Chaz Firestone
Biographic Data
| ID | 1855841 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Chaz Firestone |
| GIVEN NAMES | Chaz |
| FAMILY NAME | Firestone |
| SIGNATURE | FIRESTONE C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Johns Hopkins University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1247-2422 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
The psychophysics of compositionality
The psychophysics of style
A Phone in a Basket Looks Like a Knife in a Cup
When a piece of fruit is in a bowl, and the bowl is on a table, we appreciate not only the individual objects and their features, but also the relations containment and support, which abstract away from the particular objects involved. Independent representation of roles (e.g., containers vs. supporters) and “fillers” of those roles (e.g., bowls vs. cups, tables vs. chairs) is a core principle of language and higher-level reasoning. But does such…
Tangled Physics
Whereas decades of research have cataloged striking errors in physical reasoning, a resurgence of interest in intuitive physics has revealed humans’ remarkable ability to successfully predict the unfolding of physical scenes. A leading interpretation intended to resolve these opposing results is that physical reasoning recruits a general-purpose mechanism that reliably models physical scenarios (explaining recent successes), but overly contrived …
“Impossible” Somatosensation and the (Ir)rationality of Perception
Impossible figures represent the world in ways it cannot be. From the work of M. C. Escher to any popular perception textbook, such experiences show how some principles of mental processing can be so entrenched and inflexible as to produce absurd and even incoherent outcomes that could not occur in reality. Surprisingly, however, such impossible experiences are mostly limited to visual perception; are there “impossible figures” for other sensory …
Hi-def memories of lo-def scenes
Cognition does not affect perception
What determines what we see? In contrast to the traditional “modular” understanding of perception, according to which visual processing is encapsulated from higher-level cognition, a tidal wave of recent research alleges that states such as beliefs, desires, emotions, motivations, intentions, and linguistic representations exert direct, top-down influences on what we see. There is a growing consensus that such effects are ubiquitous, and that the…
No prominent works on this page.
Cognition does not affect perception
What determines what we see? In contrast to the traditional “modular” understanding of perception, according to which visual processing is encapsulated from higher-level cognition, a tidal wave of recent research alleges that states such as beliefs, desires, emotions, motivations, intentions, and linguistic representations exert direct, top-down influences on what we see. There is a growing consensus that such effects are ubiquitous, and that the…
“Impossible” Somatosensation and the (Ir)rationality of Perception
Impossible figures represent the world in ways it cannot be. From the work of M. C. Escher to any popular perception textbook, such experiences show how some principles of mental processing can be so entrenched and inflexible as to produce absurd and even incoherent outcomes that could not occur in reality. Surprisingly, however, such impossible experiences are mostly limited to visual perception; are there “impossible figures” for other sensory …
Hi-def memories of lo-def scenes
A Phone in a Basket Looks Like a Knife in a Cup
When a piece of fruit is in a bowl, and the bowl is on a table, we appreciate not only the individual objects and their features, but also the relations containment and support, which abstract away from the particular objects involved. Independent representation of roles (e.g., containers vs. supporters) and “fillers” of those roles (e.g., bowls vs. cups, tables vs. chairs) is a core principle of language and higher-level reasoning. But does such…
Tangled Physics
Whereas decades of research have cataloged striking errors in physical reasoning, a resurgence of interest in intuitive physics has revealed humans’ remarkable ability to successfully predict the unfolding of physical scenes. A leading interpretation intended to resolve these opposing results is that physical reasoning recruits a general-purpose mechanism that reliably models physical scenarios (explaining recent successes), but overly contrived …
The psychophysics of compositionality
The psychophysics of style
Psychology (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works) · Cognitive psychology (3 works) · Multisensory perception and integration (3 works) · Perception (3 works) · Cognition (2 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Color perception and design (2 works) · Computer vision (2 works)