Elliott O Wagner
Biographic Data
| ID | 1666186 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Elliott O Wagner |
| GIVEN NAMES | Elliott |
| FAMILY NAME | O Wagner |
| SIGNATURE | WAGNER E O |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 19 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Conventional Semantic Meaning in Signalling Games with Conflicting Interests
Lewis signalling games are often used to explain how it is possible for simple agents to develop systems of conventional semantic meaning. In these games, all players obtain identical payoffs in every outcome. This is an unrealistic payoff structure, but it is often employed because it is thought that semantic meaning will not emerge if interests conflict. Here it is shown that not only is conventional meaning possible when interests conflict, bu…
Game Theory and the Evolution of Meaning
Evolutionary game theory is a general, but mathematically precise framework for modeling the competition between and fitness‐based selection of different types of behavior. We review recent applications of this framework to account for the evolution of behavior that lends meaning to ostensible acts and signs
BRIAN SKYRMS Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information
Evolving to Divide the Fruits of Cooperation
Cooperation and the allocation of common resources are core features of social behavior. Games idealizing both interactions have been studied separately. But here, rather than examining the dynamics of the individual games, the interactions are combined so that players first choose whether to cooperate, and then, if they jointly cooperate, they bargain over the fruits of their cooperation. It is shown that the dynamics of the combined game cannot…
Deterministic Chaos and the Evolution of Meaning
Common wisdom holds that communication is impossible when messages are costless and communicators have totally opposed interests. This article demonstrates that such wisdom is false. Non-convergent dynamics can sustain partial information transfer even in a zero-sum signalling game. In particular, I investigate a signalling game in which messages are free, the state-act payoffs resemble rock–paper–scissors, and senders and receivers adjust their …
Deterministic Chaos and the Evolution of Meaning
Common wisdom holds that communication is impossible when messages are costless and communicators have totally opposed interests. This article demonstrates that such wisdom is false. Non-convergent dynamics can sustain partial information transfer even in a zero-sum signalling game. In particular, I investigate a signalling game in which messages are free, the state-act payoffs resemble rock–paper–scissors, and senders and receivers adjust their …
Evolving to Divide the Fruits of Cooperation
Cooperation and the allocation of common resources are core features of social behavior. Games idealizing both interactions have been studied separately. But here, rather than examining the dynamics of the individual games, the interactions are combined so that players first choose whether to cooperate, and then, if they jointly cooperate, they bargain over the fruits of their cooperation. It is shown that the dynamics of the combined game cannot…
Conventional Semantic Meaning in Signalling Games with Conflicting Interests
Lewis signalling games are often used to explain how it is possible for simple agents to develop systems of conventional semantic meaning. In these games, all players obtain identical payoffs in every outcome. This is an unrealistic payoff structure, but it is often employed because it is thought that semantic meaning will not emerge if interests conflict. Here it is shown that not only is conventional meaning possible when interests conflict, bu…
Evolving to Divide the Fruits of Cooperation
Cooperation and the allocation of common resources are core features of social behavior. Games idealizing both interactions have been studied separately. But here, rather than examining the dynamics of the individual games, the interactions are combined so that players first choose whether to cooperate, and then, if they jointly cooperate, they bargain over the fruits of their cooperation. It is shown that the dynamics of the combined game cannot…
Deterministic Chaos and the Evolution of Meaning
Common wisdom holds that communication is impossible when messages are costless and communicators have totally opposed interests. This article demonstrates that such wisdom is false. Non-convergent dynamics can sustain partial information transfer even in a zero-sum signalling game. In particular, I investigate a signalling game in which messages are free, the state-act payoffs resemble rock–paper–scissors, and senders and receivers adjust their …
BRIAN SKYRMS Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information
Game Theory and the Evolution of Meaning
Evolutionary game theory is a general, but mathematically precise framework for modeling the competition between and fitness‐based selection of different types of behavior. We review recent applications of this framework to account for the evolution of behavior that lends meaning to ostensible acts and signs
Conventional Semantic Meaning in Signalling Games with Conflicting Interests
Lewis signalling games are often used to explain how it is possible for simple agents to develop systems of conventional semantic meaning. In these games, all players obtain identical payoffs in every outcome. This is an unrealistic payoff structure, but it is often employed because it is thought that semantic meaning will not emerge if interests conflict. Here it is shown that not only is conventional meaning possible when interests conflict, bu…
Computer Science (5 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (5 works) · Game Theory and Applications (4 works) · Mathematical economics (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Evolutionary game theory (2 works)