W Raub
Biographic Data
| ID | 18364 |
|---|---|
| NAME | W Raub |
| GIVEN NAMES | W |
| FAMILY NAME | Raub |
| SIGNATURE | RAUB W |
| AFFILIATIONS | Utrecht University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5425-336X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 47 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 342 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 45 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 2 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1986 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 10 |
Explanatory and Causal Methodology in Sociology: Developments and Current Issues
Explanation and causality are fundamental concerns for sociology as a problem- and theory-guided empirical discipline. This introduction distinguishes explanation and causality analytically while showing how they are intertwined in research oriented toward causal explanation. We first revisit the historically most influential conception of explanation, the covering-law model, and use it to identify continuing challenges specific to sociological e…
Standards in sociology: A position statement at the 25 th anniversary of the European Academy of Sociology
This article is temporarily under embargo
Explanation in Sociology and Coleman’s Diagram
Coleman’s diagram is a visualization of rigorous sociology in line with methodological individualism. In this contribution, I argue for conceiving of the nodes and arrows of the diagram as representing key kinds of assumptions and implications of theory and explanation in sociology. Examples highlighting this perspective on the diagram, as well as various consequences, are discussed. A recurrent theme is that the diagram needs to be distinguished…
Cooperation through rational investments in social organization
Repeated interactions and contractual agreements are examples of different ways of organizing interactions in social and economic life and can foster cooperation in social dilemmas. Thus, when involved in social dilemmas, actors have incentives to form long-term relations with repeated interactions or to enter into contractual agreements. We analyze theoretically and experimentally the effects of repeated interactions and contractual agreements a…
Handbook of Sociological Science: Contributions to Rigorous Sociology
The Handbook of Sociological Science offers a refreshing, integrated perspective on research programs and ongoing developments in sociological science. It highlights key shared theoretical and methodological features, thereby contributing to progress and cumulative growth of sociological knowledge.
Analytical sociology and its lesser-known antecedents: Structural individualism in European sociology
Analytical sociology as developed by Hedström and others builds on earlier work in sociology and other social science disciplines. Sometimes, particularly in programmatic pamphlets, ‘structural individualism’ is mentioned as an antecedent of analytical sociology. Typically, however, structural individualism remains a key word without information on what it stands for, let alone on how analytical sociology builds on structural individualism. This …
Strategic tie formation for long-term exchange relations
Theory and empirical research have established that repeated interactions foster cooperation in social dilemmas. These effects of repeated interactions are meanwhile well known. Given these effects, actors have incentives for strategic tie formation in social dilemmas: they have incentives to establish long-term relations involving repeated interactions. Perhaps surprisingly, models accounting for strategic tie formation are scarce. We introduce …
Game Theory
This entry addresses key concepts, assumptions, and theorems of elementary game theory (extensive form of a game, strategy, equilibrium, equilibrium selection problem, subgame perfection, noncooperative and cooperative games) and also some more advanced topics and more recent work (incomplete information, other‐regarding preferences, bounded rationality). The entry highlights how game theory is related to social theory (Weber's definition of soci…
Trust Games
This article offers an overview of different variants of trust games and shows how game-theoretic modeling can contribute to an analysis of conditions for placing and honoring trust in such games. The focus is on explaining trust rather than on explaining consequences of trust for individual behavior or for outcomes such as societal cohesion or economic prosperity. Specifically, game-theoretic modeling allows for analyzing how the “embeddedness” …
Micro-Macro Models in Sociology: Antecedents of Coleman’s Diagram
