Craig R M Mckenzie
Biographic Data
| ID | 1660211 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Craig R M Mckenzie |
| GIVEN NAMES | Craig R M |
| FAMILY NAME | Mckenzie |
| SIGNATURE | MCKENZIE C R M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California San Diego |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 23 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 14 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
When and why framing effects are neither errors nor mistakes
Framing effects play a central role in the debate regarding human rationality. They violate the normative principle of description invariance , which states that merely redescribing options or outcomes in equivalent ways should not affect judgments or decisions. Description invariance is considered by many decision researchers to be “normatively unassailable”, and violations are widely regarded as demonstrations of systematic irrationality. This …
Is it a judgment of representativeness? Re-examining the birth sequence problem
Beyond killing one to save five: Sensitivity to ratio and probability in moral judgment
A great deal of current research on moral judgments centers on moral dilemmas concerning tradeoffs between one and five lives. Whether one considers killing one innocent person to save five others to be morally required or impermissible has been taken to determine whether one is appealing to consequentialist or non-consequentialist reasoning. But this focus on tradeoffs between one and five may obscure more nuanced commitments involved in moral d…
Default sensitivity in attempts at social influence
Sensitivity to shifts in probability of harm and benefit in moral dilemmas
Gamble evaluation and evoked reference sets: Why adding a small loss to a gamble increases its attractiveness
The Role of Inference in Attribute Framing Effects
Previous research has shown that a speaker's choice between logically equivalent frames is influenced by reference point information, and that listeners draw accurate inferences based on the frame. Less clear, however, is whether these inferences play a causal role in generating attribute framing effects. Two experiments are reported, which suggest that frame‐dependent inferences are sufficient to generate attribute framing effects, and that bloc…
Are Longshots Only for Losers? A New Look at the Last Race Effect
There is evidence that betting on longshots increases in the last race of a day of horse racing. Previous accounts have assumed that the phenomenon is driven by bettors who have lost money and are trying to recoup their losses. To test this assumption of “reference dependence,” three laboratory experiments simulated a day at the races: In each of several rounds, participants chose either (i) a gamble with a small probability of a large gain and a…
Information leakage from logically equivalent frames
Recommendations Implicit in Policy Defaults
Should people be considered organ donors after their death unless they request not to be, or should they not be considered donors unless they request to be? Because people tend to stay with the default in a variety of domains, policymakers' choice of default has large and often important effects. In the United States, where the organ-donation policy default is “not a donor,” about 5,000 people die every year because there are too few donors. Four…
The broad applicability of memory bias and its coexistence with the planning fallacy: Reply to Griffin and Buehler (2005)
People chronically underestimate how long tasks will take. In their original article, the present authors (M. M. Roy, N. J. S. Christenfeld, & C. R. M. McKenzie, suggested a simple, broadly applicable explanation: Biased predictions result from biased memories. In their comment article, D. Griffin and R. Buehler suggested that in many domains in which this memory-bias account appears to out-predict their own account, theirs actually makes no pred…
Underestimating the Duration of Future Events: Memory Incorrectly Used or Memory Bias
People frequently underestimate how long it will take them to complete a task. The prevailing view is that during the prediction process, people incorrectly use their memories of how long similar tasks have taken in the past because they take an overly optimistic outlook. A variety of evidence is reviewed in this article that points to a different, although not mutually exclusive, explanation: People base predictions of future duration on their m…
What a speaker’s choice of frame reveals: Reference points, frame selection, and framing effects
When negative evidence increases confidence: Change in belief after hearing two sides of a dispute
Four experiments examined change in confidence after hearing two sides of a dispute. The results showed that a case independently judged to weakly support one side often increased confidence that the opposing side was correct. Furthermore, the stronger the first case, the more likely a subsequent weak case had a reverse impact. Traditional belief‐updating models, which tend to focus on change in belief after individual pieces of evidence rather t…
Underestimating the Duration of Future Events: Memory Incorrectly Used or Memory Bias
People frequently underestimate how long it will take them to complete a task. The prevailing view is that during the prediction process, people incorrectly use their memories of how long similar tasks have taken in the past because they take an overly optimistic outlook. A variety of evidence is reviewed in this article that points to a different, although not mutually exclusive, explanation: People base predictions of future duration on their m…
When negative evidence increases confidence: Change in belief after hearing two sides of a dispute
Four experiments examined change in confidence after hearing two sides of a dispute. The results showed that a case independently judged to weakly support one side often increased confidence that the opposing side was correct. Furthermore, the stronger the first case, the more likely a subsequent weak case had a reverse impact. Traditional belief‐updating models, which tend to focus on change in belief after individual pieces of evidence rather t…
