Daniel Speak
Biographic Data
| ID | 2036811 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel Speak |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel |
| FAMILY NAME | Speak |
| SIGNATURE | SPEAK D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Loyola Marymount University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Faith, Free Will Skepticism, and Fischer’s Tao
Skepticism about moral freedom appears to be on the rise. This essay attempts to blunt the force of the recent growth of free will skepticism by appealing to a form of rational faith in free will. With a compelling account of the nature of faith (borrowed from Lara Buchak), we can see that even someone convinced by Pereboom-style skeptical arguments could nevertheless rationally accept and act on the claim that we enjoy moral freedom. Given an un…
The Consequence Argument Revisited
This article surveys the most recent versions of the Consequence Argument and objections to them. It considers objections made to some of the more well-known versions of the argument and recent attempts by defenders to answer these objections by offering reformulated versions of it. Many objections involve a principle van Inwagen called “Beta,” which is regarded by many as the most controversial assumption of the argument. Beta is a “transfer of …
Salvation without belief
In the Christian tradition, it is rather natural to assume that a person can receive salvation only if she believes that certain crucial and relevant propositions are true. Louis Pojman has, however, attacked this assumption. He has formulated what I call the ‘ethics’ argument against the claim that belief is necessary for salvation. After explicating this argument, I complain that it is based on an unnecessarily controversial premise and that it…
The Impertinence of Frankfurt-Style Argument
Journal Article The Impertinence of Frankfurt-Style Argument Get access Daniel Speak Daniel Speak University of Notre Dame Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 57, Issue 226, January 2007, Pages 76-95, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.470.x Published: 10 November 2006
Toward an Axiological Defense of Libertarianism
The Impertinence of Frankfurt-Style Argument
Journal Article The Impertinence of Frankfurt-Style Argument Get access Daniel Speak Daniel Speak University of Notre Dame Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 57, Issue 226, January 2007, Pages 76-95, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.470.x Published: 10 November 2006
Toward an Axiological Defense of Libertarianism
Salvation without belief
In the Christian tradition, it is rather natural to assume that a person can receive salvation only if she believes that certain crucial and relevant propositions are true. Louis Pojman has, however, attacked this assumption. He has formulated what I call the ‘ethics’ argument against the claim that belief is necessary for salvation. After explicating this argument, I complain that it is based on an unnecessarily controversial premise and that it…
The Impertinence of Frankfurt-Style Argument
Journal Article The Impertinence of Frankfurt-Style Argument Get access Daniel Speak Daniel Speak University of Notre Dame Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 57, Issue 226, January 2007, Pages 76-95, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.470.x Published: 10 November 2006
The Consequence Argument Revisited
This article surveys the most recent versions of the Consequence Argument and objections to them. It considers objections made to some of the more well-known versions of the argument and recent attempts by defenders to answer these objections by offering reformulated versions of it. Many objections involve a principle van Inwagen called “Beta,” which is regarded by many as the most controversial assumption of the argument. Beta is a “transfer of …
Faith, Free Will Skepticism, and Fischer’s Tao
Skepticism about moral freedom appears to be on the rise. This essay attempts to blunt the force of the recent growth of free will skepticism by appealing to a form of rational faith in free will. With a compelling account of the nature of faith (borrowed from Lara Buchak), we can see that even someone convinced by Pereboom-style skeptical arguments could nevertheless rationally accept and act on the claim that we enjoy moral freedom. Given an un…
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Medicine (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (2 works) · War, Ethics, and Justification (2 works) · Analytic philosophy (1 works) · Argument (complex analysis (1 works)