pa…
Does Shared Group Membership Promote Altruism: Fear, Greed, and Reputation
Two explanations of why shared group membership promotes cooperation in social dilemmas were compared. According to the fear-greed model of social identity proposed by Simpson (2006), shared group membership reduces greed but not fear and, thus, should promote altruistic behavior toward in-group members in the absence of fear. According to the group heuristic model proposed by Yamagishi and colleagues, altruistic behavior toward in-group members …
Network Connections and the Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks
This article presents an extension of recent work on exchange networks and specifies theoretically the implications of different types of network connections for the distribution of power. The paper employs power-dependence principles to make predictions concerning the distribution of power in differently organized exchange networks. The results of several laboratory experiments are reported testing these predictions. Computer simulation results …
Trust Building via Risk Taking: A Cross-Societal Experiment
The role of risk taking in building trust relations has largely been overlooked in the burgeoning literature on trust in the social sciences; yet it is central to understanding how trust develops. We argue that a series of risk-taking behaviors is indispensable to building a trust relation. We conducted experiments in Japan and the United States to examine the independent and cross-cultural effects of risk taking on trust building. The results of…
Culture, Identity, and Structure in Social Exchange: A Web-based Trust Experiment in the United States and Japan
Cross-cultural trust and cooperation are important concerns for international markets, political cooperation, and cultural exchange. Until recently, this problem was difficult to study under controlled conditions due to the inability to conduct experiments involving interaction between participants located in physically distant locations. We report results of an experiment using a Web-based “virtual lab” to study trust and trustworthiness between…
Two experimental tests of trust in in‐group strangers: The moderating role of common knowledge of group membership
The role that shared group membership plays in decisions to trust others is now well established within social psychology. A close reading of this literature, however, shows that this process is often moderated by other variables. Currently, we examined one potential moderator of this process. In particular, we evaluated the role that common knowledge of a shared social group membership between self and a to‐be‐trusted stranger provides as a basi…
The Social Exchange Heuristic: Managing Errors in Social Exchange
We extend the logic of Haselton and Buss's (2000) error management theory to the domain of social exchange and propose that a psychological mechanism, referred to as the social exchange heuristic (SEH), produces certain cognitive biases that affect how individuals manage these errors. We predicted that the SEH would remain dormant in individuals who failed to realize that they were in a situation that involved social exchange. In the first experi…
Separating Trust from Cooperation in a Dynamic Relationship: Prisoner’s Dilemma with Variable Dependence
In this article we introduce a new experimental game called Prisoner's Dilemma with Variable Dependence (PD/D), which allows players to separate their trust in their exchange partners from their cooperation with them in an ongoing relationship. The game allows researchers to observe the emergence of trust and cooperation separately, and ascertain the causal relationship between them. In six studies that use the PD/D design, we find that the playe…
Stadtluft Macht Frei (City Air Brings Freedom)
This study tested the "city air" hypothesis, which posits that the social constraints prevalent in rural life are weaker in metropolitan areas, freeing metropolitan residents from pressure to suppress their pursuit of individual goals. To do so, we replicated Yamagishi et al.'s vignette study of pen choice. In the first study using a web-based survey of 821 respondents from all prefectures in Japan, choice of a unique color pen was the highest am…
Power Relations in Exchange Networks: "A Comment on "Network Exchange Theory
Preemptive strike: An experimental study of fear-based aggression
The mere presence of a potential threat of attack was found to be sufficient to lead a significant proportion of participants to engage in preemptive attacks toward potential threats; this response occurred even without an incentive for either party to attack the other. We developed a new experimental game—the preemptive strike game (PSG)—to demonstrate this tendency for defensive aggression. We also found that the rate at which participants atta…
Does Trust Beget Trustworthiness? Trust and Trustworthiness in Two Games and Two Cultures: A Research Note
An important unanswered question in the empirical literature on trust is whether trusting begets trustworthiness. In two experimental games, with Japanese and American participants, respectively, we compared trust and trustworthiness to provide an answer to this question. The trustee in the standard Trust Game knows that he or she is trusted, whereas the trustee in the Faith Game does not know whether or not this is the case. Except for this fact…
A Defense of Deception on Scientific Grounds
debate is emerging concerning the useof deception in social science research(especially when it employs experimen-tal methods), driven primarily by the relative-ly recent move by many economists intoexperimental work. These economists general-ly argue that deception should be banned.Deception includes a variety of practices insocial science research and is not limited toexperimental research. Most often it involvesproviding limited information ab…
Trust in Social Dilemmas
Trust is one of the most classic themes across the social and behavioral sciences. It is also a topic is that is strongly intertwined with cooperation and social dilemmas, and there is little doubt that trust is an effective tool to promote cooperation, even if cooperation without trust is possible under certain circumstances. The past decade has also increasingly revealed emerging themes, new theoretical developments, intriguing questions, and a…
Unbalanced triangle in the social dilemma of trust: Internet studies of real‐time, real money social exchange between China, Japan, and Taiwan
Using a dyadic game theory paradigm, three experiments on the social dilemma of trust were conducted over the Internet in real time, involving real money. It was predicted and found that in‐group favouritism in trusting behaviour was contingent on historical relationships between societies. In the China–Japan experiment, mainland Chinese but not Japanese trusted and made fair allocations to in‐group members more than out‐group members, and out‐gr…
Does Microeconomic Theory Need a Defense