The Role of Inference in Attribute Framing Effects
Previous research has shown that a speaker's choice between logically equivalent frames is influenced by reference point information, and that listeners draw accurate inferences based on the frame. Less clear, however, is whether these inferences play a causal role in generating attribute framing effects. Two experiments are reported, which suggest that frame‐dependent inferences are sufficient to generate attribute framing effects, and that bloc…
When and why framing effects are neither errors nor mistakes
Framing effects play a central role in the debate regarding human rationality. They violate the normative principle of description invariance , which states that merely redescribing options or outcomes in equivalent ways should not affect judgments or decisions. Description invariance is considered by many decision researchers to be “normatively unassailable”, and violations are widely regarded as demonstrations of systematic irrationality. This …
When negative evidence increases confidence: Change in belief after hearing two sides of a dispute
Four experiments examined change in confidence after hearing two sides of a dispute. The results showed that a case independently judged to weakly support one side often increased confidence that the opposing side was correct. Furthermore, the stronger the first case, the more likely a subsequent weak case had a reverse impact. Traditional belief‐updating models, which tend to focus on change in belief after individual pieces of evidence rather t…
What a speaker’s choice of frame reveals: Reference points, frame selection, and framing effects
The broad applicability of memory bias and its coexistence with the planning fallacy: Reply to Griffin and Buehler (2005)
People chronically underestimate how long tasks will take. In their original article, the present authors (M. M. Roy, N. J. S. Christenfeld, & C. R. M. McKenzie, suggested a simple, broadly applicable explanation: Biased predictions result from biased memories. In their comment article, D. Griffin and R. Buehler suggested that in many domains in which this memory-bias account appears to out-predict their own account, theirs actually makes no pred…
Underestimating the Duration of Future Events: Memory Incorrectly Used or Memory Bias
People frequently underestimate how long it will take them to complete a task. The prevailing view is that during the prediction process, people incorrectly use their memories of how long similar tasks have taken in the past because they take an overly optimistic outlook. A variety of evidence is reviewed in this article that points to a different, although not mutually exclusive, explanation: People base predictions of future duration on their m…
Information leakage from logically equivalent frames
Recommendations Implicit in Policy Defaults
Should people be considered organ donors after their death unless they request not to be, or should they not be considered donors unless they request to be? Because people tend to stay with the default in a variety of domains, policymakers' choice of default has large and often important effects. In the United States, where the organ-donation policy default is “not a donor,” about 5,000 people die every year because there are too few donors. Four…
Are Longshots Only for Losers? A New Look at the Last Race Effect
There is evidence that betting on longshots increases in the last race of a day of horse racing. Previous accounts have assumed that the phenomenon is driven by bettors who have lost money and are trying to recoup their losses. To test this assumption of “reference dependence,” three laboratory experiments simulated a day at the races: In each of several rounds, participants chose either (i) a gamble with a small probability of a large gain and a…
The Role of Inference in Attribute Framing Effects
Previous research has shown that a speaker's choice between logically equivalent frames is influenced by reference point information, and that listeners draw accurate inferences based on the frame. Less clear, however, is whether these inferences play a causal role in generating attribute framing effects. Two experiments are reported, which suggest that frame‐dependent inferences are sufficient to generate attribute framing effects, and that bloc…
Gamble evaluation and evoked reference sets: Why adding a small loss to a gamble increases its attractiveness
Default sensitivity in attempts at social influence
Sensitivity to shifts in probability of harm and benefit in moral dilemmas
Is it a judgment of representativeness? Re-examining the birth sequence problem
Beyond killing one to save five: Sensitivity to ratio and probability in moral judgment
A great deal of current research on moral judgments centers on moral dilemmas concerning tradeoffs between one and five lives. Whether one considers killing one innocent person to save five others to be morally required or impermissible has been taken to determine whether one is appealing to consequentialist or non-consequentialist reasoning. But this focus on tradeoffs between one and five may obscure more nuanced commitments involved in moral d…
When and why framing effects are neither errors nor mistakes
Framing effects play a central role in the debate regarding human rationality. They violate the normative principle of description invariance , which states that merely redescribing options or outcomes in equivalent ways should not affect judgments or decisions. Description invariance is considered by many decision researchers to be “normatively unassailable”, and violations are widely regarded as demonstrations of systematic irrationality. This …
Psychology (13 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (10 works) · Social Psychology (10 works) · Cognitive psychology (9 works) · Economics (9 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Framing effect (5 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Statistics (4 works)