Mahdi Ranaee
Biographic Data
| ID | 2005239 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Mahdi Ranaee |
| GIVEN NAMES | Mahdi |
| FAMILY NAME | Ranaee |
| SIGNATURE | RANAEE M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Andrews University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6950-2277 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Sellars's Master Argument for Conceptualism
This paper reconstructs what I call Sellars's ‘master argument’ for conceptualism regarding Kantian intuitions—a coherent argumentative thread that appears throughout his works beginning with Science and Metaphysics . In contrast to standard interpretations that focus primarily on the role of the categories, I demonstrate that Sellars defends a robust form of conceptualism in which empirical concepts also play a constitutive role in intuition. Th…
Non-Accidentally Factive Mental States
I offer a counterexample to Timothy Williamson’s conjecture that knowledge is the most general factive mental state; i.e., that every factive mental state entails knowledge. I describe two counterexamples (Ernest Sosa’s and Baron Reed’s) that I find unpersuasive, and argue that they fail due to a specific feature they have in common. I then argue that there is a primitive mental state that is factive but does not entail knowledge, and that consti…
No prominent works on this page.
Non-Accidentally Factive Mental States
I offer a counterexample to Timothy Williamson’s conjecture that knowledge is the most general factive mental state; i.e., that every factive mental state entails knowledge. I describe two counterexamples (Ernest Sosa’s and Baron Reed’s) that I find unpersuasive, and argue that they fail due to a specific feature they have in common. I then argue that there is a primitive mental state that is factive but does not entail knowledge, and that consti…
Sellars's Master Argument for Conceptualism
This paper reconstructs what I call Sellars's ‘master argument’ for conceptualism regarding Kantian intuitions—a coherent argumentative thread that appears throughout his works beginning with Science and Metaphysics . In contrast to standard interpretations that focus primarily on the role of the categories, I demonstrate that Sellars defends a robust form of conceptualism in which empirical concepts also play a constitutive role in intuition. Th…
Epistemology (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (2 works) · Algorithm (1 works) · Argumentative (1 works) · Cognitive science (1 works) · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works) · Conceptualism (1 works)