Stephan Frühling
Biographic Data
| ID | 2007651 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Stephan Frühling |
| GIVEN NAMES | Stephan |
| FAMILY NAME | Frühling |
| SIGNATURE | FRÜHLING S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Australian National University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 25 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 16 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Alliances and Nuclear Risk
There is a fundamental tension between the Biden administration’s stated intent to strengthen US alliances while at the same time reducing the role of US nuclear weapons. The credibility of extended-deterrence commitments – which in times of great-power conflict lie at the heart of US alliances – hinges on US allies and adversaries believing that Washington would resort to nuclear weapons to defend the core interests of its allies. A no-first-use…
Institutions, informality, and influence
Nuclear cooperation has been a consistent feature of the Australia-US alliance. In the 1950s and 1960s, Canberra explored transferring US nuclear weapons to Australian forces operating in Southeast Asia. Since the 1960s, Australian governments have supported hosting joint facilities that contribute to America’s ability to execute global nuclear operations. And Australia has regularly invoked the nuclear umbrella as part of the alliance. We explai…
After American Primacy
Key to the defense of the free world”
After American Primacy
Is Anzus Really an Alliance? Aligning the US and Australia
The divorce of practical cooperation from underlying commitments in the ANZUS Treaty stands in notable contrast to other US alliances
Nuclear weapons and alliance institutions in the era of President Trump
The swearing in of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the United States presages, at the very least, a period of flux in American strategy with respect to the relationship between nuclear weapons and alliances. In this response to three thoughtful rejoinders to our article, “Nuclear weapons, the United States and alliances in Europe and Asia: Toward an institutional perspective,” we clarify key aspects of our argument and discuss why alliance …
Australia's Nuclear Policy
Australia’s Nuclear Policy: Reconciling Strategic, Economic and Normative Interests critically re-evaluates Australia’s engagement with nuclear weapons, nuclear power and the nuclear fuel cycle since the dawn of the nuclear age. The authors develop a holistic conception of ’nuclear policy’ that extends across the three distinct but related spheres - strategic, economic and normative - that have arisen from the basic ’dual-use’ dilemma of nuclear …
Nuclear weapons, the United States and alliances in Europe and Asia
America’s alliances in Europe and East Asia all involve some institutional cooperation on U.S. nuclear weapons policy, planning or employment—from consultative fora in Asia to joint policy and sharing of nuclear warheads in NATO. Such cooperation is often analyzed through the prism of “extended nuclear deterrence,” which focuses on the extension of U.S. security guarantees and their effect on potential adversaries. This article argues that this u…
Nato, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge
Kaliningrad's geography offers advantages not just to Russia, but also to NATO
Managing escalation
Missile defence plays an increasing role in NATO and in most US alliances in Asia, which raises the question of what impact it has on the management of extended deterrence. Extended deterrence relies on the threat of escalation. Since the costs of escalation are different for different allies, the management of extended deterrence is inherently difficult. Missile defence shifts the relative costs of conflict, and therefore also impacts on the all…
Australian defence policy and the concept of self-reliance
Since the Vietnam War, Australian defence policy has been based on the concept of self-reliance—the ability to defend Australia without allied combat forces. Self-reliance arose from concerns about US support in conflict with Indonesia. It has implicati
The fuzzy limits of self-reliance
As a close US ally, Australia is often seen as a recipient of US extended deterrence. This article argues that in recent decades, Australian strategic policy engaged with US extended deterrence at three different levels: locally, Australia eschews US combat support and deterrence under the policy of self-reliance; regionally, it supports US extended deterrence in Asia; globally, it relies on the US alliance against nuclear threats to Australia. T…
Never Say Never
Australia's decision to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons was taken on medium-term strategic grounds. While similar circumstances prevail today, it is possible to identify three conditions for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Australia to be a credible option: the existence of a major threat to Australia; a loss of confidence in US guarantees; and allied acquiescence to an Australian nucle…
Offense and Defense in Strategy
The terms and are central to strategic questions, yet established conceptions relate to technical-tactical, operational, or political/ethical/legal aspects of war. While they are applicable to different levels of strategy, they are not necessarily compatible, and can not serve to classify strategy as a whole. This article proposes a strategic understanding of the two terms, and defines three strategic types of offense (imposition of control, comp…
