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Manfred Milinski

Biographic Data

ID1850206
NAMEManfred Milinski
GIVEN NAMESManfred
FAMILY NAMEMilinski
SIGNATUREMILINSKI M
AFFILIATIONSMax Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology
ORCID0000-0003-4236-8105
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS10
TOTAL CITATIONS15
AUTHOR COUNT10
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2002
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX1
  • Climate extreme events and climate change are enforced by extortionate freeriders overloading those who mitigate – An economic experiment

    Open Access•Manfred Milinski, Stefania Innocenti•ARTICLE•Ecological Economics•2026

    Climate extremes have become more frequent and severe due to excessive human emissions, yet it remains unclear whether the threat of costly hazards spurs collective mitigation. In a laboratory experiment, groups of six players contributed individually toward a collective target that, if unmet, triggered a simulated climate catastrophe and forfeiture of their endowment. Some groups also faced intermediate climate events, avoidable through sufficie…

  • Economic experiments support Ostrom’s polycentric approach to mitigating climate change

    Open Access•Manfred Milinski, Jochem Marotzke•ARTICLE•Humanities and Social Sciences…•2022

    The late Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom envisioned a polycentric approach to mitigating climate change rather than a centralised solution. Debating about global efforts to solve climate-change problems has yet not led to an effective global treaty. Ostrom argued that instead of focusing only on global efforts, it is better to encourage polycentric efforts to reduce the risks associated with the emission of greenhouse gases. Many problems conceptual…

  • The economic interaction between climate change mitigation, climate migration and poverty

    Open Access•Jochem Marotzke, Dirk Semmann et al.•ARTICLE•Nature Climate Change•2020

  • Economics: Corruption made visible

    Open Access•Manfred Milinski•ARTICLE•Nature Human Behaviour•2017•References: 5

  • Honest signaling in trust interactions: Smiles Rated as Genuine Induce Trust and Signal Higher Earning Opportunities

    Open Access•Samuele Centorrino, Élodie Djemaï et al.•ARTICLE•Evolution and Human Behavior•2014•Cited by: 15•References: 3

    We test the hypothesis that smiles perceived as honest serve as a signal that has evolved to induce cooperation in situations requiring mutual trust.Potential trustees (84 participants from Toulouse, France) made two video clips averaging around 15 seconds for viewing by potential senders before the latter decided whether to 'send' or 'keep' a lower stake (4 euros) or higher stake (8 euros).Senders (198 participants from Lyon, France) made trust …

  • Social Behaviour: Genes, Ecology and Evolution

    Open Access•T R Birkhead, Marla B Sokolowski et al.•BOOK•Social Behaviour•2010

    Humans live in large and extensive societies and spend much of their time interacting socially. Likewise, most other animals also interact socially. Social behaviour is of constant fascination to biologists and psychologists of many disciplines, from behavioural ecology to comparative biology and sociobiology. The two major approaches used to study social behaviour involve either the mechanism of behaviour - where it has come from and how it has …

  • The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate change

    Open Access•Manfred Milinski, Ralf D Sommerfeld et al.•ARTICLE•Proceedings of the National…•2008

    Will a group of people reach a collective target through individual contributions when everyone suffers individually if the target is missed? This “collective-risk social dilemma” exists in various social scenarios, the globally most challenging one being the prevention of dangerous climate change. Reaching the collective target requires individual sacrifice, with benefits to all but no guarantee that others will also contribute. It even seems te…

  • Stabilizing the Earth’s climate is not a losing game: Supporting evidence from public goods experiments

    Open Access•Manfred Milinski, Dirk Semmann et al.•ARTICLE•Proceedings of the National…•2006

    Maintaining the Earth’s climate within habitable boundaries is probably the greatest “public goods game” played by humans. However, with >6 billion “players” taking part, the game seems to rule out individual altruistic behavior. Thus, climate protection is a problem of sustaining a public resource that everybody is free to overuse, a “tragedy of the commons” problem that emerges in many social dilemmas. We perform a previously undescribed type o…

  • Reputation, personal identity and cooperation in a social dilemma

    Manfred Milinski•CHAPTER•Cooperation in Primates and Humans•2006

  • Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’

    Open Access•Manfred Milinski, Dirk Semmann et al.•ARTICLE•Nature•2002

  • Honest signaling in trust interactions: Smiles Rated as Genuine Induce Trust and Signal Higher Earning Opportunities

    Open Access•Samuele Centorrino, Élodie Djemaï et al.•ARTICLE•Evolution and Human Behavior•2014•Cited by: 15•References: 3

