Patricia Greenspan
Biographic Data
| ID | 1752761 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Patricia Greenspan |
| GIVEN NAMES | Patricia |
| FAMILY NAME | Greenspan |
| SIGNATURE | GREENSPAN P |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Maryland, College Park |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7062-0596 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 16 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 18 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 16 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1976 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The rise of affectivism
Making Room for Options: Moral Reasons, Imperfect Duties, and Choice
An imperfect duty such as the duty to aid those in need is supposed to leave leeway for choice as to how to satisfy it, but if our reason for a certain way of satisfying it is our strongest, that leeway would seem to be eliminated. This paper defends a conception of practical reasons designed to preserve it, without slighting the binding force of moral requirements, though it allows us to discount certain moral reasons. Only reasons that offer cr…
Emotional Strategies and Rationality
Self Expressions: Mind, Morals, and the Meaning of Life
Continuing the old philosophical project of reconciling a scientific view of ourselves with the view of ourselves as agents of free will and meaning, but bringing to this project the latest insights of neuroscience, cognitive science, and psychiatry, Flanagan's collection of essays explores topics such as a scientific explanation of consciousness, the moral socialization of children, and the nature and issues of psychological phenomena such as mu…
Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms
Geographies of Responsibility
Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms
P.S. Greenspan argues that dilemmas may be regarded as possible consequences of a set of social rules designed to be simple enough to be teachable. Where these rules prohibit action either way, the problematic motivational force of dilemmas can be explained by reference to the role of emotion as a second-best substitute for action. Guilt is seen as a natural but contested candidate for the sort of emotional sanction for wrongdoing that might supp…
Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification
Book Notes Get access Wittgenstein: an Introduction. By Joachim Schulte. Translated By W.H. Brenner And J.F. Holley (State Univ. of New York Press, 1992. Pp. ix + 187. Price $29.50 h/b, $9.95 p/b.) B.N. G B.N. G Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 46, Issue 183, April 1996, Pages 281–282, https://doi.org/10.2307/2956411 Published: 01 April 1996
Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms
Greenspan argues that dilemmas may be regarded as possible consequences of a set of social rules designed to be simple enough to be teachable. Where these rules prohibit action either way, the problematic motivational force of dilemmas can be explained by reference to the role of emotion as a second-best substitute for action. Since, on the proposed account, emotions underpin the teachings of moral language, Greenspan shows how emotional capaciti…
Guilt and Virtue
L'A. veut montrer le lien entre ethique des vertus et ethique des devoirs par une analyse du concept de culpabilite. Il mene son etude en se referant a la theorie aristotelicienne des vertus comme perfection de l'individu
Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification
Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting
Anyone who has wondered if free will is just an illusion or has asked 'could I have chosen otherwise?' after performing some rash deed will find this book an absorbing discussion of an endlessly fascinating subject. Daniel Dennett, whose previous books include Brainstorms and (with Douglas Hofstadter) The Mind's I, tackles the free will problem in a highly original and witty manner, drawing on the theories and concepts of several fields usually i…
Oughts and Determinism: A Response to Goldman
In Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection, Holly S. Goldman argues for the following principles governing ought-statements:' G*1. (A) S ought at t, to perform A, at t, if and only if (1) S has the ability at t, to perform A, and (2) The sequence from t, which would follow A, is better than any sequence from t, which would follow any alternative to A,. (B) If S ought at t, to perform Ai at ti, then S ought at t, to perform an immediate successor B…
Behavior Control and Freedom of Action
Twentieth Century Ethics
The Structure of Morality
Twentieth Century Ethics
The Structure of Morality
Oughts and Determinism: A Response to Goldman
In Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection, Holly S. Goldman argues for the following principles governing ought-statements:' G*1. (A) S ought at t, to perform A, at t, if and only if (1) S has the ability at t, to perform A, and (2) The sequence from t, which would follow A, is better than any sequence from t, which would follow any alternative to A,. (B) If S ought at t, to perform Ai at ti, then S ought at t, to perform an immediate successor B…
Behavior Control and Freedom of Action
Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting
Anyone who has wondered if free will is just an illusion or has asked 'could I have chosen otherwise?' after performing some rash deed will find this book an absorbing discussion of an endlessly fascinating subject. Daniel Dennett, whose previous books include Brainstorms and (with Douglas Hofstadter) The Mind's I, tackles the free will problem in a highly original and witty manner, drawing on the theories and concepts of several fields usually i…
Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification
Guilt and Virtue
L'A. veut montrer le lien entre ethique des vertus et ethique des devoirs par une analyse du concept de culpabilite. Il mene son etude en se referant a la theorie aristotelicienne des vertus comme perfection de l'individu
Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms
Greenspan argues that dilemmas may be regarded as possible consequences of a set of social rules designed to be simple enough to be teachable. Where these rules prohibit action either way, the problematic motivational force of dilemmas can be explained by reference to the role of emotion as a second-best substitute for action. Since, on the proposed account, emotions underpin the teachings of moral language, Greenspan shows how emotional capaciti…
Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms
P.S. Greenspan argues that dilemmas may be regarded as possible consequences of a set of social rules designed to be simple enough to be teachable. Where these rules prohibit action either way, the problematic motivational force of dilemmas can be explained by reference to the role of emotion as a second-best substitute for action. Guilt is seen as a natural but contested candidate for the sort of emotional sanction for wrongdoing that might supp…
Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification
Book Notes Get access Wittgenstein: an Introduction. By Joachim Schulte. Translated By W.H. Brenner And J.F. Holley (State Univ. of New York Press, 1992. Pp. ix + 187. Price $29.50 h/b, $9.95 p/b.) B.N. G B.N. G Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 46, Issue 183, April 1996, Pages 281–282, https://doi.org/10.2307/2956411 Published: 01 April 1996
Geographies of Responsibility
Self Expressions: Mind, Morals, and the Meaning of Life
Continuing the old philosophical project of reconciling a scientific view of ourselves with the view of ourselves as agents of free will and meaning, but bringing to this project the latest insights of neuroscience, cognitive science, and psychiatry, Flanagan's collection of essays explores topics such as a scientific explanation of consciousness, the moral socialization of children, and the nature and issues of psychological phenomena such as mu…
Practical Guilt: Moral Dilemmas, Emotions, and Social Norms
Emotional Strategies and Rationality
Making Room for Options: Moral Reasons, Imperfect Duties, and Choice
An imperfect duty such as the duty to aid those in need is supposed to leave leeway for choice as to how to satisfy it, but if our reason for a certain way of satisfying it is our strongest, that leeway would seem to be eliminated. This paper defends a conception of practical reasons designed to preserve it, without slighting the binding force of moral requirements, though it allows us to discount certain moral reasons. Only reasons that offer cr…
The rise of affectivism
Epistemology (11 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Psychology (9 works) · Contemporary philosophy (6 works) · Social Psychology (6 works) · Analytic philosophy (5 works) · Free Will and Agency (5 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works)