Uncertainty, Forecasting and the Difficulty of Strategy
Strategy in practice inevitably involves the forecasting of future cause-effect relationships. Four basic sources of uncertainty that make it difficult to predict and “test” these relationships, associated variables, as well as parameters can be distinguished: aleatory uncertainty; complex systems; mental, cognitive and physiological limits; and the enemy. To a varying degree, all four contribute to the difficulty inherent in predicting the inter…
Bunker Busters” and Intra-War Deterrence
This article explores the relationship between new specialized nuclear weapons and U.S. intra-war deterrence threats. Deterrence threats have to be both severe and credible, and a deterrence posture can be based on denial or punishment. At present, the United States primarily relies on nuclear punishment for intra-war deterrence. The severity of the U.S. threat to use its current, relatively high-yield nuclear arsenal is high, but its credibility…
Nato, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge
Kaliningrad's geography offers advantages not just to Russia, but also to NATO
Managing escalation
Missile defence plays an increasing role in NATO and in most US alliances in Asia, which raises the question of what impact it has on the management of extended deterrence. Extended deterrence relies on the threat of escalation. Since the costs of escalation are different for different allies, the management of extended deterrence is inherently difficult. Missile defence shifts the relative costs of conflict, and therefore also impacts on the all…
The fuzzy limits of self-reliance
As a close US ally, Australia is often seen as a recipient of US extended deterrence. This article argues that in recent decades, Australian strategic policy engaged with US extended deterrence at three different levels: locally, Australia eschews US combat support and deterrence under the policy of self-reliance; regionally, it supports US extended deterrence in Asia; globally, it relies on the US alliance against nuclear threats to Australia. T…
Australian defence policy and the concept of self-reliance
Since the Vietnam War, Australian defence policy has been based on the concept of self-reliance—the ability to defend Australia without allied combat forces. Self-reliance arose from concerns about US support in conflict with Indonesia. It has implicati
Is Anzus Really an Alliance? Aligning the US and Australia
The divorce of practical cooperation from underlying commitments in the ANZUS Treaty stands in notable contrast to other US alliances
Nuclear weapons and alliance institutions in the era of President Trump
The swearing in of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the United States presages, at the very least, a period of flux in American strategy with respect to the relationship between nuclear weapons and alliances. In this response to three thoughtful rejoinders to our article, “Nuclear weapons, the United States and alliances in Europe and Asia: Toward an institutional perspective,” we clarify key aspects of our argument and discuss why alliance …
Nuclear weapons, the United States and alliances in Europe and Asia
America’s alliances in Europe and East Asia all involve some institutional cooperation on U.S. nuclear weapons policy, planning or employment—from consultative fora in Asia to joint policy and sharing of nuclear warheads in NATO. Such cooperation is often analyzed through the prism of “extended nuclear deterrence,” which focuses on the extension of U.S. security guarantees and their effect on potential adversaries. This article argues that this u…
Never Say Never
Australia's decision to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons was taken on medium-term strategic grounds. While similar circumstances prevail today, it is possible to identify three conditions for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Australia to be a credible option: the existence of a major threat to Australia; a loss of confidence in US guarantees; and allied acquiescence to an Australian nucle…
Bunker Busters” and Intra-War Deterrence
This article explores the relationship between new specialized nuclear weapons and U.S. intra-war deterrence threats. Deterrence threats have to be both severe and credible, and a deterrence posture can be based on denial or punishment. At present, the United States primarily relies on nuclear punishment for intra-war deterrence. The severity of the U.S. threat to use its current, relatively high-yield nuclear arsenal is high, but its credibility…
Uncertainty, Forecasting and the Difficulty of Strategy
Strategy in practice inevitably involves the forecasting of future cause-effect relationships. Four basic sources of uncertainty that make it difficult to predict and “test” these relationships, associated variables, as well as parameters can be distinguished: aleatory uncertainty; complex systems; mental, cognitive and physiological limits; and the enemy. To a varying degree, all four contribute to the difficulty inherent in predicting the inter…
Offense and Defense in Strategy
