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Daniel Kahneman

Biographic Data

ID168714
NAMEDaniel Kahneman
GIVEN NAMESDaniel
FAMILY NAMEKahneman
SIGNATUREKAHNEMAN D
AFFILIATIONSPrinceton University
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS87
TOTAL CITATIONS2682
AUTHOR COUNT84
EDITOR COUNT3
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1965
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2023
H-INDEX17
  • Income and emotional well-being: A conflict resolved

    Open Access•Matthew A Killingsworth, Daniel Kahneman et al.•ARTICLE•Proceedings of the National…•2023

    Do larger incomes make people happier? Two authors of the present paper have published contradictory answers. Using dichotomous questions about the preceding day, [Kahneman and Deaton, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 107 , 16489–16493 (2010)] reported a flattening pattern: happiness increased steadily with log(income) up to a threshold and then plateaued. Using experience sampling with a continuous scale, [Killingsworth, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.…

  • Une pensée, deux systèmes

    Daniel Kahneman, Claude Fischler•ARTICLE•Sciences Humaines•2020

  • Richard Michael Suzman (1942–2015)

    Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•2016

    Presents an obituary for Richard Michael Suzman, who died on April 16, 2015. Suzman was trained as a sociologist and anthropologist, but he was attracted to the approaches of demography and economics. He came to know a great deal about diverse fields of science, including health, physiology, psychology, genetics, and economics. He was a scientific leader who was on a quest to develop new transdisciplinary fields and to mobilize the best scientist…

  • Commentaries and Rejoinder on

    Benoît Monin, Daniel M Oppenheimer et al.•ARTICLE•Social Psychology•2014•Cited by: 15•References: 1

    While direct replications such as the “Many Labs” project are extremely valuable in testing the reliability of published findings across laboratories, they reflect the common reliance in psychology on single vignettes or stimuli, which limits the scope of the conclusions that can be reached. New experimental tools and statistical techniques make it easier to routinely sample stimuli, and to appropriately treat them as random factors. We encourage…

  • Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk

    Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky•CHAPTER•Handbook of the Fundamentals of…•2013

    This paper presents a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk, and develops an alternative model, called prospect theory. Choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with the basic tenets of utility theory. In particular, people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty. This tendency, called …

  • Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases

    Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic et al.•BOOK•Judgment under uncertainty•2013

  • Rencontre avec Daniel Kahneman: Pensée lente, pensée rapide

    Daniel Kahneman, Claude Fischler•ARTICLE•Sciences Humaines•2013

  • Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

    Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin et al.•BOOK•Heuristics and biases•2012

  • Associative processes in intuitive judgment

    Open Access•Carey K Morewedge, Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•Trends in Cognitive Sciences•2010

  • High income improves evaluation of life but not emotional well-being

    Open Access•Daniel Kahneman, Angus Deaton•ARTICLE•Proceedings of the National…•2010

    Recent research has begun to distinguish two aspects of subjective well-being. Emotional well-being refers to the emotional quality of an individual's everyday experience—the frequency and intensity of experiences of joy, stress, sadness, anger, and affection that make one's life pleasant or unpleasant. Life evaluation refers to the thoughts that people have about their life when they think about it. We raise the question of whether money buys ha…

  • International differences in well-being

    Ed Diener, Daniel Kahneman et al.•BOOK•International differences in…•2010

  • A Comparison of Affect Ratings Obtained with Ecological Momentary Assessment and the Day Reconstruction Method

    Open Access•Samantha Dockray, Nina Grant et al.•ARTICLE•Social Indicators Research•2010•Cited by: 33•References: 19

  • Memories of yesterday’s emotions: Does the valence of experience affect the memory-experience gap

    Talya Miron‐Shatz, Talya Miron-Shatz et al.•ARTICLE•Emotion•2009

    Intense pain is often exaggerated in retrospective evaluations, indicating a possible divergence between experience and memory. However, little is known regarding how people retrospectively evaluate experiences with both pleasant and unpleasant aspects. The Day Reconstruction Method (DRM; Kahneman. Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004b) provides a unique opportunity to examine memory-experience gaps in recollections of individual days, which …

  • Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree

    Daniel Kahneman, Gary Klein•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•2009•Cited by: 152•References: 1

