Charles Fruge
Biographic Data
| ID | 166894 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Charles Fruge |
| GIVEN NAMES | Charles |
| FAMILY NAME | Fruge |
| SIGNATURE | FRUGE C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6001-0241 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 9 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 11 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1988 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Imposing Mind Onto World
We impose our minds onto the world. We create artifacts that reflect our intentions to make them. We make social constructions that mirror our collective agreements. We impress value by our valuing. Discomfort with this power to mold the world in our image has led many to reject such mirroring of mind by world, but this would do away with much of the human realm. Therefore, I offer a realist account of imposition by way of enfolding it within a m…
Against Instantiation
According to traditional universalism, properties are instantiated by objects, where instantiation is a ‘tie’ that binds objects and properties into facts. I offer two arguments against this view. I then develop an alternative higher-order account which holds that properties are primitively predicated of objects yet, unlike traditional nominalism, are nevertheless genuinely real. When it is a fact that Fo, it is not because object o instantiates …
Joints and basic ways
Metaphysicians often distinguish between joints and basic ways. Joints are the unified and joint-carving properties that trace the structure of the world. They are theorized under the ideology of structural, perfectly natural, or sparse properties. Basic ways are the ultimate and independent properties that give rise to all others. They are theorized under the ideology of grounding, where the ungrounded properties are the basic ways. While these …
Janus-Faced Grounding
A common view in the metaphysics of ground is that all grounding facts are grounded. This generates an infinite regress of ever more grounding of grounding facts, but most grounding theorists take the regress to be harmless. However, in this paper, I argue that the regress is in fact vicious, therefore some grounding facts are ungrounded. Since the regress appears to fall out of two plausible principles of fundamentality, I offer a new interpreta…
Permanent Value
Temporal nihilism is the view that our lives will not matter after we die. According to the standard interpretation, this is because our lives will not make a permanent difference. Many who consider the view thus reject it by denying that our lives need to have an eternal impact. However, in this essay, I develop a different formulation of temporal nihilism revolving around the persistence of personal value itself. According to this more powerful…
Value after death
Does our life have value for us after we die? Despite the importance of such a question, many would find it absurd, even incoherent. Once we are dead, the thought goes, we are no longer around to have any wellbeing at all. However, in this paper I argue that this common thought is mistaken. In order to make sense of some of our most central normative thoughts and practices, we must hold that a person can have wellbeing after they die. I provide t…
Artifactual normativity
Guy Fletcher, Dear Prudence (Oxford: (Oxford University Press, 2021), pp. 1–223
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Structuring Wellbeing
Many questions about wellbeing involve metaphysical dependence. Does wellbeing depend on minds? Is wellbeing determined by distinct sorts of things? Is it determined differently for different subjects? However, we should distinguish two axes of dependence. First, there are the grounds that generate value. Second, there are the connections between the grounds and value which make it so that those grounds generate that value. Given these distinct a…
Possible intentions and the doctrine of double effect
Pet Ownership and Nonownership among Elderly in Arizona
This paper reports the results of a study that examined attitudes toward and attachments to pets of community-based elderly persons in Arizona. Over a three-month period, face-to-face interviews were conducted with a self-selected nonprobability sample of 218 persons 55 years of age and older. Of these 218 people, 80 were owners, and 138 were non-owners. With pet-ownership status used as the dependent variable, housing (specifically, living in a …
Pet Ownership and Nonownership among Elderly in Arizona
This paper reports the results of a study that examined attitudes toward and attachments to pets of community-based elderly persons in Arizona. Over a three-month period, face-to-face interviews were conducted with a self-selected nonprobability sample of 218 persons 55 years of age and older. Of these 218 people, 80 were owners, and 138 were non-owners. With pet-ownership status used as the dependent variable, housing (specifically, living in a …
Structuring Wellbeing
Many questions about wellbeing involve metaphysical dependence. Does wellbeing depend on minds? Is wellbeing determined by distinct sorts of things? Is it determined differently for different subjects? However, we should distinguish two axes of dependence. First, there are the grounds that generate value. Second, there are the connections between the grounds and value which make it so that those grounds generate that value. Given these distinct a…
Pet Ownership and Nonownership among Elderly in Arizona
This paper reports the results of a study that examined attitudes toward and attachments to pets of community-based elderly persons in Arizona. Over a three-month period, face-to-face interviews were conducted with a self-selected nonprobability sample of 218 persons 55 years of age and older. Of these 218 people, 80 were owners, and 138 were non-owners. With pet-ownership status used as the dependent variable, housing (specifically, living in a …
Possible intentions and the doctrine of double effect
Guy Fletcher, Dear Prudence (Oxford: (Oxford University Press, 2021), pp. 1–223
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Structuring Wellbeing
Many questions about wellbeing involve metaphysical dependence. Does wellbeing depend on minds? Is wellbeing determined by distinct sorts of things? Is it determined differently for different subjects? However, we should distinguish two axes of dependence. First, there are the grounds that generate value. Second, there are the connections between the grounds and value which make it so that those grounds generate that value. Given these distinct a…
Permanent Value
Temporal nihilism is the view that our lives will not matter after we die. According to the standard interpretation, this is because our lives will not make a permanent difference. Many who consider the view thus reject it by denying that our lives need to have an eternal impact. However, in this essay, I develop a different formulation of temporal nihilism revolving around the persistence of personal value itself. According to this more powerful…
Value after death
Does our life have value for us after we die? Despite the importance of such a question, many would find it absurd, even incoherent. Once we are dead, the thought goes, we are no longer around to have any wellbeing at all. However, in this paper I argue that this common thought is mistaken. In order to make sense of some of our most central normative thoughts and practices, we must hold that a person can have wellbeing after they die. I provide t…
Artifactual normativity
Janus-Faced Grounding
A common view in the metaphysics of ground is that all grounding facts are grounded. This generates an infinite regress of ever more grounding of grounding facts, but most grounding theorists take the regress to be harmless. However, in this paper, I argue that the regress is in fact vicious, therefore some grounding facts are ungrounded. Since the regress appears to fall out of two plausible principles of fundamentality, I offer a new interpreta…
Joints and basic ways
Metaphysicians often distinguish between joints and basic ways. Joints are the unified and joint-carving properties that trace the structure of the world. They are theorized under the ideology of structural, perfectly natural, or sparse properties. Basic ways are the ultimate and independent properties that give rise to all others. They are theorized under the ideology of grounding, where the ungrounded properties are the basic ways. While these …
Against Instantiation
According to traditional universalism, properties are instantiated by objects, where instantiation is a ‘tie’ that binds objects and properties into facts. I offer two arguments against this view. I then develop an alternative higher-order account which holds that properties are primitively predicated of objects yet, unlike traditional nominalism, are nevertheless genuinely real. When it is a fact that Fo, it is not because object o instantiates …
Imposing Mind Onto World
We impose our minds onto the world. We create artifacts that reflect our intentions to make them. We make social constructions that mirror our collective agreements. We impress value by our valuing. Discomfort with this power to mold the world in our image has led many to reject such mirroring of mind by world, but this would do away with much of the human realm. Therefore, I offer a realist account of imposition by way of enfolding it within a m…
Philosophy (9 works) · Epistemology (8 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works)