In sociology, Coleman’s diagram (the “Coleman-boat” or “Coleman’s bathtub”) has become the standard way of representing micro-macro links. Coleman’s work on micro-macro links and his diagram have several “predecessors.” Many of these were developed by European sociologists and appeared (roughly) between 1970-1980, quite some years ahead of Coleman’s contributions. Much of this work, while often pioneering, has been hardly noticed outside Europe a…
Embedded trust: The analytical approach in vignettes, laboratory experiments and surveys
Embedding Trust: A Game-Theoretic Model for Investments in and Returns on Network Embeddedness
Social relations through which information disseminates promote efficiency in social and economic interactions that are characterized by problems of trust. This provides incentives for rational actors to invest in their relations. In this article, we study a game-theoretic model in which two trustors interact repeatedly with the same trustee and decide, at the beginning of the game, whether to invest in establishing an information exchange relati…
Micro-Macro Links and Microfoundations in Sociology
Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: The effect of individual and collective decision rules
Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors individually decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors collectively agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctionin…
Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: The effect of individual and collective decision rules
Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors individually decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors collectively agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctionin…
Strategic Network Formation, Games on Networks, and Trust
This paper brings two major research lines in current sociology together. Research on social networks has long focused primarily on network effects but meanwhile also addresses the emergence and dynamics of networks. Research on trust in social and economic relations shows that networks have effects on trust. Using game theory, we provide a simple model that allows for an integrated and simultaneous analysis of network effects on trust and for th…
How Farsightedness Affects Network Formation
We develop a theoretical model of network formation where actors are limitedly farsighted. In this way we extend current models with a new set of micro-foundations. Computer simulations are used to predict the stable network structures that are likely to emerge under the new assumptions. The co-author model by Jackson/Wolinsky (1996) is used as an example. The co-author model formulates a tension between stability and efficiency when actors are m…
The rationality of social structure: Cooperation in social dilemmas through investments in and returns on social capital
Combining Statistical Evidence From Several Studies: A Method Using Bayesian Updating and an Example From Research on Trust Problems in Social and Economic Exchange
The effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable is often evaluated with hypothesis testing. Sometimes, multiple studies are available that test the same hypothesis. In such studies, the dependent variable and the main predictors might differ, while they do measure the same theoretical concepts. In this article, we present a Bayesian updating method that can be used to quantify the joint evidence in multiple studies regarding the eff…
Trust in triads: Experience effects
Parental work characteristics and time with children: The moderating effects of parent's gender and children's age
This article investigates the association between work characteristics and parent-child interaction time. In addition to studying the commonly considered working hours, the authors investigated the effects of job demands and resources such as job insecurity, autonomy and non-standard hours. Moreover, they analysed whether these associations were different for fathers than for mothers and for parents with young vs adolescent children. The authors …
Embedded Trust: The Analytical Approach in Vignettes, Laboratory Experiments and Surveys
Zur Dynamik prosozialen Verhaltens in einem asymmetrischen sozialen Dilemma: Ein Beitrag zur experimentellen Spieltheorie / The Dynamics of Pro-social Behavior in an Asymmetric Social Dilemma: A Behav…
In diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir prosoziales Verhalten im Sinne wechselseitiger Hilfeleistungen. Als formales Modell verwenden wir ein asymmetrisches wiederholtes Solidaritätsspiel zwischen zwei Akteuren. Wir modellieren Asymmetrie in drei Dimensionen: (1.) Nutzen, den ein Akteur aus der Hilfeleistung des anderen zieht, (2.) Kosten der eigenen Hilfeleistung und (3.)Wahrscheinlichkeit, mit der ein Akteur Hilfe benötigt. Wir untersuchen die Effekt…
Micro-Macro Links and Microfoundations in Sociology
