Elisabeth Pacherie
Biographic Data
| ID | 183983 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Elisabeth Pacherie |
| GIVEN NAMES | Elisabeth |
| FAMILY NAME | Pacherie |
| SIGNATURE | PACHERIE E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2337-581X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 44 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 43 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 44 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1992 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Motoric representational format
Kinds of Goal-Directed Processes and Kinds of Values
Agnes Moors’ claim that the processes underlying emotional behavior and those driving non-emotional instrumental behavior are predominantly goal-directed leads her to the eliminativist conclusion that there is no solid mechanistic distinction between emotional and non-emotional episodes—and, thus, that emotions do not qualify as scientifically fruitful concepts. Here, I introduce a distinction between two types of goal-directed processes and disc…
Social perspective-taking influences on metacognition
We often effortlessly take the perceptual perspective of others: we represent some aspect of the environment that others currently perceive. However, taking someone's perspective can interfere with one's perceptual processing: another person's gaze can spontaneously affect our ability to detect stimuli in a scene. But it is still unclear whether our cognitive evaluation of those judgements is also affected. In this study, we investigated whether …
Role and limits of socio-normative influences in delusions of control
Social bonding through shared experiences
Sharing emotions with other individuals is a widespread phenomenon. Previous research proposed that experiencing intense and similar emotions with other individuals reinforces social bonds. However, several aspects of this phenomenon remain unclear, notably whether social bonding requires the convergence and synchronization of emotions in the group, and whether these effects generalize across positively valenced and negatively valenced emotional …
Commitments and the sense of joint agency
The purpose of this article is to explore the role commitments may play in shaping our sense of joint agency. First, we propose that commitments may contribute to the generation of the sense of joint agency by stabilizing expectations and improving predictability. Second, we argue that commitments have a normative element that may bolster an agent's sense of control over the joint action and help counterbalance the potentially disruptive effects …
Collective Emotion
Research on collective emotion spans social sciences, psychology and philosophy. There are detailed case studies and diverse theories of collective emotion. However, experimental evidence regarding the universal characteristics, antecedents and consequences of collective emotion remains sparse. Moreover, current research mainly relies on emotion self-reports, accounting for the subjective experience of collective emotion and ignoring their cognit…
Addressing joint action challenges in HRI
The vast expansion of research in human-robot interactions (HRI) these last decades has been accompanied by the design of increasingly skilled robots for engaging in joint actions with humans. However, these advances have encountered significant challenges to ensure fluent interactions and sustain human motivation through the different steps of joint action. After exploring current literature on joint action in HRI, leading to a more precise defi…
Motor Coordination and Strategic Cooperation in Joint Action
Naturalistic joint action between two agents typically requires both motor coordination and strategic cooperation. However, these two fundamental processes have systematically been studied independently. We presented 50 dyads of adult participants with a novel collaborative task that combined different levels of motor noise with different levels of strategic noise, to determine whether the sense of agency (the experience of control over an action…
Modulations of one’s sense of agency during human–machine interactions
Although previous investigations reported a reduced sense of agency when individuals act with traditional machines, little is known about the mechanisms underpinning interactions with human-like automata. The aim of this study was twofold: (1) to investigate the effect of the machine's physical appearance on the individuals' sense of agency and (2) to explore the cognitive mechanisms underlying the individuals' sense of agency when they are engag…
Joint actions, commitments and the need to belong
Agents' pivotality and reward fairness modulate sense of agency in cooperative joint action
Towards a Blueprint for a Social Animal
Beyond Automaticity
The sense of agency in human-human vs human-robot joint action
Action co-representation and the sense of agency during a joint Simon task
Alterations of agency in hypnosis
Hypnotic suggestions can lead to altered experiences of agency, reality, and memory. The present work is primarily concerned with alterations of the sense of agency (SoA) following motor suggestions. When people respond to the suggestion that their arm is rising up all by itself, they usually have a feeling of passivity for their action. The mechanisms leading to such alterations of the SoA are still controversial. We propose a theoretical model …