    This article reports on an effort to explore the differences between two approaches to intuition and expertise that are often viewed as conflicting: heuristics and biases (HB) and naturalistic decision making (NDM). Starting from the obvious fact that professional intuition is sometimes marvelous and sometimes flawed, the authors attempt to map the boundary conditions that separate true intuitive skill from overconfident and biased impressions. T…

  • Time Use and Subjective Well-Being in France and the U.S

    Open Access•Alan B Krueger, Daniel Kahneman et al.•ARTICLE•Social Indicators Research•2009•Cited by: 30•References: 8

  • Interpretations of Utility and Their Implications for the Valuation of Health

    Open Access•Paul Dolan, Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2008•Cited by: 52•References: 66

    The term 'utility' can be interpreted in terms of the hedonic experience of an outcome (experienced utility) or in terms of the preference or desire for that outcome (decision utility). It is this second interpretation that lies at the heart of the methods that economists have developed to value non-market goods, such as health. In this article, we argue that decision utility is unlikely to generate meaningful data on the utility associated with …

  • Would You Be Happier If You Were Richer? A Focusing Illusion

    Open Access•Daniel Kahneman, Alan B Krueger et al.•ARTICLE•Science•2006

    The belief that high income is associated with good mood is widespread but mostly illusory. People with above-average income are relatively satisfied with their lives but are barely happier than others in moment-to-moment experience, tend to be more tense, and do not spend more time in particularly enjoyable activities. Moreover, the effect of income on life satisfaction seems to be transient. We argue that people exaggerate the contribution of i…

  • A population approach to the study of emotion: Diurnal rhythms of a working day examined with the day reconstruction method

    Arthur A Stone, J E Schwartz et al.•ARTICLE•Emotion•2006

    To date, diurnal rhythms of emotions have been studied with real-time data collection methods mostly in relatively small samples. The Day Reconstruction Method (DRM), a new survey instrument that reconstructs the emotions of a day, is examined as a method for enabling large-scale investigations of rhythms. Diurnal cycles were observed for 12 emotion adjectives in 909 women over a working day. Bimodal patterns with peaks at noon and evenings were …

  • Anomalies: Utility Maximization and Experienced Utility

    Open Access•Daniel Kahneman, Richard H Thaler•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2006•Cited by: 41•References: 23

    In this column, we discuss a version of the utility maximization hypothesis that can be tested-and we find that it is false. We review empirical challenges to utility maximization, which return to the old question of whether preferences optimize the experience of outcomes. Much of this work has focused on a necessary condition for utility-maximizing choices: an ability of economic agents to make accurate, or at least unbiased, forecasts of the he…

  • Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being

    Open Access•Daniel Kahneman, Alan B Krueger•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2006•Cited by: 287•References: 25

    Direct reports of subjective well-being may have a useful role in the measurement of consumer preferences and social welfare, if they can be done in a credible way. Can well-being be measured by a subjective survey, even approximately? In this paper, we discuss research on how individuals' responses to subjective well-being questions vary with their circumstances and other factors. We will argue that it is fruitful to distinguish among different …

  • The Boundaries of Loss Aversion

    Open Access•Nathan Novemsky, Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•Journal of Marketing Research•2005

    In this article, the authors propose some psychological principles to describe the boundaries of loss aversion. A key idea is that exchange goods that are given up “as intended” do not exhibit loss aversion. For example, the authors propose that money given up in purchases is not generally subject to loss aversion. The results of several experiments provide preliminary support for the hypotheses. The authors find that, consistent with prospect th…

  • Experienced Utility as a Standard of Policy Evaluation

    Open Access•Daniel Kahneman, Robert Sugden•ARTICLE•Environmental and Resource…•2005

  • Toward National Well-Being Accounts

    Daniel Kahneman, Alan B Krueger et al.•ARTICLE•American Economic Review•2004

    Toward National Well-Being Accounts by Daniel Kahneman, Alan B. Krueger, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz and Arthur Stone. Published in volume 94, issue 2, pages 429-434 of American Economic Review, May 2004

  • A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day Reconstruction Method

    Open Access•Daniel Kahneman, Alan B Krueger et al.•ARTICLE•Science•2004

    The Day Reconstruction Method (DRM) assesses how people spend their time and how they experience the various activities and settings of their lives, combining features of time-budget measurement and experience sampling. Participants systematically reconstruct their activities and experiences of the preceding day with procedures designed to reduce recall biases. The DRM's utility is shown by documenting close correspondences between the DRM report…

  • A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality.

    Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•2003

Next
  • Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability

    Open Access•Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•Cognitive Psychology•1973•Cited by: 1067

  • Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem

    Daniel Kahneman, Jack L Knetsch et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1990•Cited by: 301

    Contrary to theoretical expectations, measures of willingness-to-accept greatly exceed measures of willingness-to-pay. This paper reports several experiments that demonstrate that this "endowment effect" persists even in market settings with opportunities to learn. Consumption objects (e.g., coffee mugs) are randomly given to half the subjects in an experiment. Markets for the mugs are then conducted. The Coase theorem predicts that about half th…

  • Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being

    Open Access•Daniel Kahneman, Alan B Krueger•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2006•Cited by: 287•References: 25

    Direct reports of subjective well-being may have a useful role in the measurement of consumer preferences and social welfare, if they can be done in a credible way. Can well-being be measured by a subjective survey, even approximately? In this paper, we discuss research on how individuals' responses to subjective well-being questions vary with their circumstances and other factors. We will argue that it is fruitful to distinguish among different …

  • Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias

    Open Access•Daniel Kahneman, Jack L Knetsch et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•1991•Cited by: 267•References: 9

    A wine-loving economist we know purchased some nice Bordeaux wines years ago at low prices. The wines have greatly appreciated in value, so that a bottle that cost only $10 when purchased would now fetch $200 at auction. This economist now drinks some of this wine occasionally, but would neither be willing to sell the wine at the auction price nor buy an additional bottle at that price. Thaler (1980) called this pattern-the fact that people often…

  • Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree

    Daniel Kahneman, Gary Klein•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•2009•Cited by: 152•References: 1

    This article reports on an effort to explore the differences between two approaches to intuition and expertise that are often viewed as conflicting: heuristics and biases (HB) and naturalistic decision making (NDM). Starting from the obvious fact that professional intuition is sometimes marvelous and sometimes flawed, the authors attempt to map the boundary conditions that separate true intuitive skill from overconfident and biased impressions. T…

  • Belief in the law of small numbers

    Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•Psychological Bulletin•1971•Cited by: 94

    People have erroneous intuitions about the laws of chance. In particular, they regard a sample randomly drawn from a population as highly representative, that is, similar to the population in all essential characteristics. The prevalence of the belief and its unfortunate consequences for psychological research are illustrated by the responses of professional psychologists to a questionnaire concerning research decisions. Apparently, most psycholo…

  • Duration neglect in retrospective evaluations of affective episodes

    Barbara L Fredrickson, Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•Journal of Personality and Social…•1993•Cited by: 58

    Two experiments documented a phenomenon of duration neglect in people's global evaluations of past affective experiences. In Study 1, 32 Ss viewed aversive film clips and pleasant film clips that varied in duration and intensity. Ss provided real-time ratings of affect during each clip and global evaluations of each clip when it was over. In Study 2, 96 Ss viewed these same clips and later ranked them by their contribution to an overall experienc…

  • Choosing Less-Preferred Experiences For the Sake of Variety

    Rebecca K Ratner, Barbara E Kahn et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Consumer Research•1999•Cited by: 56

    Data from several experiments show that, contrary to traditional models of variety seeking, individuals choose to switch to less-preferred options even though they enjoy those items less than they would have enjoyed repeating a more-preferred option. Two explanations for this finding are tested. Results indicate no evidence of a benefit to more-preferred options due to the contrast to less-preferred alternatives. However, the results of three stu…

  • Predicting a changing taste: Do people know what they will like

    Open Access•Daniel Kahneman, Jackie Snell•ARTICLE•Journal of Behavioral Decision…•1992•Cited by: 53•References: 8

    A distinction is made between decision utility, experienced utility, and predicted utility and an experiment is reported addressing people's ability to forecast experienced utility. Subjects in two experiments made predictions of their future liking for stimuli to which they were then exposed daily for one week. The stimuli were ice cream in a pilot study, plain yogurt in the main study, and short musical pieces in both studies. Decreased liking …

  • Interpretations of Utility and Their Implications for the Valuation of Health

    Open Access•Paul Dolan, Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2008•Cited by: 52•References: 66

