Joseph A Maiolo
Biographic Data
| ID | 1712353 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Joseph A Maiolo |
| GIVEN NAMES | Joseph A |
| FAMILY NAME | Maiolo |
| SIGNATURE | MAIOLO J A |
| AFFILIATIONS | King's College London |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8954-9881 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 11 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Making the Unipolar Moment
The 1970s was a decade of gloom for U.S. foreign policy commentators. The Soviet Union appeared to be winning the Cold War arms race. Moscow-backed revolutionary movements surged across the Third World. Stagflation, a fear of Japanese imports, and oil-price shocks plagued the U.S. economy. The trauma of the Iranian hostage crisis seemed to underscore a lack of American confidence on the global stage. By the 1990s, this situation was dramatically …
Systems and Boundaries in International History
The recent transnational, global, and cultural turns have challenged international historians to reconsider the approach, purpose, and value of their field. Although the new trends are beneficial to the extent that they challenge the premise that the nation-state should be the primary framework of historical inquiry, the boundaries of international history have expanded too far, and the cultural turn's preoccupation with national discourses at th…
Introduction to Volume II
It is the long-lived, leftist and populist American historian Louis (‘ Studs ’) Terkel (1912 – 2008) who has provided what might be agreed as the ‘name brand’ of the global conflict fought between 1939 and 1945. In 1984 he published The Good War. The next year, it won the Pulitzer Prize for nonfiction. Terkel aimed to recover the reaction of ‘ordinary’ Americans (and only them), whether they were civilians or military, to their years of battle fr…
Personalities, Policies, and International History
This brief essay pays tribute to the contribution of Donald Cameron Watt (1928–2014) to the historiography of twentieth-century international history and the origins of the Second World War in Europe. It sets out his characteristic approach to the field, especially the emphasis he placed on the beliefs and perceptions of key decision-makers in the international system in explaining how and why events occurred the way they did. This essay suggests…
Sir Basil Zaharoff and Sir Vincent Caillard as Instruments of British Policy towards Greece and the Ottoman Empire during the Asquith and Lloyd George Administrations, 1915–8
The notorious arms trader Sir Basil Zaharoff is remembered as the archetypal 'merchant of death'. During the First World War, he is alleged to have exercised a malign influence over statesmen in London and Paris. Recently released Foreign Office files now allow us to document Zaharoff's wartime activities on behalf of the British government as an agent of influence in the Levant. The new sources reveal that Sir Vincent H.P. Caillard, the financia…
Anglo-Soviet Naval Armaments Diplomacy Before the Second World War
The failure of Britain and the Soviet Union to cooperate in the containment of Nazi Germany has attracted much attention. Most historians blame Britain for the lack of cooperation between the two powers against Hitler. Some emphasise a lack of realism in British policy as the root cause, other an excess of anti-communism. This article evaluates these arguments by exploring Anglo-Soviet naval armaments diplomacy from 1935 to 1939 based on document…
Naval History and Maritime Strategy
Between Two Oceans
Journal Article Between Two Oceans: A Military History of Singapore from First Settlement to Final British Withdrawal, Malcolm H. Murfett, John N. Miksic, Brian P. Farrell, and Chiang Ming Shun Get access Joseph A. Maiolo Joseph A. Maiolo University of Leeds Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The English Historical Review, Volume 116, Issue 467, June 2001, Pages 761–762, https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/116.467.76…
The admiralty and the Anglo‐German Naval agreement of 18 June 1935
This essay offers a reappraisal of the Royal Navy's decisive role in the making of the Anglo‐German Naval Agreement. It argues that the Admiralty's response to Hitler's offer of a fixed naval tonnage ratio was more rational and more complex than previous accounts would suggest. The premise here is that the only way to grasp Admiralty policy is to reconstruct the coherent set of financial, industrial, technical, diplomatic and strategic imperative…
Deception and intelligence failure
This essay examines the key role played by intelligence and deception in the interactive process of British and German preparations in the 1930s for U‐boat warfare. It argues that the Royal Navy (RN) employed the general perception of ASDIC (sonar) as an ‘antidote’ to the submarine to mislead potential foes about the state of its anti‐submarine defences. This British campaign of deception had a discernible impact. Before the outbreak of World War…
The Knockout Blow against the Import System
This article examines the performance of the Admiralty in assessing the German navy's intentions and capabilities in the nineteen-thirties. It demonstrates that the British Naval Staff developed through a methodical war planning process a distinct image of Germany's sea strategy. As the planning process advanced, the Naval Staff became convinced by a steady influx of reliable intelligence that German strategists intended in a future war to launch…
Systems and Boundaries in International History
The recent transnational, global, and cultural turns have challenged international historians to reconsider the approach, purpose, and value of their field. Although the new trends are beneficial to the extent that they challenge the premise that the nation-state should be the primary framework of historical inquiry, the boundaries of international history have expanded too far, and the cultural turn's preoccupation with national discourses at th…
Personalities, Policies, and International History
This brief essay pays tribute to the contribution of Donald Cameron Watt (1928–2014) to the historiography of twentieth-century international history and the origins of the Second World War in Europe. It sets out his characteristic approach to the field, especially the emphasis he placed on the beliefs and perceptions of key decision-makers in the international system in explaining how and why events occurred the way they did. This essay suggests…
