Urs Fischbacher
Biographic Data
| ID | 169410 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Urs Fischbacher |
| GIVEN NAMES | Urs |
| FAMILY NAME | Fischbacher |
| SIGNATURE | FISCHBACHER U |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Zurich |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5115-8815 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 26 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 259 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 26 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Strategic Conformity or Anti-Conformity to Avoid Punishment and Attract Reward
We provide systematic insights on strategic conformist—as well as anti-conformist—behaviour in situations where people are evaluated, i.e., where an individual has to be selected for reward (e.g., promotion) or punishment (e.g., layoffs). To affect the probability of being selected, people may attempt to fit in or stand out in order to affect the chances of being noticed or liked by the evaluator. We investigate such strategic incentives for conf…
Honesty and Self-Selection into Cheap Talk
In many situations, people can lie strategically, for their own benefit. Since individuals differ with respect to their willingness to lie, the credibility of statements will crucially depend on who self-selects into such cheap-talk situations. We study this process in a two-stage political competition setting. At the entry stage, potential candidates compete in a contest to become their party’s candidate in an election. At the election stage, th…
Non‐additivity and the Salience of Marginal Productivities: Experimental Evidence on Distributive Fairness
We investigate the relevance of different distributive fairness norms in a team production process in which the team members’ contributions to the joint output are not necessarily additive. In some of the cases of non‐additivity, the individual marginal contributions to the output are not salient. We vary the salience and investigate how third parties allocate the joint output to the team members. We find that the prevalent norm is to hold others…
Social Value Orientation Moderates the Effects of Intuition versus Reflection on Responses to Unfair Ultimatum Offers
We investigated whether social value orientation (SVO) moderates the effects of intuitive versus reflective information processing on responses to unfair offers. We measured SVO one week prior to an ultimatum game experiment in which participants had to accept or reject a series of 10 ultimatum offers including very low (unfair) ones. Before making these decisions, participants mentally contrasted their individual goals with the obstacle of ponde…
Affect and fairness: Dictator games under cognitive load
Reciprocity and resistance to comprehensive reform
Lies in Disguise-an Experimental Study on Cheating: Lies In Disguise
We present a novel experimental design to measure honesty and lying. Participants receive a die which they roll privately. Since their payoff depends on the reported roll of the die, the subjects have an incentive to be dishonest and report higher numbers to get a higher payoff. This design has three advantages. First, cheating cannot be detected on the individual level, which reduces potential demand effects. Second, the method is very easy to i…
How to Model Heterogeneity in Costly Punishment: Insights from Responders' Response Times
We investigate what processes may underlie heterogeneity in social preferences. We address this question by examining participants' decisions and associated response times across 12 mini‐ultimatum games. Using a finite mixture model and cross‐validating its classification with a response time analysis, we identified four groups of responders: one group takes little to no account of the proposed split or the foregone allocation and swiftly accepts…
The behavioral validity of the strategy method in public good experiments
Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments
One lingering puzzle is why voluntary contributions to public goods decline over time in experimental and real-world settings. We show that the decline of cooperation is driven by individual preferences for imperfect conditional cooperation. Many people's desire to contribute less than others, rather than changing beliefs of what others will contribute over time or people's heterogeneity in preferences makes voluntary cooperation fragile. Univers…
Testing theories of fairness—Intentions matter
Z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments) is a software for developing and conducting economic experiments. The software is stable and allows programming almost any kind of experiments in a short time. In this article, I present the guiding principles behind the software design, its features, and its limitations.