Using Coleman's well-known scheme as an anchor, we review key features of explanations of social phenomena that employ micro-macro models. Some antecedents of micro-macro models and of Coleman's scheme as well as some paradigmatic examples of micro-macro links are sketched. We then discuss micro-level assumptions in micro-macro explanations and the robustness of macro-level implications to variations in micro-level assumptions. We conclude with a…
Persistent Inequalities in Time Use between Men and Women: A Detailed Look at the Influence of Economic Circumstances, Policies, and Culture
The aim of this contribution is to refine explanations for inequalities in the amount of time men and women spend in paid work and housework by breaking down institutional conditions into economic circumstances, policy conditions, and cultural influences. We indicate our expectations for these macro indicators as well as for their interaction with micro level indicators. We expect, for example, that the negative effect on paid work for married wo…
Reputation and Efficiency in Social Interactions: An Example of Network Effects
Reputations emerge if an actor's future partners are informed on his present behavior. Reputations depend on the "embeddedness" of interactions in structures or networks of social relations. They illustrate the effects of such embeddedness on the outcomes of interactions.This article presents simple game-theoretic models of reputation effects on efficiency (in the Pareto sense) in interactions. In a comparative perspective, the authors start with…
Micro-Macro Links and Microfoundations in Sociology
Using Coleman's well-known scheme as an anchor, we review key features of explanations of social phenomena that employ micro-macro models. Some antecedents of micro-macro models and of Coleman's scheme as well as some paradigmatic examples of micro-macro links are sketched. We then discuss micro-level assumptions in micro-macro explanations and the robustness of macro-level implications to variations in micro-level assumptions. We conclude with a…
Friendship and Delinquency: Selection and Influence Processes in Early Adolescence
Positive association of relevant characteristics is a widespread pattern among adolescent friends. A positive association may be caused by the selection of similar others as friends and by the deselection of dissimilar ones, but also by influence processes where friends adjust their behavior to each other. Social control theory argues that adolescents select each other as friends based on delinquency. Differential association theory, on the other…
Persistent Inequalities in Time Use between Men and Women: A Detailed Look at the Influence of Economic Circumstances, Policies, and Culture
The aim of this contribution is to refine explanations for inequalities in the amount of time men and women spend in paid work and housework by breaking down institutional conditions into economic circumstances, policy conditions, and cultural influences. We indicate our expectations for these macro indicators as well as for their interaction with micro level indicators. We expect, for example, that the negative effect on paid work for married wo…
Gains, losses, and cooperation in social dilemmas and collective action: The effects of risk preferences
We address two related issues. First, we analyze the effects of risk preferences on cooperation in social dilemmas. Second, we compare social dilemmas in which outcomes represent gains with dilemmas where outcomes represent losses. We show that predictions on gain‐loss asymmetries with respect to conditions for cooperation crucially depend on assumptions concerning risk preferences. Under the assumption of risk aversion for gains as well as losse…
Hostage Posting as a Mechanism of Trust: Binding, Compensation, and Signaling
We study voluntary hostage posting - pledging a bond - as a commitment mechanism promoting trust, including trust in economic exchange. A hostage can promote trust by binding the trustee through reducing his incentives for abusing trust, by providing compensation for the trustor in case trust is abused, and by serving as a signal for the trustor about unobservable characteristics of the trustee that are related to the trustee's opportunities and …
Trust Problems in Household Outsourcing
This article addresses the issue of domestic outsourcing. We view outsourcing decisions as the result of utility-maximizing behavior on the part of households. Earlier studies have shown that households with more time constraints, the most common reason for outsourcing, do not always outsource more. To account for these unexpected empirical findings, we provide a new explanation for outsourcing decisions that focuses on trust problems associated …
How Inter-firm Co-operation Depends on Social Embeddedness: A Vignette Study
This paper examines the effects of the social context of economic exchange on the governance of transactions in buyer-supplier relations between firms. We distinguish three dimensions of social embeddedness of transactions, namely, repeated exchange between the partners (temporal embeddedness), relations with third parties such as other firms (network embeddedness) and social institutions that allow for credible agreements and commitments (instit…
