Agnes Cornell
Biographic Data
| ID | 185386 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Agnes Cornell |
| GIVEN NAMES | Agnes |
| FAMILY NAME | Cornell |
| SIGNATURE | CORNELL A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Gothenburg |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2018-8955 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 19 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 228 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 19 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 9 |
V-Dem Codebook v14
Colonial origins of modern bureaucracy? India and the professionalization of the British civil service
This article examines the diffusion of meritocratic practices as a potential instance of policy transfer by scrutinizing the introduction of open and competitive examinations during the mid‐nineteenth century in the British Civil Service. Scholars have argued that British reformers were inspired by meritocratic practices in British‐ruled India. In order to assess this claim, we combine qualitative analysis of archival material documenting the int…
Voting for bureaucracy? Contestation, suffrage and meritocracy
The relationship between democracy and bureaucracy is the object of both classic and contemporary studies in political science. In classic works, scholars argue that there is an inherent conflict between democracy and bureaucracy, whereas contemporary scholars often assert that democracy is positively related to the development of bureaucracy. We argue that both classic and recent interpretations of the relationship are too simplistic since the t…
Brokering Bureaucrats
Clientelism, the exchange of selective rewards for votes, is fraught with commitment problems and questions remain regarding how it occurs in settings lacking strong parties. In such settings, we argue, bureaucrats can act as brokers using their own networks. Bureaucrats can use their discretionary power to cultivate reciprocal relations with voters and leverage this political capital in negotiations with politicians to secure career advancements…
V-Dem Codebook v11
V-Dem Dataset v11.1
V-Dem Codebook V10
Bureaucracy and Growth
We revisit the hypothesis that a Weberian bureaucracy enhances economic growth. Theoretically, we develop arguments for why such a bureaucracy may enhance growth and discuss plausible counterarguments. Empirically, we use new measures capturing various Weberian features in countries across the world, with some time series extending back to 1789. The evidence base from previous large- N studies is surprisingly thin, but our extensive data enable u…
V-Dem Codebook V9
Money matters
Economic theory as well as conventional wisdom from corruption‐ridden countries suggest that low wages among public employees lead to corruption, but cross‐sectional empirical research has largely failed to confirm this relationship. In this article, we investigate the relationship between experiences of corruption and wage levels for public sector employees, utilizing both objective and expert survey data, with global coverage. The statistical a…
Introducing the Historical Varieties of Democracy dataset
The Historical Varieties of Democracy dataset (Historical V-Dem) contains about 260 indicators, both factual and evaluative, describing various aspects of political regimes and state institutions. The dataset covers 91 polities globally - including most large, sovereign states, as well as some semi-sovereign entities and large colonies - from 1789 to 1920 for many cases. The majority of the indicators come from the Varieties of Democracy dataset,…
Cooking the books
Accurate knowledge about societal conditions and public policies is an important public good in any polity, yet governments across the world differ dramatically in the extent to which they collect and publish such knowledge. This article develops and tests the argument that this variation to some extent can be traced to the degree of bureaucratic politicization in a polity. A politicized bureaucracy offers politicians greater opportunities to dem…
The Real Lessons of the Interwar Years
Several observers have recently invoked interwar political developments to make the case that even established democracies are fragile and vulnerable to breakdown. However, the real lesson of the interwar period is that even crises as devastating as the Great Depression and the political success of totalitarian movements did little to undermine the stability of established democratic systems. Only in new and fragile democracies did the economic, …
Devolution and corruption in Kenya
How does decentralization affect patronage and rent seeking? While centralization is seen as enabling these practices, many expect decentralization to reduce them. With few examples of meaningful reform it is difficult to establish if this is the case in the context of African states. We look at the impact of decentralization on rent seeking and patronage in Kenya, where the devolution of significant powers to county governments has recently take…
Institutions as Incentives for Civic Action
This paper examines the link between political control of government bureaucracies and citizens’ likelihood to stage disruptive protests. A public administration heavily controlled by politicians, and staffed to a large extent with political appointees, allows politicians to intervene in policy implementation and favor some groups over others in terms of access to public services. Such a system may induce citizens or civic associations to resort …