    The term 'utility' can be interpreted in terms of the hedonic experience of an outcome (experienced utility) or in terms of the preference or desire for that outcome (decision utility). It is this second interpretation that lies at the heart of the methods that economists have developed to value non-market goods, such as health. In this article, we argue that decision utility is unlikely to generate meaningful data on the utility associated with …

  • A Psychological Perspective on Economics

    Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•American Economic Review•2003•Cited by: 50•References: 7

    My first exposure to the psychological assumptions of economics was in a report that Bruno Frey wrote on that subject in the early 1970's. Its first or second sentence stated that the agent of economic theory is rational and selfish, and that his tastes do not change. I found this list quite startling, because I had been professionally trained as a psychologist not to believe a word of it. The gap between the assumptions of our disciplines appear…

  • Anomalies: Utility Maximization and Experienced Utility

    Open Access•Daniel Kahneman, Richard H Thaler•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic…•2006•Cited by: 41•References: 23

    In this column, we discuss a version of the utility maximization hypothesis that can be tested-and we find that it is false. We review empirical challenges to utility maximization, which return to the old question of whether preferences optimize the experience of outcomes. Much of this work has focused on a necessary condition for utility-maximizing choices: an ability of economic agents to make accurate, or at least unbiased, forecasts of the he…

  • Experiences extended across time: Evaluation of moments and episodes

    Open Access•Carol Varey, Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•Journal of Behavioral Decision…•1992•Cited by: 39•References: 3

    Intuitions relating to outcomes extended over time are examined. Utility integration is proposed as a normative rule for the evaluation of extended episodes. In Experiment 1, subjects explicitly compared aversive experiences of varying durations. By several measures, disutility was a marginally decreasing function of episode duration, even for experiences that were thought to become increasingly aversive. This pattern is a qualitative violation o…

  • A Comparison of Affect Ratings Obtained with Ecological Momentary Assessment and the Day Reconstruction Method

    Open Access•Samantha Dockray, Nina Grant et al.•ARTICLE•Social Indicators Research•2010•Cited by: 33•References: 19

  • Time Use and Subjective Well-Being in France and the U.S

    Open Access•Alan B Krueger, Daniel Kahneman et al.•ARTICLE•Social Indicators Research•2009•Cited by: 30•References: 8

  • Correlations, causes and heuristics in surveys of life satisfaction

    Open Access•Craig R Fox, Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•Social Indicators Research•1992•Cited by: 19•References: 10

  • Propensities and counterfactuals: The loser that almost won

    Daniel Kahneman, Carol A Varey et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Personality and Social…•1990•Cited by: 17

  • Experiences of collaborative research

    Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•2003•Cited by: 16•References: 8

    The author's personal history of the research that led to his recognition in economics is described, focusing on the process of collaboration and on the experience of controversy. The author's collaboration with Amos Tversky dealt with 3 major topics: judgment under uncertainty, decision making, and framing effects. A subsequent collaboration, with the economist Richard Thaler, played a role in the development of behavioral economics. Procedures …

  • Commentaries and Rejoinder on

    Benoît Monin, Daniel M Oppenheimer et al.•ARTICLE•Social Psychology•2014•Cited by: 15•References: 1

    While direct replications such as the “Many Labs” project are extremely valuable in testing the reliability of published findings across laboratories, they reflect the common reliance in psychology on single vignettes or stimuli, which limits the scope of the conclusions that can be reached. New experimental tools and statistical techniques make it easier to routinely sample stimuli, and to appropriately treat them as random factors. We encourage…

  • How the Scope and Method of Public Funding Affect Willingness to Pay for Public Goods

    Donald Philip Green, Daniel Kahneman et al.•ARTICLE•Public Opinion Quarterly•1994•Cited by: 14•References: 1

    This article examines the sensitivity of survey measures of willingness to pay for public goods. Visitors to a science museum in San Francisco were asked to provide estimates of their willingness to pay for saving seabirds from oil spills and for teaching English to immigrants under various experimental conditions. Willingness to pay was substantially reduced by a seemingly innocuous reminder about how many individuals would be affected by a tax …

  • Control of spurious association and the reliability of the controlled variable

    Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•Psychological Bulletin•1965•Cited by: 9

  • Predictably Incoherent Judgments

    Cass R Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman et al.•ARTICLE•Stanford Law Review•2002•Cited by: 7