Private ordering: A comparative institutional analysis of hostage games
Hostage posting (in the sense of pledging a bond) is a commitment device that allows for cooperation of rational actors in economic and social relations with incentive problems, like in the Prisoner's Dilemma. This paper provides, first, an informal discussion of hostage posting as a mechanism of cooperatioa We then analyze noncooperative 2‐ and n‐person games with complete information where players can post a hostage prior to their interaction. …
Die Sozialstruktur der Kooperation rationaler Egoisten: Zur „utilitaristischen“ Erklärung sozialer Ordnung
Soziale Situationen strategischer Interdependenz, in denen kooperatives Verhalten für nicht durch externe Instanzen eingeschränkte, rationale und egoistische Akteure zwar vorteilhaft, jedoch schwierig zu erreichen ist, treten in vielen Zusammenhängen auf. Klassisches Beispiel ist Hobbes’ Problem der sozialen Ordnung. Weitere zentrale Beispiele sind bestimmte wirtschaftliche und „soziale“ Austauschbeziehungen oder solidarisches Verhalten in Gruppe…
Parental work characteristics and time with children: The moderating effects of parent's gender and children's age
This article investigates the association between work characteristics and parent-child interaction time. In addition to studying the commonly considered working hours, the authors investigated the effects of job demands and resources such as job insecurity, autonomy and non-standard hours. Moreover, they analysed whether these associations were different for fathers than for mothers and for parents with young vs adolescent children. The authors …
Problematic social situations and the “large‐number dilemma” a game‐theoretical analysis
(1988). Problematic social situations and the “large‐number dilemma” a game‐theoretical analysis. The Journal of Mathematical Sociology: Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 311-357
Explanation in Sociology and Coleman’s Diagram
Coleman’s diagram is a visualization of rigorous sociology in line with methodological individualism. In this contribution, I argue for conceiving of the nodes and arrows of the diagram as representing key kinds of assumptions and implications of theory and explanation in sociology. Examples highlighting this perspective on the diagram, as well as various consequences, are discussed. A recurrent theme is that the diagram needs to be distinguished…
A General Game-Theoretic Model of Preference Adaptations in Problematic Social Situations
This article analyzes the active and intentional modification of preferences as a mechanism of cooperation in "problematic" social situations (i.e., situations where individually rational behavior generates outcomes that are suboptimal in the Pareto sense). It is shown that an intentional modification of preferences in such situations can result in a generalization of Sen's Assurance Game preferences. As a formal framework for the analysis, a non…
Embedding Trust: A Game-Theoretic Model for Investments in and Returns on Network Embeddedness
Social relations through which information disseminates promote efficiency in social and economic interactions that are characterized by problems of trust. This provides incentives for rational actors to invest in their relations. In this article, we study a game-theoretic model in which two trustors interact repeatedly with the same trustee and decide, at the beginning of the game, whether to invest in establishing an information exchange relati…
Cooperation via Hostages
Conditional cooperation of selfish and rational actors is feasible in repeated encounters. We stress an important alternative for conditional cooperation: credible commitments that can be incurred via voluntary hostage posting (in the sense of pledging a bond). Hostages may facilitate cooperation in different ways. First, they reduce incentives to behave uncooperatively. Second, by offering some compensation for losses, hostages reduce the costs …
Revolution and Risk: Paradoxical Consequences of Risk Aversion in Interdependent Situations
We analyze the effects of risk preferences on cooperative behavior in a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. We show that, counterintuitively, risk aversion favors cooperative behavior. Hence, if people are risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses, conditions for cooperation are less restrictive when outcomes represent gains than if outcomes represent losses. In an experimental test of this prediction, we find that risk aversion indeed favors co…
Eine Notiz über die Stabilisierung von Vertrauen durch eine Mischung von wiederholten Interaktionen und glaubwürdigen Festlegungen
