K Kuwabara
Biographic Data
| ID | 17112 |
|---|---|
| NAME | K Kuwabara |
| GIVEN NAMES | K |
| FAMILY NAME | Kuwabara |
| SIGNATURE | KUWABARA K |
| AFFILIATIONS | Columbia University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6511-5691 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 132 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Lay theories of networking ability
When Beauty Doesn't Pay
We analyzed a random sample of individual listings from an online market for peer-to-peer lending to examine the effects of gender and attractiveness on receiving loans. In this setting, we tested the theoretical argument that women are penalized for violating beliefs about women's social roles when they seek loans for male-typed endeavors, such as running a business. Consistent with this theory, female borrowers seeking loans for business purpos…
Costly Punishment Increases Prosocial Punishment by Designated Punishers
A classic problem in the literature on authority is that those with the power to enforce cooperation and proper norms of conduct can also abuse or misuse their power. The present research tested the argument that concerns about legitimacy can help regulate the use of power to punish by invoking a sense of what is morally right or socially proper for power-holders. We tested this idea in a laboratory experiment using public goods games in which on…
In the shade of a forest status, reputation, and ambiguity in an online microcredit market
Do Reputation Systems Undermine Trust? Divergent Effects of Enforcement Type on Generalized Trust and Trustworthiness
Research shows that enforcing cooperation using contracts or tangible sanctions can backfire, undermining people's intrinsic motivation to cooperate: when the enforcement is removed, people are less trusting or trustworthy than when there is no enforcement to begin with. The author examines whether reputation systems have similar consequences for generalized trust and trustworthiness. Using a web-based experiment simulating online market transact…
Trust, Cohesion, and Cooperation After Early Versus Late Trust Violations in Two-Person Exchange
We examine how the timing of trust violations affects cooperation and solidarity, including trust and relational cohesion. Past studies that used repeated Prisoner’s Dilemmas suggest that trust violations are more harmful when they occur in early rather than later interactions. We argue that this effect of early trust violations depends on cultural and individual differences in generalized trust. A laboratory study from high- and low-trust cultur…
Temporal Dynamics of Social Exchange and the Development of Solidarity
In their concerted efforts to unpack the microprocesses that transform repeated exchanges into an exchange relation, exchange theorists have paid little attention to how actors perceive changes and dynamics in exchanges over time. We help fill this gap by studying how temporal patterns of exchange affect the development of cohesion. Some exchange relations develop gradually as actors hedge their bets, making incremental commitments to “test the w…
Cohesion, Cooperation, and the Value of Doing Things Together
A recent debate in sociological exchange theory concerns which form of exchange is likely to promote cohesion in exchange relations. One side maintains that bilateral exchange, often associated with economic transactions, entails joint action to share mutual benefits, contributing more to feelings of cohesion than do independent acts of unilateral giving from one person to another, typical of social exchange. The other side argues that bilateral …
Specialization in Relational Reasoning
Although deduction can be applied both to associations between nonsocial objects and to social relationships among people, the authors hypothesize that social targets elicit specialized cognitive mechanisms that facilitate inferences about social relations. Consistent with this view, in Experiments 1a and 1b the authors show that participants are more efficient and more accurate at inferring social relations compared to nonsocial relations. In Ex…
The False Enforcement of Unpopular Norms
Prevailing theory assumes that people enforce norms in order to pressure others to act in ways that they approve. Yet there are numerous examples of "unpopular norms" in which people compel each other to do things that they privately disapprove. While peer sanctioning suggests a ready explanation for why people conform to unpopular norms, it is harder to understand why they would enforce a norm they privately oppose. The authors argue that people…
Culture, Identity, and Structure in Social Exchange
Cross-cultural trust and cooperation are important concerns for international markets, political cooperation, and cultural exchange. Until recently, this problem was difficult to study under controlled conditions due to the inability to conduct experiments involving interaction between participants located in physically distant locations. We report results of an experiment using a Web-based “virtual lab” to study trust and trustworthiness between…
Linux
This paper establishes a context for the work of Eric Raymond and his description of the Linux phenomenon, by examining the emerging science of complex adaptive systems pioneered by John Holland, Christopher Langton, Robert Axelrod, among others. Raymond's evolutionary view is given an extended and more formal treatment under the terms of chaos and complexity, and chaos and complexity under the terms of sociology. In addition, this paper presents…
Nothing to Fear But Fear Itself
This article extends Simpson's (2003) research on sex differences in social dilemmas. To test the hypotheses that men defect in response to greed and women to fear, Simpson created Fear and Greed Dilemmas, but experiments using these games supported the greed hypothesis only. In this article I focus on why the fear hypothesis failed and suggest that fear was actually absent in the Fear Dilemma. To retest Simpson's hypotheses, I propose a new asym…
Reputation systems
T he Internet offers vast new opportunities to interact with total strangers. These interactions can be fun, informative, even profitable. But they also involve risk. Is the advice of a self-proclaimed expert at expertcentral.com reliable? Will an unknown dotcom site or eBay seller ship items promptly with appropriate packaging? Will the product be the same one described online?