    When people make moral or legal judgments in isolation, they produce a pattern of outcomes that they would themselves reject, if only they could see that pattern as a whole.A major reason is that human thinking is category-bound.When people see a case in isolation, they spontaneously compare it to other cases that are mainly drawn from the same category of harms.When people are required to compare cases that involve different kinds of harms, judg…

  • Debate: “Biopolitics” and the Missing Political Scientists

    Open Access•Michael Atkinson, Robert Nigol et al.•ARTICLE•Swiss Political Science Review•2002•Cited by: 2•References: 16

  • Obituary: Amos Tversky (1937–1006)

    Daniel Kahneman, Eldar Shafir•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•1998•Cited by: 1

  • Method, findings, and theory in studies of visual masking

    Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•Psychological Bulletin•1968•Cited by: 1

    Classifies the various paradigms in the study of visual masking and relates them to cases of interference among cotemporaneous stimuli. The dependent variables in masking studies are described. A distinction between criterion content and criterion level is introduced in the discussion of detection under masking and metacontrast. Various conceptions of identification of forms under masking and the contributions of masking effects to the study of p…

  • Control of spurious association and the reliability of the controlled variable

    Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•Psychological Bulletin•1965•Cited by: 9

  • Pupil Diameter and Load on Memory

    Open Access•Daniel Kahneman, Jackson Beatty et al.•ARTICLE•Science•1966

    During a short-term memory task, pupil diameter is a measure of the amount of material which is under active processing at any time. The pupil dilates as the material is presented and constricts during report. The rate of change of these functions is related to task difficulty.

  • Training Agents of Social Change in Israel: Definition of Objectives and a Training Approach

    Daniel Kahneman, E O Schild et al.•ARTICLE•Human Organization•1966•Cited by: 1

    Many sectors of Israeli life are characterized, not only by a rapid rate of change but also by the relative prevalence of planned social change. In response to the economic and social problems ultimately related to the achievement of statehood and the absorption of mass immigration, most public institutions are engaged in inducing and/or controlling change in many spheres of behavior. Recent years have witnessed an increase in the awareness on th…

  • Method, findings, and theory in studies of visual masking

    Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•Psychological Bulletin•1968•Cited by: 1

    Classifies the various paradigms in the study of visual masking and relates them to cases of interference among cotemporaneous stimuli. The dependent variables in masking studies are described. A distinction between criterion content and criterion level is introduced in the discussion of detection under masking and metacontrast. Various conceptions of identification of forms under masking and the contributions of masking effects to the study of p…

  • Belief in the law of small numbers

    Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•Psychological Bulletin•1971•Cited by: 94

    People have erroneous intuitions about the laws of chance. In particular, they regard a sample randomly drawn from a population as highly representative, that is, similar to the population in all essential characteristics. The prevalence of the belief and its unfortunate consequences for psychological research are illustrated by the responses of professional psychologists to a questionnaire concerning research decisions. Apparently, most psycholo…

  • Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness

    Open Access•Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky•ARTICLE•Cognitive Psychology•1972

  • On the psychology of prediction.

    Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky•ARTICLE•Psychological Review•1973

    Intuitive predictions follow a judgmental heuristic—representativeness. By this heuristic, people predict the outcome that appears most representative of the evidence. Consequently, intuitive predictions are insensitive to the reliability of the evidence or to the prior probability of the outcome, in violation of the logic of statistical prediction. The hypothesis that people predict by representativeness is supported in a series of studies with …

  • Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability

    Open Access•Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•Cognitive Psychology•1973•Cited by: 1067

  • Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases

    Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman•CHAPTER•Utility, Probability, and Human…•1975

  • Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases

    Open Access•Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman•CHAPTER•Uncertainty in economics•1978

  • On the interpretation of intuitive probability: A reply to Jonathan Cohen

    Open Access•Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky•ARTICLE•Cognition•1979

  • Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk

    Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky•ARTICLE•Econometrica•1979

    This paper presents a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk, and develops an alternative model, called prospect theory. Choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with the basic tenets of utility theory. In particular, people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty. This tendency, called …

  • The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice

    Open Access•Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•Science•1981

    The psychological principles that govern the perception of decision problems and the evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produce predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is framed in different ways. Reversals of preference are demonstrated in choices regarding monetary outcomes, both hypothetical and real, and in questions pertaining to the loss of human lives. The effects of frames on preferences are compared to the effects of…

