Martín Ordóñez
Biographic Data
| ID | 167011 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Martín Ordóñez |
| GIVEN NAMES | Martín |
| FAMILY NAME | Ordóñez |
| SIGNATURE | ORDÓÑEZ M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5243-1273 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Driven by Clients: A Variant of Clientelism and Its Consequences for Democracy
Clientelism is traditionally viewed as a mechanism through which patrons exert control over clients. Drawing on qualitative data from three municipalities in Santiago, Chile, and building on literature that emphasizes client agency, this article explores a variant of clientelism in which clients initiate and enforce clientelistic relationships. The findings suggest that these two forms of clientelism can differently impact a crucial aspect of dem…
Loyal to the Executive: The Effect of State Capacity on Local Horizontal Accountability
State capacity is often hypothesized to reinforce democracy, wherever democracy already exists. This article demonstrates that, at the local level, capacity can actually undermine democracy by making it harder for councilors to hold mayors accountable. Drawing on the comparative method, this work analyzes the effect of bureaucratic capacity on horizontal accountability (which is critical for liberal democracy) in four municipalities in Santiago, …
Loyal to the Executive: The Effect of State Capacity on Local Horizontal Accountability
State capacity is often hypothesized to reinforce democracy, wherever democracy already exists. This article demonstrates that, at the local level, capacity can actually undermine democracy by making it harder for councilors to hold mayors accountable. Drawing on the comparative method, this work analyzes the effect of bureaucratic capacity on horizontal accountability (which is critical for liberal democracy) in four municipalities in Santiago, …
Driven by Clients: A Variant of Clientelism and Its Consequences for Democracy
Clientelism is traditionally viewed as a mechanism through which patrons exert control over clients. Drawing on qualitative data from three municipalities in Santiago, Chile, and building on literature that emphasizes client agency, this article explores a variant of clientelism in which clients initiate and enforce clientelistic relationships. The findings suggest that these two forms of clientelism can differently impact a crucial aspect of dem…
Loyal to the Executive: The Effect of State Capacity on Local Horizontal Accountability
State capacity is often hypothesized to reinforce democracy, wherever democracy already exists. This article demonstrates that, at the local level, capacity can actually undermine democracy by making it harder for councilors to hold mayors accountable. Drawing on the comparative method, this work analyzes the effect of bureaucratic capacity on horizontal accountability (which is critical for liberal democracy) in four municipalities in Santiago, …
Driven by Clients: A Variant of Clientelism and Its Consequences for Democracy
Clientelism is traditionally viewed as a mechanism through which patrons exert control over clients. Drawing on qualitative data from three municipalities in Santiago, Chile, and building on literature that emphasizes client agency, this article explores a variant of clientelism in which clients initiate and enforce clientelistic relationships. The findings suggest that these two forms of clientelism can differently impact a crucial aspect of dem…
Accountability (2 works) · Democracy (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Public Administration (2 works) · Public Policy and Administration Research (2 works) · Public relations (2 works) · Agency (philosophy) (1 works) · Autonomy (1 works)