Why Bureaucratic Stability Matters for the Implementation of Democratic Governance Programs
The theoretical framework developed in this article suggests that high turnover rates in the public administrations of aid‐recipient countries present a challenge to the implementation of democratic governance (DG) aid. If high turnover rates are due to individuals' search for better opportunities, it will affect the implementation primarily through lack of experience and shorter time horizons among civil servants. However, if high turnover rates…
Meritocratic administration and democratic stability
This paper presents a hypothesis for understanding democratic stability based on the distinction between politicized and meritocratic bureaucracies. We argue that in a politicized administration, the professional careers of large numbers of government officials depend directly upon which party wins the elections. This increases the likelihood that the government will take opportunistic actions aimed at surviving in office at any cost; that is, be…
Plus ça change? County-level politics in Kenya after devolution
For the first time on 4 March 2013, Kenyans voted for county governors. Devolution has significantly changed fiscal and administrative organization, but has it led to changes in politics? Has it enabled the emergence of new elites, the entrenchment of old ones or rebalanced power between the counties and the centre? These issues are explored, by asking, first, whether gubernatorial candidates were 'insiders' who had held public office before, or …
Does regime type matter for the impact of democracy aid on democracy
During the last decades democracy aid, which aims at fostering democracy in aid recipient countries, has become a popular type of foreign aid among major donor countries. This article asks whether the effect of democracy aid differs between different types of authoritarian regimes. According to previous research the rulers' risk of losing power varies among types of regimes. Theoretically, we may assume that when the risk of losing power is low, …
Devolution and corruption in Kenya
How does decentralization affect patronage and rent seeking? While centralization is seen as enabling these practices, many expect decentralization to reduce them. With few examples of meaningful reform it is difficult to establish if this is the case in the context of African states. We look at the impact of decentralization on rent seeking and patronage in Kenya, where the devolution of significant powers to county governments has recently take…
Institutions as Incentives for Civic Action
This paper examines the link between political control of government bureaucracies and citizens’ likelihood to stage disruptive protests. A public administration heavily controlled by politicians, and staffed to a large extent with political appointees, allows politicians to intervene in policy implementation and favor some groups over others in terms of access to public services. Such a system may induce citizens or civic associations to resort …
Does regime type matter for the impact of democracy aid on democracy
During the last decades democracy aid, which aims at fostering democracy in aid recipient countries, has become a popular type of foreign aid among major donor countries. This article asks whether the effect of democracy aid differs between different types of authoritarian regimes. According to previous research the rulers' risk of losing power varies among types of regimes. Theoretically, we may assume that when the risk of losing power is low, …
Why Bureaucratic Stability Matters for the Implementation of Democratic Governance Programs
The theoretical framework developed in this article suggests that high turnover rates in the public administrations of aid‐recipient countries present a challenge to the implementation of democratic governance (DG) aid. If high turnover rates are due to individuals' search for better opportunities, it will affect the implementation primarily through lack of experience and shorter time horizons among civil servants. However, if high turnover rates…
Cooking the books
Accurate knowledge about societal conditions and public policies is an important public good in any polity, yet governments across the world differ dramatically in the extent to which they collect and publish such knowledge. This article develops and tests the argument that this variation to some extent can be traced to the degree of bureaucratic politicization in a polity. A politicized bureaucracy offers politicians greater opportunities to dem…
Plus ça change? County-level politics in Kenya after devolution
For the first time on 4 March 2013, Kenyans voted for county governors. Devolution has significantly changed fiscal and administrative organization, but has it led to changes in politics? Has it enabled the emergence of new elites, the entrenchment of old ones or rebalanced power between the counties and the centre? These issues are explored, by asking, first, whether gubernatorial candidates were 'insiders' who had held public office before, or …
Bureaucracy and Growth
We revisit the hypothesis that a Weberian bureaucracy enhances economic growth. Theoretically, we develop arguments for why such a bureaucracy may enhance growth and discuss plausible counterarguments. Empirically, we use new measures capturing various Weberian features in countries across the world, with some time series extending back to 1789. The evidence base from previous large- N studies is surprisingly thin, but our extensive data enable u…