Motor intentionality
In his book Phenomenology of Perception, the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty first coined the phrase “motor intentionality.” At the same time he highlighted the contrast between motor and cognitive intentionality, he also emphasized their generally smooth interplay in normal agents. An account of motor intentionality should thus aim at elucidating not just what distinguishes motor intentionality from more cognitive forms of intentionalit…
Solution Thinking and Team Reasoning
In his book, Understanding Institutions, Francesco Guala discusses two solutions to the problem of mindreading for coordination, the solution thinking approach proposed by Adam Morton and the team reasoning approach developed by Michael Bacharach, Robert Sugden, and Natalie Gold. I argue that the family resemblance between the two approaches is even stronger than Guala thinks
Integration of Action, Joint Action and Learning in Robot Cognitive Architectures
Intégration de l’action, de l’action conjointe et de l’apprentissage dans les architectures cognitives robotiques. À l’opposé des recherches en Intelligence Artificielle, où des algorithmes conçus pour des problèmes spécifiques peuvent être testés dans des conditions de simulation parfaitement contrôlée, la Robotique a toujours eu à faire face à la nécessité d’intégrer la perception, la décision et l’exécution de l’action pour pouvoir fonctionner…
Consciousness and Agency
Modest Sociality
A central claim in Michael Bratman's account of shared agency is that there need be no radical conceptual, metaphysical or normative discontinuity between robust forms of small-scale shared intentional agency, i.e., modest sociality, and individual planning agency. What I propose to do is consider another potential discontinuity, whose existence would throw doubt on his contention that the structure of a robust form of modest sociality is entirel…
On Commitments and Other Uncertainty Reduction Tools in Joint Action
In this paper, we evaluate the proposal that a central function of commitments within joint action is to reduce various kinds of uncertainty, and that this accounts for the prevalence of commitments in joint action. While this idea is prima facie attractive, we argue that it faces two serious problems. First, commitments can only reduce uncertainty if they are credible, and accounting for the credibility of commitments proves not to be straightfo…
Perceptual hysteresis as a marker of perceptual inflexibility in schizophrenia
Can Conscious Agency Be Saved
Intentional joint agency
Nonconceptual Representations for Action and the Limits of Intentional Control
In this paper I argue that, to make intentional actions fully intelligible, we need to posit representations of action the content of which is nonconceptual. I further argue that an analysis of the properties of these nonconceptual representations, and of their relationships to action representations at higher levels, sheds light on the limits of intentional control. On the one hand, the capacity to form nonconceptual representations of goal-dire…
Narrators and comparators
On Commitments and Other Uncertainty Reduction Tools in Joint Action
In this paper, we evaluate the proposal that a central function of commitments within joint action is to reduce various kinds of uncertainty, and that this accounts for the prevalence of commitments in joint action. While this idea is prima facie attractive, we argue that it faces two serious problems. First, commitments can only reduce uncertainty if they are credible, and accounting for the credibility of commitments proves not to be straightfo…
Joint actions, commitments and the need to belong
Solution Thinking and Team Reasoning
In his book, Understanding Institutions, Francesco Guala discusses two solutions to the problem of mindreading for coordination, the solution thinking approach proposed by Adam Morton and the team reasoning approach developed by Michael Bacharach, Robert Sugden, and Natalie Gold. I argue that the family resemblance between the two approaches is even stronger than Guala thinks
Integration of Action, Joint Action and Learning in Robot Cognitive Architectures
Intégration de l’action, de l’action conjointe et de l’apprentissage dans les architectures cognitives robotiques. À l’opposé des recherches en Intelligence Artificielle, où des algorithmes conçus pour des problèmes spécifiques peuvent être testés dans des conditions de simulation parfaitement contrôlée, la Robotique a toujours eu à faire face à la nécessité d’intégrer la perception, la décision et l’exécution de l’action pour pouvoir fonctionner…
Modest Sociality
A central claim in Michael Bratman's account of shared agency is that there need be no radical conceptual, metaphysical or normative discontinuity between robust forms of small-scale shared intentional agency, i.e., modest sociality, and individual planning agency. What I propose to do is consider another potential discontinuity, whose existence would throw doubt on his contention that the structure of a robust form of modest sociality is entirel…
Compte rendu de G. Kleiber, La sémantique du Prototype, catégories et sens lexical
Le fonctionnalisme