Linux
The False Enforcement of Unpopular Norms
Prevailing theory assumes that people enforce norms in order to pressure others to act in ways that they approve. Yet there are numerous examples of "unpopular norms" in which people compel each other to do things that they privately disapprove. While peer sanctioning suggests a ready explanation for why people conform to unpopular norms, it is harder to understand why they would enforce a norm they privately oppose. The authors argue that people…
Cohesion, Cooperation, and the Value of Doing Things Together
A recent debate in sociological exchange theory concerns which form of exchange is likely to promote cohesion in exchange relations. One side maintains that bilateral exchange, often associated with economic transactions, entails joint action to share mutual benefits, contributing more to feelings of cohesion than do independent acts of unilateral giving from one person to another, typical of social exchange. The other side argues that bilateral …
Culture, Identity, and Structure in Social Exchange
Cross-cultural trust and cooperation are important concerns for international markets, political cooperation, and cultural exchange. Until recently, this problem was difficult to study under controlled conditions due to the inability to conduct experiments involving interaction between participants located in physically distant locations. We report results of an experiment using a Web-based “virtual lab” to study trust and trustworthiness between…
Do Reputation Systems Undermine Trust? Divergent Effects of Enforcement Type on Generalized Trust and Trustworthiness
Research shows that enforcing cooperation using contracts or tangible sanctions can backfire, undermining people's intrinsic motivation to cooperate: when the enforcement is removed, people are less trusting or trustworthy than when there is no enforcement to begin with. The author examines whether reputation systems have similar consequences for generalized trust and trustworthiness. Using a web-based experiment simulating online market transact…
Nothing to Fear But Fear Itself
This article extends Simpson's (2003) research on sex differences in social dilemmas. To test the hypotheses that men defect in response to greed and women to fear, Simpson created Fear and Greed Dilemmas, but experiments using these games supported the greed hypothesis only. In this article I focus on why the fear hypothesis failed and suggest that fear was actually absent in the Fear Dilemma. To retest Simpson's hypotheses, I propose a new asym…
Trust, Cohesion, and Cooperation After Early Versus Late Trust Violations in Two-Person Exchange
We examine how the timing of trust violations affects cooperation and solidarity, including trust and relational cohesion. Past studies that used repeated Prisoner’s Dilemmas suggest that trust violations are more harmful when they occur in early rather than later interactions. We argue that this effect of early trust violations depends on cultural and individual differences in generalized trust. A laboratory study from high- and low-trust cultur…
Costly Punishment Increases Prosocial Punishment by Designated Punishers
A classic problem in the literature on authority is that those with the power to enforce cooperation and proper norms of conduct can also abuse or misuse their power. The present research tested the argument that concerns about legitimacy can help regulate the use of power to punish by invoking a sense of what is morally right or socially proper for power-holders. We tested this idea in a laboratory experiment using public goods games in which on…
In the shade of a forest status, reputation, and ambiguity in an online microcredit market
Reputation systems
T he Internet offers vast new opportunities to interact with total strangers. These interactions can be fun, informative, even profitable. But they also involve risk. Is the advice of a self-proclaimed expert at expertcentral.com reliable? Will an unknown dotcom site or eBay seller ship items promptly with appropriate packaging? Will the product be the same one described online?