Adding versus averaging models revisited: A test of a path-analytic integration model
Valid Predictions from Invalid Comparisons: Response to Heckathorn
Initial impression versus missing information as explanations of the set-size effect
The Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Theory and Experimental Results
This paper presents a theoretical analysis of the structural determinants of power in exchange networks, along with research findings from laboratory experiments and a computer simulation of bargaining in network structures. Two theoretical traditions are dealth with: (1) point centrality in graph-theoretic representations of structure, as an approach to power distributions; and (2) power dependence principles applied to exchange networks. Measur…
Development of distribution rules in small groups
Cross-over interaction and the set-size effect in information integration: Are they mutually exclusive
The path-analytic averaging (PAA) model of information integration predicts that the two most important findings in the information integration literature, cross-over interaction and the set-size effect, are mutually exclusive. Previous tests of the PAA model have examined cross-over interaction and the set-size effect separately; the present experiment tested both simultaneously, by asking 40 undergraduates to rate the desirability of candidates…
Point and Line Vulnerability as Bases for Predicting the Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Reply to Willer
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Motivational bases of the public goods problem
The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good
The Provision of a Sanctioning System in the United States and Japan
Yamagishi's (1986a) experiment, which tested hypotheses derived from the structural goal/expectation approach to the problem of social dilemmas, was replicated using North American subjects. The results of the current experiment, using 48 same-sex, four-person groups, replicated the major findings of the original study. In addition, American subjects had a higher level of trust and cooperated more in the absence of a sanctioning system than did J…
Seriousness of Social Dilemmas and the Provision of a Sanctioning System
Two types of cooperation can be distinguished in social dilemmas. Elementary cooperation occurs when members cooperate for the benefit of the collectivity. Instrumental cooperation occurs when members cooperate to introduce a change in the incentive structure (such as the provision of a sanctioning system) so as to eliminate the dilemma from the original situation. The results of a social dilemma experiment, using 48 same-sex four-person groups, …
Exit from the group as an individualistic solution to the free rider problem in the United States and Japan
Network Connections and the Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks
This article presents an extension of recent work on exchange networks and specifies theoretically the implications of different types of network connections for the distribution of power. The paper employs power-dependence principles to make predictions concerning the distribution of power in differently organized exchange networks. The results of several laboratory experiments are reported testing these predictions. Computer simulation results …
Power Relations in Exchange Networks: "A Comment on "Network Exchange Theory
Power in exchange networks: A power-dependence formulation
Generalized Exchange and Social Dilemmas
In generalized exchange, the rewards that an actor receives usually are not directly contingent on the resources provided by that actor; therefore free riding can occur. The actor can receive benefit without contributing. Scholars interested in generalized exchange systems have often overlooked this inherent free-riding problem and thus have been overoptimistic in concluding that generalized exchange promotes mutual trust and solidarity among the…
Trust and commitment in the United States and Japan
Uncertainty, Trust, and Commitment Formation in the United States and Japan
A theory of trust proposed by Yamagishi and Yamagishi provides the basis for the prediction that (1) social uncertainty promotes commitment formation between particular partners and (2) high trusters tend to form committed relations less frequently than would low trusters when facing social uncertainty. These predictions receive support in two experiments conducted in the United States and Japan. The findings provide empirical support for the the…
Trust, Gullibility, and Social Intelligence
A series of experiments conducted in Japan by Yamagishi and his associates are presented, all consistently showing that high trusters (as measured with a general trust scale) are more sensitive than low trusters to information potentially revealing lack of trustworthiness in others and judge other people's choice in a one‐shot prisoner's dilemma more accurately. Based on these findings, a new theoretical twist is introduced to the “emancipation t…
Reciprocity, Trust, and the Sense of Control: A Cross-Societal Study
Most cognitive approaches for explaining cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games include the view that many people believe that mutual cooperation is generally a gainful strategy to all parties and will cooperate when they think their partner cooperates. Proceeding along these lines, we argue that many participants treat a Prisoner's Dilemma game as an assurance game, and respond in a reciprocal manner to the choice or expected choice of their pa…
Social exchange and reciprocity: Confusion or a heuristic?
The Group as the Container of Generalized Reciprocity
The results of an experiment with 91 Japanese participants confirmed the hypothesis that players of a Prisoner's Dilemma game would cooperate more with an in-group member than with an out-group member in the simultaneous game but not in the sequential game. The game used in the experiment was constructed such that each player gave his or her partner a portion of his or her own endowment of 300 yen. The group membership was created on the basis of…
You can judge a book by its cover Evidence that cheaters may look different from cooperators
The State of Civil Society in Japan
For all the obstacles that remain, civil society is burgeoning in Japan, and the idea of civil society is at the core of the current debate about how to reinvigorate the country. This book gathers the insights of American and Japanese scholars from the fields of political science, sociology, social psychology, and history to investigate the nature of associational life and the public sphere in Japan. It goes beyond assessing the condition of civi…
Psychology (46 works) · Social Psychology (43 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (22 works) · Political science (22 works) · Social Psychology (21 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (20 works) · Economics (19 works) · Social and Intergroup Psychology (18 works) · Computer Science (16 works) · Law (15 works)