Meritocratic administration and democratic stability
This paper presents a hypothesis for understanding democratic stability based on the distinction between politicized and meritocratic bureaucracies. We argue that in a politicized administration, the professional careers of large numbers of government officials depend directly upon which party wins the elections. This increases the likelihood that the government will take opportunistic actions aimed at surviving in office at any cost; that is, be…
Introducing the Historical Varieties of Democracy dataset
The Historical Varieties of Democracy dataset (Historical V-Dem) contains about 260 indicators, both factual and evaluative, describing various aspects of political regimes and state institutions. The dataset covers 91 polities globally - including most large, sovereign states, as well as some semi-sovereign entities and large colonies - from 1789 to 1920 for many cases. The majority of the indicators come from the Varieties of Democracy dataset,…
Brokering Bureaucrats
Clientelism, the exchange of selective rewards for votes, is fraught with commitment problems and questions remain regarding how it occurs in settings lacking strong parties. In such settings, we argue, bureaucrats can act as brokers using their own networks. Bureaucrats can use their discretionary power to cultivate reciprocal relations with voters and leverage this political capital in negotiations with politicians to secure career advancements…
Money matters
Economic theory as well as conventional wisdom from corruption‐ridden countries suggest that low wages among public employees lead to corruption, but cross‐sectional empirical research has largely failed to confirm this relationship. In this article, we investigate the relationship between experiences of corruption and wage levels for public sector employees, utilizing both objective and expert survey data, with global coverage. The statistical a…
The Real Lessons of the Interwar Years
Several observers have recently invoked interwar political developments to make the case that even established democracies are fragile and vulnerable to breakdown. However, the real lesson of the interwar period is that even crises as devastating as the Great Depression and the political success of totalitarian movements did little to undermine the stability of established democratic systems. Only in new and fragile democracies did the economic, …
Colonial origins of modern bureaucracy? India and the professionalization of the British civil service
This article examines the diffusion of meritocratic practices as a potential instance of policy transfer by scrutinizing the introduction of open and competitive examinations during the mid‐nineteenth century in the British Civil Service. Scholars have argued that British reformers were inspired by meritocratic practices in British‐ruled India. In order to assess this claim, we combine qualitative analysis of archival material documenting the int…
Voting for bureaucracy? Contestation, suffrage and meritocracy
The relationship between democracy and bureaucracy is the object of both classic and contemporary studies in political science. In classic works, scholars argue that there is an inherent conflict between democracy and bureaucracy, whereas contemporary scholars often assert that democracy is positively related to the development of bureaucracy. We argue that both classic and recent interpretations of the relationship are too simplistic since the t…
Does regime type matter for the impact of democracy aid on democracy
During the last decades democracy aid, which aims at fostering democracy in aid recipient countries, has become a popular type of foreign aid among major donor countries. This article asks whether the effect of democracy aid differs between different types of authoritarian regimes. According to previous research the rulers' risk of losing power varies among types of regimes. Theoretically, we may assume that when the risk of losing power is low, …
Why Bureaucratic Stability Matters for the Implementation of Democratic Governance Programs
The theoretical framework developed in this article suggests that high turnover rates in the public administrations of aid‐recipient countries present a challenge to the implementation of democratic governance (DG) aid. If high turnover rates are due to individuals' search for better opportunities, it will affect the implementation primarily through lack of experience and shorter time horizons among civil servants. However, if high turnover rates…
Meritocratic administration and democratic stability
This paper presents a hypothesis for understanding democratic stability based on the distinction between politicized and meritocratic bureaucracies. We argue that in a politicized administration, the professional careers of large numbers of government officials depend directly upon which party wins the elections. This increases the likelihood that the government will take opportunistic actions aimed at surviving in office at any cost; that is, be…
Plus ça change? County-level politics in Kenya after devolution
For the first time on 4 March 2013, Kenyans voted for county governors. Devolution has significantly changed fiscal and administrative organization, but has it led to changes in politics? Has it enabled the emergence of new elites, the entrenchment of old ones or rebalanced power between the counties and the centre? These issues are explored, by asking, first, whether gubernatorial candidates were 'insiders' who had held public office before, or …