Cet article propose un bref historique du développement des idées fonctionnalistes dans les sciences cognitives. Les motivations qui ont guidé le fonctionnalisme classique et les modèles qui ont inspiré ses formulations sont présentés et discutés. La manière dont il conçoit son rapport au physicalisme, le traitement qu'il propose de l'intentionnalité des états mentaux et des aspects qualitatifs de la vie mentale sont examinés. Les principales dif…
Externalisme, rationalité et explanandum de la psychologie intentionnelle
À l'occasion de la tenue à Paris des Conférences Jean-Nicod de philoso-phie cognitive dont il a été le premier invité au printemps 1993, Jerry Fodor a présenté le dernier état de la théorie qu'il défend en philosophie de l'esprit 1 . Cette théorie se fonde sur trois théses sur la signification et l'esprit qui, prises séparément, semblent chacune dotée d'une certaine plausibilité, mais dont la cohérence mutuelle apparaît sujette à caution. L'objet…
Pensée, langage et communautéMichel Seymour Collection «Analytiques», vol. 7Montréal, Bellarmin; Paris, Vrin, 1994, 342 p
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Looking for the agent
Philosophie et psychologiePascal Engel Collection «Folio essais» Paris, Gallimard, 1996, 473 p
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La dynamique des intentions
I argue that in order to solve the main difficulties confronted by the classical versions of the causal theory of action, it is necessary not just to make room for intentions, considered as irreducible to complexes of beliefs and desires, but also to distinguish among several types of intentions. I present a three-tiered theory of intentions that distinguishes among future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions, and motor intentions. I …
Agency, Simulation and Self‐identification
This paper is concerned with the problem of self‐identification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in self‐identification and in agency‐ascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that cl…
In Defence of the Doxastic Conception of Delusions
In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that t…
Toward a Dynamic Theory of Intentions
This chapter outlines a dynamic theory of intentions and argues that several categories of intentions should be distinguished based on their different functional roles and the different types of contents they involve. It explains how understanding of the dynamic transitions among these different categories of intentions may elucidate the distinctive nature of actions and intentionality. It also claims that the experiments conducted by Benjamin Li…
Too much ado about belief
Phenomenology and delusions
Narrators and comparators
The phenomenology of action
Framing Joint Action
Nonconceptual Representations for Action and the Limits of Intentional Control
In this paper I argue that, to make intentional actions fully intelligible, we need to posit representations of action the content of which is nonconceptual. I further argue that an analysis of the properties of these nonconceptual representations, and of their relationships to action representations at higher levels, sheds light on the limits of intentional control. On the one hand, the capacity to form nonconceptual representations of goal-dire…
Out of nowhere
Can Conscious Agency Be Saved
How does it feel to act together
Intentional joint agency
Perceptual hysteresis as a marker of perceptual inflexibility in schizophrenia
Consciousness and Agency
Modest Sociality
A central claim in Michael Bratman's account of shared agency is that there need be no radical conceptual, metaphysical or normative discontinuity between robust forms of small-scale shared intentional agency, i.e., modest sociality, and individual planning agency. What I propose to do is consider another potential discontinuity, whose existence would throw doubt on his contention that the structure of a robust form of modest sociality is entirel…
On Commitments and Other Uncertainty Reduction Tools in Joint Action
In this paper, we evaluate the proposal that a central function of commitments within joint action is to reduce various kinds of uncertainty, and that this accounts for the prevalence of commitments in joint action. While this idea is prima facie attractive, we argue that it faces two serious problems. First, commitments can only reduce uncertainty if they are credible, and accounting for the credibility of commitments proves not to be straightfo…
Integration of Action, Joint Action and Learning in Robot Cognitive Architectures
Intégration de l’action, de l’action conjointe et de l’apprentissage dans les architectures cognitives robotiques. À l’opposé des recherches en Intelligence Artificielle, où des algorithmes conçus pour des problèmes spécifiques peuvent être testés dans des conditions de simulation parfaitement contrôlée, la Robotique a toujours eu à faire face à la nécessité d’intégrer la perception, la décision et l’exécution de l’action pour pouvoir fonctionner…
Psychology (36 works) · Philosophy (24 works) · Epistemology (23 works) · Social Psychology (21 works) · Cognitive psychology (19 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (18 works) · Free Will and Agency (16 works) · Action Observation and Synchronization (15 works) · Computer Science (13 works) · Cognition (12 works)