  • The Psychology of Preferences

    Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky•ARTICLE•Scientific American•1982

  • The simulation heuristic

    Open Access•Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky•CHAPTER•Judgment under uncertainty•1982

    Our original treatment of the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 11) discussed two classes of mental operations that “bring things to mind”: the retrieval of instances and the construction of examples or scenarios. Recall and construction are quite different ways of bringing things to mind; they are used to answer different questions, and they follow different rules. Past research has dealt mainly with the retrieval of instances fr…

  • Variants of uncertainty

    Open Access•Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky•ARTICLE•Cognition•1982

  • Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases

    Open Access•Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman•CHAPTER•Judgment under uncertainty•1982

    Many decisions are based on beliefs concerning the likelihood of uncertain events such as the outcome of an election, the guilt of a defendant, or the future value of the dollar. These beliefs are usually expressed in statements such as “I think that ...,” “chances are ...,” “it is unlikely that ...,” and so forth. Occasionally, beliefs concerning uncertain events are expressed in numerical form as odds or subjective probabilities. What determine…

  • Judgments of and by representativeness

    Open Access•Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman•CHAPTER•Judgment under uncertainty•1982

    Several years ago, we presented an analysis of judgment under uncertainty that related subjective probabilities and intuitive predictions to expectations and impressions about representativeness. Two distinct hypotheses incorporated this concept: (i) people expect samples to be highly similar to their parent population and also to represent the randomness of the sampling process (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 2; 1974, 1); (ii) people often rely on re…

  • Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases

    Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman et al.•BOOK•Judgment under uncertainty•1982

    The thirty-five chapters in this book describe various judgmental heuristics and the biases they produce, not only in laboratory experiments but in important social, medical, and political situations as well. Individual chapters discuss the representativeness and availability heuristics, problems in judging covariation and control, overconfidence, multistage inference, social perception, medical diagnosis, risk perception, and methods for correct…

  • Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.

    Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•Psychological Review•1983

    Perhaps the simplest and the most basic qualitative law of probability is the conjunction rule: The probability of a conjunction, P (A&B) cannot exceed the probabilities of its constituents, P (A) and P (B), because the extension (or the possibility set) of the conjunction is included in the extension of its constituents. Judgments under uncertainty, however, are often mediated by intuitive heuristics that are not bound by the conjunction rule. A…

  • Choices, values, and frames

    Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky•ARTICLE•American Psychologist•1984

    This book presents the definitive exposition of 'prospect theory', a compelling alternative to the classical utility theory of choice. Building on the 1982 volume, Judgement Under Uncertainty, this book brings together seminal papers on prospect theory from economists, decision theorists, and psychologists, including the work of the late Amos Tversky, whose contributions are collected here for the first time. While remaining within a rational cho…

  • Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.

    Daniel Kahneman, Dale T Miller•ARTICLE•Psychological Review•1986

    A theory of norms and normality is presented and applied to some phenomena of emotional responses, social judgment, and conversations about causes. Norms are assumed to be constructed ad hoc by recruiting specific representations. Category norms are derived by recruiting exemplars. Specific objects or events generate their own norms by retrieval of similar experiences stored in memory or by construction of counterfactual alternatives. The normali…

  • Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions

    Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman•ARTICLE•The Journal of Business•1986

  • Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics

    Daniel Kahneman, Jack L Knetsch et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Business•1986

    Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, The Journal of Business, Vol. 59, No. 4, Part 2: The Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory (Oct., 1986), pp. S285-S300

  • Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem

    Daniel Kahneman, Jack L Knetsch et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1990•Cited by: 301

    Contrary to theoretical expectations, measures of willingness-to-accept greatly exceed measures of willingness-to-pay. This paper reports several experiments that demonstrate that this "endowment effect" persists even in market settings with opportunities to learn. Consumption objects (e.g., coffee mugs) are randomly given to half the subjects in an experiment. Markets for the mugs are then conducted. The Coase theorem predicts that about half th…

Psychology (61 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (52 works) · Computer Science (32 works) · Social Psychology (32 works) · Economics (28 works) · Cognitive psychology (22 works) · Mathematics (19 works) · Microeconomics (17 works) · Political science (15 works) · Artificial Intelligence (13 works)

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