Linux
Linux
This paper establishes a context for the work of Eric Raymond and his description of the Linux phenomenon, by examining the emerging science of complex adaptive systems pioneered by John Holland, Christopher Langton, Robert Axelrod, among others. Raymond's evolutionary view is given an extended and more formal treatment under the terms of chaos and complexity, and chaos and complexity under the terms of sociology. In addition, this paper presents…
Nothing to Fear But Fear Itself
This article extends Simpson's (2003) research on sex differences in social dilemmas. To test the hypotheses that men defect in response to greed and women to fear, Simpson created Fear and Greed Dilemmas, but experiments using these games supported the greed hypothesis only. In this article I focus on why the fear hypothesis failed and suggest that fear was actually absent in the Fear Dilemma. To retest Simpson's hypotheses, I propose a new asym…
Culture, Identity, and Structure in Social Exchange
Cross-cultural trust and cooperation are important concerns for international markets, political cooperation, and cultural exchange. Until recently, this problem was difficult to study under controlled conditions due to the inability to conduct experiments involving interaction between participants located in physically distant locations. We report results of an experiment using a Web-based “virtual lab” to study trust and trustworthiness between…
The False Enforcement of Unpopular Norms
Prevailing theory assumes that people enforce norms in order to pressure others to act in ways that they approve. Yet there are numerous examples of "unpopular norms" in which people compel each other to do things that they privately disapprove. While peer sanctioning suggests a ready explanation for why people conform to unpopular norms, it is harder to understand why they would enforce a norm they privately oppose. The authors argue that people…
Specialization in Relational Reasoning
Although deduction can be applied both to associations between nonsocial objects and to social relationships among people, the authors hypothesize that social targets elicit specialized cognitive mechanisms that facilitate inferences about social relations. Consistent with this view, in Experiments 1a and 1b the authors show that participants are more efficient and more accurate at inferring social relations compared to nonsocial relations. In Ex…
Cohesion, Cooperation, and the Value of Doing Things Together
A recent debate in sociological exchange theory concerns which form of exchange is likely to promote cohesion in exchange relations. One side maintains that bilateral exchange, often associated with economic transactions, entails joint action to share mutual benefits, contributing more to feelings of cohesion than do independent acts of unilateral giving from one person to another, typical of social exchange. The other side argues that bilateral …
Temporal Dynamics of Social Exchange and the Development of Solidarity
In their concerted efforts to unpack the microprocesses that transform repeated exchanges into an exchange relation, exchange theorists have paid little attention to how actors perceive changes and dynamics in exchanges over time. We help fill this gap by studying how temporal patterns of exchange affect the development of cohesion. Some exchange relations develop gradually as actors hedge their bets, making incremental commitments to “test the w…
Trust, Cohesion, and Cooperation After Early Versus Late Trust Violations in Two-Person Exchange
We examine how the timing of trust violations affects cooperation and solidarity, including trust and relational cohesion. Past studies that used repeated Prisoner’s Dilemmas suggest that trust violations are more harmful when they occur in early rather than later interactions. We argue that this effect of early trust violations depends on cultural and individual differences in generalized trust. A laboratory study from high- and low-trust cultur…
Do Reputation Systems Undermine Trust? Divergent Effects of Enforcement Type on Generalized Trust and Trustworthiness
Research shows that enforcing cooperation using contracts or tangible sanctions can backfire, undermining people's intrinsic motivation to cooperate: when the enforcement is removed, people are less trusting or trustworthy than when there is no enforcement to begin with. The author examines whether reputation systems have similar consequences for generalized trust and trustworthiness. Using a web-based experiment simulating online market transact…
When Beauty Doesn't Pay
We analyzed a random sample of individual listings from an online market for peer-to-peer lending to examine the effects of gender and attractiveness on receiving loans. In this setting, we tested the theoretical argument that women are penalized for violating beliefs about women's social roles when they seek loans for male-typed endeavors, such as running a business. Consistent with this theory, female borrowers seeking loans for business purpos…
Costly Punishment Increases Prosocial Punishment by Designated Punishers
A classic problem in the literature on authority is that those with the power to enforce cooperation and proper norms of conduct can also abuse or misuse their power. The present research tested the argument that concerns about legitimacy can help regulate the use of power to punish by invoking a sense of what is morally right or socially proper for power-holders. We tested this idea in a laboratory experiment using public goods games in which on…
In the shade of a forest status, reputation, and ambiguity in an online microcredit market
Lay theories of networking ability
Psychology (11 works) · Social Psychology (11 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Political science (7 works) · Economics (6 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Business (4 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (4 works) · Law (4 works)