Various mechanisms are known that can stabilize trust relations. Examples are repeated interactions and credible commitments through warranties, deposits, and other kinds of ‘hostages’. Usually, these mechanisms are studied in isolation from one another. An integrated analysis is widely neglected. In this note, the effects of a ‘mix’ of mechanisms are analyzed. A simple case is offered, where a combination of repeated interactions and credible co…
Strategic tie formation for long-term exchange relations
Theory and empirical research have established that repeated interactions foster cooperation in social dilemmas. These effects of repeated interactions are meanwhile well known. Given these effects, actors have incentives for strategic tie formation in social dilemmas: they have incentives to establish long-term relations involving repeated interactions. Perhaps surprisingly, models accounting for strategic tie formation are scarce. We introduce …
Combining Statistical Evidence From Several Studies: A Method Using Bayesian Updating and an Example From Research on Trust Problems in Social and Economic Exchange
The effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable is often evaluated with hypothesis testing. Sometimes, multiple studies are available that test the same hypothesis. In such studies, the dependent variable and the main predictors might differ, while they do measure the same theoretical concepts. In this article, we present a Bayesian updating method that can be used to quantify the joint evidence in multiple studies regarding the eff…
Theory and Empirical Research in Analytical Sociology: The Case of Cooperation in Problematic Social Situations
The integration of theory and empirical research in analytical social science has always been a core topic of Analyse & Kritik. This paper focuses on how analytical theory and empirical research have moved closer to each other in sociology, using rational choice theory and game-theoretic models as well as empirical research on problematic social situations (social dilemmas, collective action problems, etc.) as an example. We try to highlight the …
On the Usefulness of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems
An important task in the application of game-theoretic rational choice models to collective action problems consists in linking elements of the social structure to abstract concepts used in the modeling of game situations. Michael Hechter correctly identifies three major research areas in game theory (equilibrium selection, incomplete information, imperfect information) where such links are needed. However, we disagree with most of his conclusion…
Sozialstruktur und kooperative Gleichgewichte: Bemerkungen zum Beitrag von Ulrich Mueller
Zur Entstehung der Moral aus natürlichen Neigungen: Eine spieltheoretische Spekulation
Do individuals accept a moral point of view - if they are completely oriented towards their natural preferences and interests? The present article outlines the context of discussion concerning this question within moral philosophy and the social science. In addition it suggests a game-theoretical model with the help of which the question can be answered positively
Die Sozialstruktur der Kooperation rationaler Egoisten: Zur „utilitaristischen“ Erklärung sozialer Ordnung
Soziale Situationen strategischer Interdependenz, in denen kooperatives Verhalten für nicht durch externe Instanzen eingeschränkte, rationale und egoistische Akteure zwar vorteilhaft, jedoch schwierig zu erreichen ist, treten in vielen Zusammenhängen auf. Klassisches Beispiel ist Hobbes’ Problem der sozialen Ordnung. Weitere zentrale Beispiele sind bestimmte wirtschaftliche und „soziale“ Austauschbeziehungen oder solidarisches Verhalten in Gruppe…
Problematic social situations and the “large‐number dilemma” a game‐theoretical analysis
(1988). Problematic social situations and the “large‐number dilemma” a game‐theoretical analysis. The Journal of Mathematical Sociology: Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 311-357
A General Game-Theoretic Model of Preference Adaptations in Problematic Social Situations
This article analyzes the active and intentional modification of preferences as a mechanism of cooperation in "problematic" social situations (i.e., situations where individually rational behavior generates outcomes that are suboptimal in the Pareto sense). It is shown that an intentional modification of preferences in such situations can result in a generalization of Sen's Assurance Game preferences. As a formal framework for the analysis, a non…
Reputation and Efficiency in Social Interactions: An Example of Network Effects