The terms and are central to strategic questions, yet established conceptions relate to technical-tactical, operational, or political/ethical/legal aspects of war. While they are applicable to different levels of strategy, they are not necessarily compatible, and can not serve to classify strategy as a whole. This article proposes a strategic understanding of the two terms, and defines three strategic types of offense (imposition of control, comp…
Never Say Never
Australia's decision to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons was taken on medium-term strategic grounds. While similar circumstances prevail today, it is possible to identify three conditions for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Australia to be a credible option: the existence of a major threat to Australia; a loss of confidence in US guarantees; and allied acquiescence to an Australian nucle…
The fuzzy limits of self-reliance
As a close US ally, Australia is often seen as a recipient of US extended deterrence. This article argues that in recent decades, Australian strategic policy engaged with US extended deterrence at three different levels: locally, Australia eschews US combat support and deterrence under the policy of self-reliance; regionally, it supports US extended deterrence in Asia; globally, it relies on the US alliance against nuclear threats to Australia. T…
Australian defence policy and the concept of self-reliance
Since the Vietnam War, Australian defence policy has been based on the concept of self-reliance—the ability to defend Australia without allied combat forces. Self-reliance arose from concerns about US support in conflict with Indonesia. It has implicati
Australia's Nuclear Policy
Australia’s Nuclear Policy: Reconciling Strategic, Economic and Normative Interests critically re-evaluates Australia’s engagement with nuclear weapons, nuclear power and the nuclear fuel cycle since the dawn of the nuclear age. The authors develop a holistic conception of ’nuclear policy’ that extends across the three distinct but related spheres - strategic, economic and normative - that have arisen from the basic ’dual-use’ dilemma of nuclear …
Nuclear weapons, the United States and alliances in Europe and Asia
America’s alliances in Europe and East Asia all involve some institutional cooperation on U.S. nuclear weapons policy, planning or employment—from consultative fora in Asia to joint policy and sharing of nuclear warheads in NATO. Such cooperation is often analyzed through the prism of “extended nuclear deterrence,” which focuses on the extension of U.S. security guarantees and their effect on potential adversaries. This article argues that this u…
Nato, A2/AD and the Kaliningrad Challenge
Kaliningrad's geography offers advantages not just to Russia, but also to NATO
Managing escalation
Missile defence plays an increasing role in NATO and in most US alliances in Asia, which raises the question of what impact it has on the management of extended deterrence. Extended deterrence relies on the threat of escalation. Since the costs of escalation are different for different allies, the management of extended deterrence is inherently difficult. Missile defence shifts the relative costs of conflict, and therefore also impacts on the all…
Nuclear weapons and alliance institutions in the era of President Trump
The swearing in of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the United States presages, at the very least, a period of flux in American strategy with respect to the relationship between nuclear weapons and alliances. In this response to three thoughtful rejoinders to our article, “Nuclear weapons, the United States and alliances in Europe and Asia: Toward an institutional perspective,” we clarify key aspects of our argument and discuss why alliance …
Is Anzus Really an Alliance? Aligning the US and Australia
The divorce of practical cooperation from underlying commitments in the ANZUS Treaty stands in notable contrast to other US alliances
After American Primacy
Key to the defense of the free world”
After American Primacy
Institutions, informality, and influence
Nuclear cooperation has been a consistent feature of the Australia-US alliance. In the 1950s and 1960s, Canberra explored transferring US nuclear weapons to Australian forces operating in Southeast Asia. Since the 1960s, Australian governments have supported hosting joint facilities that contribute to America’s ability to execute global nuclear operations. And Australia has regularly invoked the nuclear umbrella as part of the alliance. We explai…
Alliances and Nuclear Risk
There is a fundamental tension between the Biden administration’s stated intent to strengthen US alliances while at the same time reducing the role of US nuclear weapons. The credibility of extended-deterrence commitments – which in times of great-power conflict lie at the heart of US alliances – hinges on US allies and adversaries believing that Washington would resort to nuclear weapons to defend the core interests of its allies. A no-first-use…
Political science (15 works) · Law (13 works) · Law (13 works) · Business (8 works) · Economics (7 works) · International trade (7 works) · Alliance (6 works) · Deterrence theory (6 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (6 works) · Nuclear Issues and Defense (6 works)