    We test the hypothesis that smiles perceived as honest serve as a signal that has evolved to induce cooperation in situations requiring mutual trust.Potential trustees (84 participants from Toulouse, France) made two video clips averaging around 15 seconds for viewing by potential senders before the latter decided whether to 'send' or 'keep' a lower stake (4 euros) or higher stake (8 euros).Senders (198 participants from Lyon, France) made trust …

  • Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’

    Open Access•Manfred Milinski, Dirk Semmann et al.•ARTICLE•Nature•2002

  • Stabilizing the Earth’s climate is not a losing game: Supporting evidence from public goods experiments

    Open Access•Manfred Milinski, Dirk Semmann et al.•ARTICLE•Proceedings of the National…•2006

    Maintaining the Earth’s climate within habitable boundaries is probably the greatest “public goods game” played by humans. However, with >6 billion “players” taking part, the game seems to rule out individual altruistic behavior. Thus, climate protection is a problem of sustaining a public resource that everybody is free to overuse, a “tragedy of the commons” problem that emerges in many social dilemmas. We perform a previously undescribed type o…

  • Reputation, personal identity and cooperation in a social dilemma

    Manfred Milinski•CHAPTER•Cooperation in Primates and Humans•2006

  • The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate change

    Open Access•Manfred Milinski, Ralf D Sommerfeld et al.•ARTICLE•Proceedings of the National…•2008

    Will a group of people reach a collective target through individual contributions when everyone suffers individually if the target is missed? This “collective-risk social dilemma” exists in various social scenarios, the globally most challenging one being the prevention of dangerous climate change. Reaching the collective target requires individual sacrifice, with benefits to all but no guarantee that others will also contribute. It even seems te…

  • Social Behaviour: Genes, Ecology and Evolution

    Open Access•T R Birkhead, Marla B Sokolowski et al.•BOOK•Social Behaviour•2010

    Humans live in large and extensive societies and spend much of their time interacting socially. Likewise, most other animals also interact socially. Social behaviour is of constant fascination to biologists and psychologists of many disciplines, from behavioural ecology to comparative biology and sociobiology. The two major approaches used to study social behaviour involve either the mechanism of behaviour - where it has come from and how it has …

  • Honest signaling in trust interactions: Smiles Rated as Genuine Induce Trust and Signal Higher Earning Opportunities

    Open Access•Samuele Centorrino, Élodie Djemaï et al.•ARTICLE•Evolution and Human Behavior•2014•Cited by: 15•References: 3

    We test the hypothesis that smiles perceived as honest serve as a signal that has evolved to induce cooperation in situations requiring mutual trust.Potential trustees (84 participants from Toulouse, France) made two video clips averaging around 15 seconds for viewing by potential senders before the latter decided whether to 'send' or 'keep' a lower stake (4 euros) or higher stake (8 euros).Senders (198 participants from Lyon, France) made trust …

  • Economics: Corruption made visible

    Open Access•Manfred Milinski•ARTICLE•Nature Human Behaviour•2017•References: 5

  • The economic interaction between climate change mitigation, climate migration and poverty

    Open Access•Jochem Marotzke, Dirk Semmann et al.•ARTICLE•Nature Climate Change•2020

  • Economic experiments support Ostrom’s polycentric approach to mitigating climate change

    Open Access•Manfred Milinski, Jochem Marotzke•ARTICLE•Humanities and Social Sciences…•2022

    The late Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom envisioned a polycentric approach to mitigating climate change rather than a centralised solution. Debating about global efforts to solve climate-change problems has yet not led to an effective global treaty. Ostrom argued that instead of focusing only on global efforts, it is better to encourage polycentric efforts to reduce the risks associated with the emission of greenhouse gases. Many problems conceptual…

  • Climate extreme events and climate change are enforced by extortionate freeriders overloading those who mitigate – An economic experiment

    Open Access•Manfred Milinski, Stefania Innocenti•ARTICLE•Ecological Economics•2026

    Climate extremes have become more frequent and severe due to excessive human emissions, yet it remains unclear whether the threat of costly hazards spurs collective mitigation. In a laboratory experiment, groups of six players contributed individually toward a collective target that, if unmet, triggered a simulated climate catastrophe and forfeiture of their endowment. Some groups also faced intermediate climate events, avoidable through sufficie…

Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (7 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (6 works) · Political science (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Dilemma (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Business (3 works) · Climate change (3 works) · Climate change mitigation (3 works)

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