Reputations emerge if an actor's future partners are informed on his present behavior. Reputations depend on the "embeddedness" of interactions in structures or networks of social relations. They illustrate the effects of such embeddedness on the outcomes of interactions.This article presents simple game-theoretic models of reputation effects on efficiency (in the Pareto sense) in interactions. In a comparative perspective, the authors start with…
Eine Notiz über die Stabilisierung von Vertrauen durch eine Mischung von wiederholten Interaktionen und glaubwürdigen Festlegungen
Various mechanisms are known that can stabilize trust relations. Examples are repeated interactions and credible commitments through warranties, deposits, and other kinds of ‘hostages’. Usually, these mechanisms are studied in isolation from one another. An integrated analysis is widely neglected. In this note, the effects of a ‘mix’ of mechanisms are analyzed. A simple case is offered, where a combination of repeated interactions and credible co…
On the Usefulness of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems
An important task in the application of game-theoretic rational choice models to collective action problems consists in linking elements of the social structure to abstract concepts used in the modeling of game situations. Michael Hechter correctly identifies three major research areas in game theory (equilibrium selection, incomplete information, imperfect information) where such links are needed. However, we disagree with most of his conclusion…
Social Theory and Social Policy: Essays in Honor of James S. Coleman
Introduction Introduction: The Intellectual Contributions of James S. Coleman by Aage B. Sorensen and Seymour Spilerman Policy-Relevant Social Theory The Individual as Participant in Political Exchange by James Buchanan The Conditions of Fruitfulness of Theorizing about Mechanisms in Social Science by Arthur L. Stinchcombe Beyond the Alternative between the Homo Sociologicus and the Homo Oeconomicus: Toward a Theory of Cold Beliefs by Raymond Bou…
Private ordering: A comparative institutional analysis of hostage games
Hostage posting (in the sense of pledging a bond) is a commitment device that allows for cooperation of rational actors in economic and social relations with incentive problems, like in the Prisoner's Dilemma. This paper provides, first, an informal discussion of hostage posting as a mechanism of cooperatioa We then analyze noncooperative 2‐ and n‐person games with complete information where players can post a hostage prior to their interaction. …
Gains, losses, and cooperation in social dilemmas and collective action: The effects of risk preferences
We address two related issues. First, we analyze the effects of risk preferences on cooperation in social dilemmas. Second, we compare social dilemmas in which outcomes represent gains with dilemmas where outcomes represent losses. We show that predictions on gain‐loss asymmetries with respect to conditions for cooperation crucially depend on assumptions concerning risk preferences. Under the assumption of risk aversion for gains as well as losse…
Revolution and Risk: Paradoxical Consequences of Risk Aversion in Interdependent Situations
We analyze the effects of risk preferences on cooperative behavior in a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. We show that, counterintuitively, risk aversion favors cooperative behavior. Hence, if people are risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses, conditions for cooperation are less restrictive when outcomes represent gains than if outcomes represent losses. In an experimental test of this prediction, we find that risk aversion indeed favors co…
Cooperation via Hostages
Conditional cooperation of selfish and rational actors is feasible in repeated encounters. We stress an important alternative for conditional cooperation: credible commitments that can be incurred via voluntary hostage posting (in the sense of pledging a bond). Hostages may facilitate cooperation in different ways. First, they reduce incentives to behave uncooperatively. Second, by offering some compensation for losses, hostages reduce the costs …
How Inter-firm Co-operation Depends on Social Embeddedness: A Vignette Study
This paper examines the effects of the social context of economic exchange on the governance of transactions in buyer-supplier relations between firms. We distinguish three dimensions of social embeddedness of transactions, namely, repeated exchange between the partners (temporal embeddedness), relations with third parties such as other firms (network embeddedness) and social institutions that allow for credible agreements and commitments (instit…
Solidarity in social relations: Theory‐guided empirical studies
In 1998, Thomas Fararo and Patrick Doreian edited The Problem of Solidarity: Theories and Models as a companion volume to JMS. Their volume featured influential contributions to the development of formal theoretical models for the analysis of solidarity in groups of different sizes and in society as a whole. The present special issue of JMS complements this perspective by focusing on theory‐guided empirical studies of solidarity in dyadic relatio…
