Antonio Cabrales
Biographic Data
| ID | 2050116 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Antonio Cabrales |
| GIVEN NAMES | Antonio |
| FAMILY NAME | Cabrales |
| SIGNATURE | CABRALES A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidad Carlos III de Madrid |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0209-0399 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 37 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Strategic information transmission and social preferences
This paper reports on experiments regarding cheap talk games where senders engage in deception also when their interests are not in conflict with those of the receiver. The amount of miscom- munication we observe is higher than in previous experimental findings on cheap talk games, even though, as in previous work, some participants appear to feature a cost of lying. A novel feature of our framework is that sometimes senders’ and receivers’ inter…
Pricing group membership
We consider a model where agents differ in their ‘types’ which determines their contribution towards a club good (i.e public good within a group). We analyze what the equilibrium composition of groups are under mandated and voluntary choice. We show that there exists a top-down sorting equilibrium i.e. an equilibrium where there exists a set of prices which leads to groups that can be ordered by sets of types, with the highest types in the group …
Robots, labor markets, and universal basic income
Automation is a big concern in modern societies in view of its widespread impact on many socioeconomic issues including income, jobs, and productivity. While previous studies have concentrated on determining the effects on jobs and salaries, our aim is to understand how automation affects productivity, and how some policies, such as taxes on robots or universal basic income, moderate or aggravate those effects. To this end, we have designed an ex…
Occupational Choice with Endogenous Spillovers
We study a model that integrates productive and socialising efforts with occupational choice, and endogenous spillovers. We show that more talented individuals work harder and contribute more to externalities, but also have incentives to segregate. Average socialising increases the productivity of the occupation. The size of an occupation grows with its synergies. Individuals underinvest in productive and socialising effort, and sort themselves i…
Kin Selective Suicide
Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors
Consider an investor who fears ruin when facing investments that satisfy no-arbitrage. Before investing he can purchase information about the state of nature as an information structure. Given his prior, information structure α investment dominates information structure β if, whenever he is willing to buy β at some price, he is also willing to buy α at that price. We show that this informativeness ordering is complete and is represented by the de…
Decentralization, political competition and corruption
The Quality of Political Institutions and the Curse of Natural Resources
We propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources, which emphasises the behaviour and incentives of politicians. We extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections. This gives rise to a new restriction that policies should not give rise to a revolution. Our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions, namely, in countries with w…
Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors
La Crema
We analyze a mutual fire insurance mechanism used in Andorra, which is called La Crema in the local language. This mechanism relies on households' announced property values to determine how much a household is reimbursed in the case of a fire and how payments are apportioned among other households. The only Pareto-efficient allocation reachable through the mechanism requires that all households honestly report the true value of their property. Ho…
The Quality of Political Institutions and the Curse of Natural Resources
We propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources, which emphasises the behaviour and incentives of politicians. We extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections. This gives rise to a new restriction that policies should not give rise to a revolution. Our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions, namely, in countries with w…
Decentralization, political competition and corruption
Occupational Choice with Endogenous Spillovers
We study a model that integrates productive and socialising efforts with occupational choice, and endogenous spillovers. We show that more talented individuals work harder and contribute more to externalities, but also have incentives to segregate. Average socialising increases the productivity of the occupation. The size of an occupation grows with its synergies. Individuals underinvest in productive and socialising effort, and sort themselves i…
La Crema
We analyze a mutual fire insurance mechanism used in Andorra, which is called La Crema in the local language. This mechanism relies on households' announced property values to determine how much a household is reimbursed in the case of a fire and how payments are apportioned among other households. The only Pareto-efficient allocation reachable through the mechanism requires that all households honestly report the true value of their property. Ho…
La Crema
We analyze a mutual fire insurance mechanism used in Andorra, which is called La Crema in the local language. This mechanism relies on households' announced property values to determine how much a household is reimbursed in the case of a fire and how payments are apportioned among other households. The only Pareto-efficient allocation reachable through the mechanism requires that all households honestly report the true value of their property. Ho…
Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors
The Quality of Political Institutions and the Curse of Natural Resources
We propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources, which emphasises the behaviour and incentives of politicians. We extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections. This gives rise to a new restriction that policies should not give rise to a revolution. Our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions, namely, in countries with w…
Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors
Consider an investor who fears ruin when facing investments that satisfy no-arbitrage. Before investing he can purchase information about the state of nature as an information structure. Given his prior, information structure α investment dominates information structure β if, whenever he is willing to buy β at some price, he is also willing to buy α at that price. We show that this informativeness ordering is complete and is represented by the de…
Decentralization, political competition and corruption
Kin Selective Suicide
Occupational Choice with Endogenous Spillovers
We study a model that integrates productive and socialising efforts with occupational choice, and endogenous spillovers. We show that more talented individuals work harder and contribute more to externalities, but also have incentives to segregate. Average socialising increases the productivity of the occupation. The size of an occupation grows with its synergies. Individuals underinvest in productive and socialising effort, and sort themselves i…
Robots, labor markets, and universal basic income
Automation is a big concern in modern societies in view of its widespread impact on many socioeconomic issues including income, jobs, and productivity. While previous studies have concentrated on determining the effects on jobs and salaries, our aim is to understand how automation affects productivity, and how some policies, such as taxes on robots or universal basic income, moderate or aggravate those effects. To this end, we have designed an ex…
Pricing group membership
We consider a model where agents differ in their ‘types’ which determines their contribution towards a club good (i.e public good within a group). We analyze what the equilibrium composition of groups are under mandated and voluntary choice. We show that there exists a top-down sorting equilibrium i.e. an equilibrium where there exists a set of prices which leads to groups that can be ordered by sets of types, with the highest types in the group …
Strategic information transmission and social preferences
This paper reports on experiments regarding cheap talk games where senders engage in deception also when their interests are not in conflict with those of the receiver. The amount of miscom- munication we observe is higher than in previous experimental findings on cheap talk games, even though, as in previous work, some participants appear to feature a cost of lying. A novel feature of our framework is that sometimes senders’ and receivers’ inter…
Economics (8 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Economic theories and models (4 works) · Actuarial science (3 works) · Statistics (3 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (2 works) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (2 works)