A theory of reciprocity
Group Affiliation and Altruistic Norm Enforcement
Oxytocin increases trust in humans
Human Altruism – Proximate Patterns and Evolutionary Origins
Are people selfish or altruistic? Throughout history this question has been answered on the basis of much introspection and little evidence. It has been at the heart of many controversial debates in politics, science, and philosophy. Some of the most fundamental questions concerning our evolutionary origins, our social relations, and the organization of society are centered around issues of altruism and selfishness. Experimental evidence indicate…
Altruists with Green Beards
If cooperative dispositions are associated with unique phenotypic features (’green beards’), cooperative individuals can be identified. Therefore, cooperative individuals can avoid exploitation by defectors by cooperating exclusively with other cooperative individuals; consequently, cooperators flourish and defectors die out. Experimental evidence suggests that subjects, who are given the opportunity to make promises in face-to-face interactions,…
Social norms and human cooperation
The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment
Many people voluntarily incur costs to punish violations of social norms. Evolutionary models and empirical evidence indicate that such altruistic punishment has been a decisive force in the evolution of human cooperation. We used H 2 15 O positron emission tomography to examine the neural basis for altruistic punishment of defectors in an economic exchange. Subjects could punish defection either symbolically or effectively. Symbolic punishment d…
Third-party punishment and social norms
Reasons for Conflict: Lessons from Bargaining Experiments
In this paper we experimentally study the effects of fairness, spite, and reputation formation on conflict. We show that fairness preferences are a potential source of conflict and that intentions play an important role in the perception of fairness. Further, we show that feelings of spite may affect the occurrence of conflict. Finally, we study reputation formation as a possible source of conflict. We show that people invest in a reputation of b…
The nature of human altruism
On the Nature of Fair Behavior
This article shows that identical offers in an ultimatum game generate systematically different rejection rates depending on the other offers that are available to the proposer. This result casts doubt on the consequentialist practice in economics to define the utility of an action solely in terms of the consequences of the action irrespective of the set of alternatives. It means in particular that negatively reciprocal behavior cannot be fully c…
Why Social Preferences Matter – the Impact of non‐Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives
Journal Article Why Social Preferences Matter – the Impact of non‐Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives Get access Ernst Fehr, Ernst Fehr University of Zurich Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Urs Fischbacher Urs Fischbacher University of Zurich Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 112, Issue 478, March 2002, Pages C1–C33, …
Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms
Why Social Preferences Matter – the Impact of non‐Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives
Journal Article Why Social Preferences Matter – the Impact of non‐Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives Get access Ernst Fehr, Ernst Fehr University of Zurich Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Urs Fischbacher Urs Fischbacher University of Zurich Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 112, Issue 478, March 2002, Pages C1–C33, …
Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms
The behavioral validity of the strategy method in public good experiments
Affect and fairness: Dictator games under cognitive load
Social Value Orientation Moderates the Effects of Intuition versus Reflection on Responses to Unfair Ultimatum Offers
We investigated whether social value orientation (SVO) moderates the effects of intuitive versus reflective information processing on responses to unfair offers. We measured SVO one week prior to an ultimatum game experiment in which participants had to accept or reject a series of 10 ultimatum offers including very low (unfair) ones. Before making these decisions, participants mentally contrasted their individual goals with the obstacle of ponde…
How to Model Heterogeneity in Costly Punishment: Insights from Responders' Response Times
We investigate what processes may underlie heterogeneity in social preferences. We address this question by examining participants' decisions and associated response times across 12 mini‐ultimatum games. Using a finite mixture model and cross‐validating its classification with a response time analysis, we identified four groups of responders: one group takes little to no account of the proposed split or the foregone allocation and swiftly accepts…
Human Altruism – Proximate Patterns and Evolutionary Origins
Are people selfish or altruistic? Throughout history this question has been answered on the basis of much introspection and little evidence. It has been at the heart of many controversial debates in politics, science, and philosophy. Some of the most fundamental questions concerning our evolutionary origins, our social relations, and the organization of society are centered around issues of altruism and selfishness. Experimental evidence indicate…
Honesty and Self-Selection into Cheap Talk
In many situations, people can lie strategically, for their own benefit. Since individuals differ with respect to their willingness to lie, the credibility of statements will crucially depend on who self-selects into such cheap-talk situations. We study this process in a two-stage political competition setting. At the entry stage, potential candidates compete in a contest to become their party’s candidate in an election. At the election stage, th…
Non‐additivity and the Salience of Marginal Productivities: Experimental Evidence on Distributive Fairness
We investigate the relevance of different distributive fairness norms in a team production process in which the team members’ contributions to the joint output are not necessarily additive. In some of the cases of non‐additivity, the individual marginal contributions to the output are not salient. We vary the salience and investigate how third parties allocate the joint output to the team members. We find that the prevalent norm is to hold others…
Altruists with Green Beards
If cooperative dispositions are associated with unique phenotypic features (’green beards’), cooperative individuals can be identified. Therefore, cooperative individuals can avoid exploitation by defectors by cooperating exclusively with other cooperative individuals; consequently, cooperators flourish and defectors die out. Experimental evidence suggests that subjects, who are given the opportunity to make promises in face-to-face interactions,…
Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
Why Social Preferences Matter – the Impact of non‐Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives
