Joel Backström
Biographic Data
| ID | 1693924 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Joel Backström |
| GIVEN NAMES | Joel |
| FAMILY NAME | Backström |
| SIGNATURE | BACKSTRÖM J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Runebergsgatan 50 a 17, 00260 Helsinki, Finland |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
“We Are All Sick People”—On Wittgenstein’s Religious Point of View
Drury reports Wittgenstein telling him, “I am not a religious man but I can’t help seeing every problem from a religious point of view, I would like my work to be understood in this way”. My paper attempts to make sense of this strange claim. I first consider the meaning Wittgenstein gives to ‘religious’ in speaking of questions he explicitly designates as such, and then explain how that (sort of) meaning could also apply to the (other) character…
Moral Foundations of Philosophy of Mind
This volume brings together a collection of essays that explore in a new way how unacknowledged moral concerns are integral to debates in the philosophy of mind. The radical suggestion of the book is that we can make sense of the internal dynamics and cultural significance of these debates only when we understand the moral forces that shape them. Drawing inspiration from a variety of traditions including Wittgenstein, Lacan, phenomenology and ana…
Fearful fantasies
I argue that human sexuality, and in particular the difficulties associated with it, should be understood as responses, expressive and repressive, to love. Sexual trouble cannot be articulated in terms of a conflictual interplay between “nature” and “culture”, but instead manifests a fear of wholly giving oneself to one’s desire for the other, announced in arousal. I discuss the rôle of fantasies as defensive strategies through which desire is de…
No prominent works on this page.
Fearful fantasies
I argue that human sexuality, and in particular the difficulties associated with it, should be understood as responses, expressive and repressive, to love. Sexual trouble cannot be articulated in terms of a conflictual interplay between “nature” and “culture”, but instead manifests a fear of wholly giving oneself to one’s desire for the other, announced in arousal. I discuss the rôle of fantasies as defensive strategies through which desire is de…
Moral Foundations of Philosophy of Mind
This volume brings together a collection of essays that explore in a new way how unacknowledged moral concerns are integral to debates in the philosophy of mind. The radical suggestion of the book is that we can make sense of the internal dynamics and cultural significance of these debates only when we understand the moral forces that shape them. Drawing inspiration from a variety of traditions including Wittgenstein, Lacan, phenomenology and ana…
“We Are All Sick People”—On Wittgenstein’s Religious Point of View
Drury reports Wittgenstein telling him, “I am not a religious man but I can’t help seeing every problem from a religious point of view, I would like my work to be understood in this way”. My paper attempts to make sense of this strange claim. I first consider the meaning Wittgenstein gives to ‘religious’ in speaking of questions he explicitly designates as such, and then explain how that (sort of) meaning could also apply to the (other) character…
Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Psychoanalysis, Philosophy, and Politics (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Arousal (1 work) · Cognitive science (1 work) · Confusion (1 work) · Epistemology (1 work) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (1 work) · Ethics (1 work)