Institutions as Incentives for Civic Action
This paper examines the link between political control of government bureaucracies and citizens’ likelihood to stage disruptive protests. A public administration heavily controlled by politicians, and staffed to a large extent with political appointees, allows politicians to intervene in policy implementation and favor some groups over others in terms of access to public services. Such a system may induce citizens or civic associations to resort …
Devolution and corruption in Kenya
How does decentralization affect patronage and rent seeking? While centralization is seen as enabling these practices, many expect decentralization to reduce them. With few examples of meaningful reform it is difficult to establish if this is the case in the context of African states. We look at the impact of decentralization on rent seeking and patronage in Kenya, where the devolution of significant powers to county governments has recently take…
The Real Lessons of the Interwar Years
Several observers have recently invoked interwar political developments to make the case that even established democracies are fragile and vulnerable to breakdown. However, the real lesson of the interwar period is that even crises as devastating as the Great Depression and the political success of totalitarian movements did little to undermine the stability of established democratic systems. Only in new and fragile democracies did the economic, …
Cooking the books
Accurate knowledge about societal conditions and public policies is an important public good in any polity, yet governments across the world differ dramatically in the extent to which they collect and publish such knowledge. This article develops and tests the argument that this variation to some extent can be traced to the degree of bureaucratic politicization in a polity. A politicized bureaucracy offers politicians greater opportunities to dem…
V-Dem Codebook V9
Money matters
Economic theory as well as conventional wisdom from corruption‐ridden countries suggest that low wages among public employees lead to corruption, but cross‐sectional empirical research has largely failed to confirm this relationship. In this article, we investigate the relationship between experiences of corruption and wage levels for public sector employees, utilizing both objective and expert survey data, with global coverage. The statistical a…
Introducing the Historical Varieties of Democracy dataset
The Historical Varieties of Democracy dataset (Historical V-Dem) contains about 260 indicators, both factual and evaluative, describing various aspects of political regimes and state institutions. The dataset covers 91 polities globally - including most large, sovereign states, as well as some semi-sovereign entities and large colonies - from 1789 to 1920 for many cases. The majority of the indicators come from the Varieties of Democracy dataset,…
V-Dem Codebook V10
Bureaucracy and Growth
We revisit the hypothesis that a Weberian bureaucracy enhances economic growth. Theoretically, we develop arguments for why such a bureaucracy may enhance growth and discuss plausible counterarguments. Empirically, we use new measures capturing various Weberian features in countries across the world, with some time series extending back to 1789. The evidence base from previous large- N studies is surprisingly thin, but our extensive data enable u…
V-Dem Codebook v11
V-Dem Dataset v11.1
Colonial origins of modern bureaucracy? India and the professionalization of the British civil service
This article examines the diffusion of meritocratic practices as a potential instance of policy transfer by scrutinizing the introduction of open and competitive examinations during the mid‐nineteenth century in the British Civil Service. Scholars have argued that British reformers were inspired by meritocratic practices in British‐ruled India. In order to assess this claim, we combine qualitative analysis of archival material documenting the int…
Voting for bureaucracy? Contestation, suffrage and meritocracy
The relationship between democracy and bureaucracy is the object of both classic and contemporary studies in political science. In classic works, scholars argue that there is an inherent conflict between democracy and bureaucracy, whereas contemporary scholars often assert that democracy is positively related to the development of bureaucracy. We argue that both classic and recent interpretations of the relationship are too simplistic since the t…
Brokering Bureaucrats
Clientelism, the exchange of selective rewards for votes, is fraught with commitment problems and questions remain regarding how it occurs in settings lacking strong parties. In such settings, we argue, bureaucrats can act as brokers using their own networks. Bureaucrats can use their discretionary power to cultivate reciprocal relations with voters and leverage this political capital in negotiations with politicians to secure career advancements…
V-Dem Codebook v14
Political science (13 works) · Law (12 works) · Politics (12 works) · Law (11 works) · Sociology (10 works) · Political economy (9 works) · Bureaucracy (8 works) · Economics (8 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (8 works) · Public Administration (8 works)