Journal Article Why Social Preferences Matter – the Impact of non‐Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives Get access Ernst Fehr, Ernst Fehr University of Zurich Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Urs Fischbacher Urs Fischbacher University of Zurich Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 112, Issue 478, March 2002, Pages C1–C33, …
Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms
Reasons for Conflict: Lessons from Bargaining Experiments
In this paper we experimentally study the effects of fairness, spite, and reputation formation on conflict. We show that fairness preferences are a potential source of conflict and that intentions play an important role in the perception of fairness. Further, we show that feelings of spite may affect the occurrence of conflict. Finally, we study reputation formation as a possible source of conflict. We show that people invest in a reputation of b…
The nature of human altruism
On the Nature of Fair Behavior
This article shows that identical offers in an ultimatum game generate systematically different rejection rates depending on the other offers that are available to the proposer. This result casts doubt on the consequentialist practice in economics to define the utility of an action solely in terms of the consequences of the action irrespective of the set of alternatives. It means in particular that negatively reciprocal behavior cannot be fully c…
Social norms and human cooperation
The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment
Many people voluntarily incur costs to punish violations of social norms. Evolutionary models and empirical evidence indicate that such altruistic punishment has been a decisive force in the evolution of human cooperation. We used H 2 15 O positron emission tomography to examine the neural basis for altruistic punishment of defectors in an economic exchange. Subjects could punish defection either symbolically or effectively. Symbolic punishment d…
Third-party punishment and social norms
Oxytocin increases trust in humans
Human Altruism – Proximate Patterns and Evolutionary Origins
Are people selfish or altruistic? Throughout history this question has been answered on the basis of much introspection and little evidence. It has been at the heart of many controversial debates in politics, science, and philosophy. Some of the most fundamental questions concerning our evolutionary origins, our social relations, and the organization of society are centered around issues of altruism and selfishness. Experimental evidence indicate…
Altruists with Green Beards
If cooperative dispositions are associated with unique phenotypic features (’green beards’), cooperative individuals can be identified. Therefore, cooperative individuals can avoid exploitation by defectors by cooperating exclusively with other cooperative individuals; consequently, cooperators flourish and defectors die out. Experimental evidence suggests that subjects, who are given the opportunity to make promises in face-to-face interactions,…
A theory of reciprocity
Group Affiliation and Altruistic Norm Enforcement
Z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments) is a software for developing and conducting economic experiments. The software is stable and allows programming almost any kind of experiments in a short time. In this article, I present the guiding principles behind the software design, its features, and its limitations.
Testing theories of fairness—Intentions matter
Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments
One lingering puzzle is why voluntary contributions to public goods decline over time in experimental and real-world settings. We show that the decline of cooperation is driven by individual preferences for imperfect conditional cooperation. Many people's desire to contribute less than others, rather than changing beliefs of what others will contribute over time or people's heterogeneity in preferences makes voluntary cooperation fragile. Univers…
The behavioral validity of the strategy method in public good experiments
Lies in Disguise-an Experimental Study on Cheating: Lies In Disguise
We present a novel experimental design to measure honesty and lying. Participants receive a die which they roll privately. Since their payoff depends on the reported roll of the die, the subjects have an incentive to be dishonest and report higher numbers to get a higher payoff. This design has three advantages. First, cheating cannot be detected on the individual level, which reduces potential demand effects. Second, the method is very easy to i…
How to Model Heterogeneity in Costly Punishment: Insights from Responders' Response Times
We investigate what processes may underlie heterogeneity in social preferences. We address this question by examining participants' decisions and associated response times across 12 mini‐ultimatum games. Using a finite mixture model and cross‐validating its classification with a response time analysis, we identified four groups of responders: one group takes little to no account of the proposed split or the foregone allocation and swiftly accepts…
Affect and fairness: Dictator games under cognitive load
Reciprocity and resistance to comprehensive reform
Social Value Orientation Moderates the Effects of Intuition versus Reflection on Responses to Unfair Ultimatum Offers
We investigated whether social value orientation (SVO) moderates the effects of intuitive versus reflective information processing on responses to unfair offers. We measured SVO one week prior to an ultimatum game experiment in which participants had to accept or reject a series of 10 ultimatum offers including very low (unfair) ones. Before making these decisions, participants mentally contrasted their individual goals with the obstacle of ponde…
Non‐additivity and the Salience of Marginal Productivities: Experimental Evidence on Distributive Fairness
We investigate the relevance of different distributive fairness norms in a team production process in which the team members’ contributions to the joint output are not necessarily additive. In some of the cases of non‐additivity, the individual marginal contributions to the output are not salient. We vary the salience and investigate how third parties allocate the joint output to the team members. We find that the prevalent norm is to hold others…
Honesty and Self-Selection into Cheap Talk
In many situations, people can lie strategically, for their own benefit. Since individuals differ with respect to their willingness to lie, the credibility of statements will crucially depend on who self-selects into such cheap-talk situations. We study this process in a two-stage political competition setting. At the entry stage, potential candidates compete in a contest to become their party’s candidate in an election. At the election stage, th…
Economics (23 works) · Psychology (22 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (21 works) · Social Psychology (21 works) · Microeconomics (20 works) · Political science (16 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (10 works) · Social Psychology (10 works) · Computer Science (9 works) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (8 works)