Linda F Callahan
Biographic Data
| ID | 172685 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Linda F Callahan |
| GIVEN NAMES | Linda F |
| FAMILY NAME | Callahan |
| SIGNATURE | CALLAHAN L F |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Notre Dame |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4658-7762 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 15 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 10 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1989 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Stubborn Fools and the Arrogantly Open-minded
The thought that intellectual arrogance consists in, roughly, overconfident resilience in one’s beliefs has been influential in philosophy and psychology. This thought is in the background of much of the philosophical literature on disagreement as well as some leading psychological scales of intellectual humility. It is not true, however. This paper highlights cases (of “stubborn fools” and the “arrogantly open-minded”) that cause trouble for equ…
Epistemic authenticity
There are better and worse ways to acquire epistemic virtues and more generally to be disposed to change or maintain one's epistemic dispositions over time. This is a dimension along which one might be better or worse as an epistemic agent that, we argue, cannot be explained with reference to current normative categories in epistemology but requires recognition of a new norm or virtue—namely, “epistemic authenticity”—which is the central virtue i…
New and Improved
Some philosophers—call them pessimists–think we have reason to avoid deferring to testimony to settle our questions in domains where deep understanding is important. Extant defences of pessimism focus on whether deferring to testimony is ever sufficient for acquiring understanding. But I argue that these defences/articulations of pessimism are unsatisfactory. Even if deference to testimony were always insufficient for acquiring understanding—whic…
Intellectual humility and Christian faith
Christians talk a lot about humility. They also talk a lot about the kinds of radical faith that seem to fly in the face of intellectual humility. I explore how best to resolve this tension, from a Christian perspective. I argue that rather than prohibiting radical, ‘all-in’ faith or giving up on an intellectual humility requirement, Christians should conceive of intellectual humility as rooted in (non-)concern for one’s intellectual ego. This ki…
(Joint) achievements and the value problem
Intellectual humility
Humility for Everyone
This paper attempts to motivate and reconcile two thoughts about humility that are in tension. First, the experiences of oppressed people matter a great deal to the question of whether humility is a virtue. Second, prima facie anyway, there still seems reason to think humility is a virtue, and an ‘inclusive’ virtue at that, i.e. a virtue for all people. I attempt to reconcile these two thoughts by suggesting a new account of humility, which I cal…
Moral Testimony
Why is there a felt asymmetry between cases in which agents defer to testifiers for certain moral beliefs, and cases in which agents defer on many other matters? One explanation influential in the literature is that having understanding of a proposition is both (a) in tension with acquiring belief in the proposition by deferring to another's testimony and (b) distinctively important when it comes to moral propositions, as compared with what we mi…
History
Within a given drama, characters act out their roles within scenes that are known as themes. Bormann (1972, 1980, 1982, 1983) defined setting themes as fantasy themes that depict the location of where life dramas take place. An analysis of the discourse revealed that Jesse Jackson's drama took place in four different settings or scenes: (a) in history, (b) in a society where many people are stuck at the bottom and have been left out of the Americ…
A contrasting view on rheumatoid arthritis
A contrasting view on rheumatoid arthritis. L F Callahan, T Pincus, and F WolfeCopyRight https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.79.9.1308 Published Online: October 07, 2011
Moral Testimony
Why is there a felt asymmetry between cases in which agents defer to testifiers for certain moral beliefs, and cases in which agents defer on many other matters? One explanation influential in the literature is that having understanding of a proposition is both (a) in tension with acquiring belief in the proposition by deferring to another's testimony and (b) distinctively important when it comes to moral propositions, as compared with what we mi…
Humility for Everyone
This paper attempts to motivate and reconcile two thoughts about humility that are in tension. First, the experiences of oppressed people matter a great deal to the question of whether humility is a virtue. Second, prima facie anyway, there still seems reason to think humility is a virtue, and an ‘inclusive’ virtue at that, i.e. a virtue for all people. I attempt to reconcile these two thoughts by suggesting a new account of humility, which I cal…
Intellectual humility
(Joint) achievements and the value problem
A contrasting view on rheumatoid arthritis
A contrasting view on rheumatoid arthritis. L F Callahan, T Pincus, and F WolfeCopyRight https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.79.9.1308 Published Online: October 07, 2011
History
Within a given drama, characters act out their roles within scenes that are known as themes. Bormann (1972, 1980, 1982, 1983) defined setting themes as fantasy themes that depict the location of where life dramas take place. An analysis of the discourse revealed that Jesse Jackson's drama took place in four different settings or scenes: (a) in history, (b) in a society where many people are stuck at the bottom and have been left out of the Americ…
Moral Testimony
Why is there a felt asymmetry between cases in which agents defer to testifiers for certain moral beliefs, and cases in which agents defer on many other matters? One explanation influential in the literature is that having understanding of a proposition is both (a) in tension with acquiring belief in the proposition by deferring to another's testimony and (b) distinctively important when it comes to moral propositions, as compared with what we mi…
Humility for Everyone
This paper attempts to motivate and reconcile two thoughts about humility that are in tension. First, the experiences of oppressed people matter a great deal to the question of whether humility is a virtue. Second, prima facie anyway, there still seems reason to think humility is a virtue, and an ‘inclusive’ virtue at that, i.e. a virtue for all people. I attempt to reconcile these two thoughts by suggesting a new account of humility, which I cal…
(Joint) achievements and the value problem
Intellectual humility
Stubborn Fools and the Arrogantly Open-minded
The thought that intellectual arrogance consists in, roughly, overconfident resilience in one’s beliefs has been influential in philosophy and psychology. This thought is in the background of much of the philosophical literature on disagreement as well as some leading psychological scales of intellectual humility. It is not true, however. This paper highlights cases (of “stubborn fools” and the “arrogantly open-minded”) that cause trouble for equ…
Epistemic authenticity
There are better and worse ways to acquire epistemic virtues and more generally to be disposed to change or maintain one's epistemic dispositions over time. This is a dimension along which one might be better or worse as an epistemic agent that, we argue, cannot be explained with reference to current normative categories in epistemology but requires recognition of a new norm or virtue—namely, “epistemic authenticity”—which is the central virtue i…
New and Improved
Some philosophers—call them pessimists–think we have reason to avoid deferring to testimony to settle our questions in domains where deep understanding is important. Extant defences of pessimism focus on whether deferring to testimony is ever sufficient for acquiring understanding. But I argue that these defences/articulations of pessimism are unsatisfactory. Even if deference to testimony were always insufficient for acquiring understanding—whic…
Intellectual humility and Christian faith
Christians talk a lot about humility. They also talk a lot about the kinds of radical faith that seem to fly in the face of intellectual humility. I explore how best to resolve this tension, from a Christian perspective. I argue that rather than prohibiting radical, ‘all-in’ faith or giving up on an intellectual humility requirement, Christians should conceive of intellectual humility as rooted in (non-)concern for one’s intellectual ego. This ki…
Philosophy (7 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Forgiveness and Related Behaviors (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Ethics in medical practice (3 works) · Humility (3 works) · Theology (3 works)