Sir Basil Zaharoff and Sir Vincent Caillard as Instruments of British Policy towards Greece and the Ottoman Empire during the Asquith and Lloyd George Administrations, 1915–8
The notorious arms trader Sir Basil Zaharoff is remembered as the archetypal 'merchant of death'. During the First World War, he is alleged to have exercised a malign influence over statesmen in London and Paris. Recently released Foreign Office files now allow us to document Zaharoff's wartime activities on behalf of the British government as an agent of influence in the Levant. The new sources reveal that Sir Vincent H.P. Caillard, the financia…
Naval History and Maritime Strategy
Between Two Oceans
Journal Article Between Two Oceans: A Military History of Singapore from First Settlement to Final British Withdrawal, Malcolm H. Murfett, John N. Miksic, Brian P. Farrell, and Chiang Ming Shun Get access Joseph A. Maiolo Joseph A. Maiolo University of Leeds Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The English Historical Review, Volume 116, Issue 467, June 2001, Pages 761–762, https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/116.467.76…
The admiralty and the Anglo‐German Naval agreement of 18 June 1935
This essay offers a reappraisal of the Royal Navy's decisive role in the making of the Anglo‐German Naval Agreement. It argues that the Admiralty's response to Hitler's offer of a fixed naval tonnage ratio was more rational and more complex than previous accounts would suggest. The premise here is that the only way to grasp Admiralty policy is to reconstruct the coherent set of financial, industrial, technical, diplomatic and strategic imperative…
Deception and intelligence failure
This essay examines the key role played by intelligence and deception in the interactive process of British and German preparations in the 1930s for U‐boat warfare. It argues that the Royal Navy (RN) employed the general perception of ASDIC (sonar) as an ‘antidote’ to the submarine to mislead potential foes about the state of its anti‐submarine defences. This British campaign of deception had a discernible impact. Before the outbreak of World War…
The Knockout Blow against the Import System
This article examines the performance of the Admiralty in assessing the German navy's intentions and capabilities in the nineteen-thirties. It demonstrates that the British Naval Staff developed through a methodical war planning process a distinct image of Germany's sea strategy. As the planning process advanced, the Naval Staff became convinced by a steady influx of reliable intelligence that German strategists intended in a future war to launch…
Naval History and Maritime Strategy
Between Two Oceans
Journal Article Between Two Oceans: A Military History of Singapore from First Settlement to Final British Withdrawal, Malcolm H. Murfett, John N. Miksic, Brian P. Farrell, and Chiang Ming Shun Get access Joseph A. Maiolo Joseph A. Maiolo University of Leeds Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The English Historical Review, Volume 116, Issue 467, June 2001, Pages 761–762, https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/116.467.76…
Anglo-Soviet Naval Armaments Diplomacy Before the Second World War
The failure of Britain and the Soviet Union to cooperate in the containment of Nazi Germany has attracted much attention. Most historians blame Britain for the lack of cooperation between the two powers against Hitler. Some emphasise a lack of realism in British policy as the root cause, other an excess of anti-communism. This article evaluates these arguments by exploring Anglo-Soviet naval armaments diplomacy from 1935 to 1939 based on document…
Sir Basil Zaharoff and Sir Vincent Caillard as Instruments of British Policy towards Greece and the Ottoman Empire during the Asquith and Lloyd George Administrations, 1915–8
The notorious arms trader Sir Basil Zaharoff is remembered as the archetypal 'merchant of death'. During the First World War, he is alleged to have exercised a malign influence over statesmen in London and Paris. Recently released Foreign Office files now allow us to document Zaharoff's wartime activities on behalf of the British government as an agent of influence in the Levant. The new sources reveal that Sir Vincent H.P. Caillard, the financia…
Introduction to Volume II
It is the long-lived, leftist and populist American historian Louis (‘ Studs ’) Terkel (1912 – 2008) who has provided what might be agreed as the ‘name brand’ of the global conflict fought between 1939 and 1945. In 1984 he published The Good War. The next year, it won the Pulitzer Prize for nonfiction. Terkel aimed to recover the reaction of ‘ordinary’ Americans (and only them), whether they were civilians or military, to their years of battle fr…
Personalities, Policies, and International History
This brief essay pays tribute to the contribution of Donald Cameron Watt (1928–2014) to the historiography of twentieth-century international history and the origins of the Second World War in Europe. It sets out his characteristic approach to the field, especially the emphasis he placed on the beliefs and perceptions of key decision-makers in the international system in explaining how and why events occurred the way they did. This essay suggests…
Systems and Boundaries in International History
The recent transnational, global, and cultural turns have challenged international historians to reconsider the approach, purpose, and value of their field. Although the new trends are beneficial to the extent that they challenge the premise that the nation-state should be the primary framework of historical inquiry, the boundaries of international history have expanded too far, and the cultural turn's preoccupation with national discourses at th…
Making the Unipolar Moment
The 1970s was a decade of gloom for U.S. foreign policy commentators. The Soviet Union appeared to be winning the Cold War arms race. Moscow-backed revolutionary movements surged across the Third World. Stagflation, a fear of Japanese imports, and oil-price shocks plagued the U.S. economy. The trauma of the Iranian hostage crisis seemed to underscore a lack of American confidence on the global stage. By the 1990s, this situation was dramatically …
History (9 works) · Law (8 works) · Political science (8 works) · History (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Politics (6 works) · Economic history (5 works) · World Wars: History, Literature, and Impact (4 works) · Archaeology (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works)