Trust Problems in Household Outsourcing
This article addresses the issue of domestic outsourcing. We view outsourcing decisions as the result of utility-maximizing behavior on the part of households. Earlier studies have shown that households with more time constraints, the most common reason for outsourcing, do not always outsource more. To account for these unexpected empirical findings, we provide a new explanation for outsourcing decisions that focuses on trust problems associated …
Embedded trust: Control and learning
This paper discusses two mechanisms through which social embeddedness can affect trust among actors in cooperative relations. Trust can be based on past experiences with a partner or trust can be built on possibilities for sanctioning an untrustworthy trustee through own or third-party sanctions. These two mechanisms are labeled learning and control. The mechanisms are often left implicit or discussed in isolation in earlier research. Learning an…
Hostage Posting as a Mechanism of Trust: Binding, Compensation, and Signaling
We study voluntary hostage posting - pledging a bond - as a commitment mechanism promoting trust, including trust in economic exchange. A hostage can promote trust by binding the trustee through reducing his incentives for abusing trust, by providing compensation for the trustor in case trust is abused, and by serving as a signal for the trustor about unobservable characteristics of the trustee that are related to the trustee's opportunities and …
Theory and Empirical Research in Analytical Sociology: The Case of Cooperation in Problematic Social Situations
The integration of theory and empirical research in analytical social science has always been a core topic of Analyse & Kritik. This paper focuses on how analytical theory and empirical research have moved closer to each other in sociology, using rational choice theory and game-theoretic models as well as empirical research on problematic social situations (social dilemmas, collective action problems, etc.) as an example. We try to highlight the …
A Family Affair: Explaining Co-Working By Family Members
This study focuses on co-working by intimate partners and other family members in entrepreneurs' businesses. We hypothesize that co-working by family is beneficial because it reduces trust problems associated with employment relations. On the other hand, co-working is risky because co-working family members may lose income from, and their investments in, the business in the case of bankruptcy or, specific to co-working partners, in the case of se…
Trust in triads: An experimental study
Friendship and Delinquency: Selection and Influence Processes in Early Adolescence
Positive association of relevant characteristics is a widespread pattern among adolescent friends. A positive association may be caused by the selection of similar others as friends and by the deselection of dissimilar ones, but also by influence processes where friends adjust their behavior to each other. Social control theory argues that adolescents select each other as friends based on delinquency. Differential association theory, on the other…
Embedded Trust: The Analytical Approach in Vignettes, Laboratory Experiments and Surveys
Zur Dynamik prosozialen Verhaltens in einem asymmetrischen sozialen Dilemma: Ein Beitrag zur experimentellen Spieltheorie / The Dynamics of Pro-social Behavior in an Asymmetric Social Dilemma: A Behav…
In diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir prosoziales Verhalten im Sinne wechselseitiger Hilfeleistungen. Als formales Modell verwenden wir ein asymmetrisches wiederholtes Solidaritätsspiel zwischen zwei Akteuren. Wir modellieren Asymmetrie in drei Dimensionen: (1.) Nutzen, den ein Akteur aus der Hilfeleistung des anderen zieht, (2.) Kosten der eigenen Hilfeleistung und (3.)Wahrscheinlichkeit, mit der ein Akteur Hilfe benötigt. Wir untersuchen die Effekt…
Micro-Macro Links and Microfoundations in Sociology
Using Coleman's well-known scheme as an anchor, we review key features of explanations of social phenomena that employ micro-macro models. Some antecedents of micro-macro models and of Coleman's scheme as well as some paradigmatic examples of micro-macro links are sketched. We then discuss micro-level assumptions in micro-macro explanations and the robustness of macro-level implications to variations in micro-level assumptions. We conclude with a…
Economics (28 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (26 works) · Sociology (24 works) · Computer Science (21 works) · Psychology (21 works) · Microeconomics (20 works) · Political science (17 works) · Social Psychology (17 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (13 works) · Epistemology (12 works)