Borut Trpin
Biographic Data
| ID | 2053757 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Borut Trpin |
| GIVEN NAMES | Borut |
| FAMILY NAME | Trpin |
| SIGNATURE | TRPIN B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Ljubljana |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1121-9388 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Coherence-based measures of explanatory power
Recent critiques have cast doubt on the viability of probabilistic measures of explanatory power. We respond by developing a coherence-based family of measures that sidesteps these challenges. Rather than assessing explanatory power solely by how well a hypothesis accounts for the evidence, these measures evaluate how well the entire explanatory package, including multiple explanantia, coheres with the explanandum compared to how well it coheres …
Why Coherence Matters in advance
Explicating the concept of coherence and establishing a measure for assessing the coherence of an information set are two of the most important tasks of coherentist epistemology. To this end, several principles have been proposed to guide the specification of a measure of coherence. We depart from this prevailing path by challenging two well-established and prima facie plausible principles: Agreement and Dependence. Instead, we propose a new prob…
Coherence as a constraint on scientific inquiry
We investigate the epistemic role of coherence in scientific reasoning, focusing on its use as a heuristic for filtering evidence. Using a novel computational model based on Bayesian networks, we simulate agents who update their beliefs under varying levels of noise and bias. Some agents treat reductions in coherence as higher-order evidence and interpret such drops as signals that something has gone epistemically awry, even when the source of er…
The Mix Matters
What is the rational response to a scientific disagreement? Many epistemologists argue that disagreement with an epistemic peer should generally lead to conciliation by lowering confidence in the disputed belief or even suspending judgment altogether. Although this conciliatory approach is widely regarded as a norm of individual rationality, its value in the context of collective scientific inquiry is less clear. Some have even raised concerns th…
Against Methodological Gambling
Should a scientist rely on methodological triangulation? Heesen et al. (Synthese 196(8):3067–3081, 2019) recently provided a convincing affirmative answer. However, their approach requires belief gambles if the evidence is discordant. We instead propose epistemically modest triangulation (EMT), according to which one should withhold judgement in such cases. We show that for a scientist in a methodologically diffident situation the expected utilit…
Lying, more or less
Partial lying denotes the cases where we partially believe something to be false but nevertheless assert it with the intent to deceive the addressee. We investigate how the severity of partial lying may be determined and how partial lies can be classified. We also study how much epistemic damage an agent suffers depending on the level of trust that she invests in the liar and the severity of the lies she is told. Our analysis is based on the resu…
Inference to the Best Explanation in Uncertain Evidential Situations
It has recently been argued that a non-Bayesian probabilistic version of inference to the best explanation (IBE*) has a number of advantages over Bayesian conditionalization (Douven [2013]; Douven and Wenmackers [2017]). We investigate how IBE* could be generalized to uncertain evidential situations and formulate a novel updating rule IBE**. We then inspect how it performs in comparison to its Bayesian counterpart, Jeffrey conditionalization (JC)…
Inference to the Best Explanation in Uncertain Evidential Situations
It has recently been argued that a non-Bayesian probabilistic version of inference to the best explanation (IBE*) has a number of advantages over Bayesian conditionalization (Douven [2013]; Douven and Wenmackers [2017]). We investigate how IBE* could be generalized to uncertain evidential situations and formulate a novel updating rule IBE**. We then inspect how it performs in comparison to its Bayesian counterpart, Jeffrey conditionalization (JC)…
Lying, more or less
Partial lying denotes the cases where we partially believe something to be false but nevertheless assert it with the intent to deceive the addressee. We investigate how the severity of partial lying may be determined and how partial lies can be classified. We also study how much epistemic damage an agent suffers depending on the level of trust that she invests in the liar and the severity of the lies she is told. Our analysis is based on the resu…
Inference to the Best Explanation in Uncertain Evidential Situations
It has recently been argued that a non-Bayesian probabilistic version of inference to the best explanation (IBE*) has a number of advantages over Bayesian conditionalization (Douven [2013]; Douven and Wenmackers [2017]). We investigate how IBE* could be generalized to uncertain evidential situations and formulate a novel updating rule IBE**. We then inspect how it performs in comparison to its Bayesian counterpart, Jeffrey conditionalization (JC)…
Lying, more or less
Partial lying denotes the cases where we partially believe something to be false but nevertheless assert it with the intent to deceive the addressee. We investigate how the severity of partial lying may be determined and how partial lies can be classified. We also study how much epistemic damage an agent suffers depending on the level of trust that she invests in the liar and the severity of the lies she is told. Our analysis is based on the resu…
Against Methodological Gambling
Should a scientist rely on methodological triangulation? Heesen et al. (Synthese 196(8):3067–3081, 2019) recently provided a convincing affirmative answer. However, their approach requires belief gambles if the evidence is discordant. We instead propose epistemically modest triangulation (EMT), according to which one should withhold judgement in such cases. We show that for a scientist in a methodologically diffident situation the expected utilit…
Coherence as a constraint on scientific inquiry
We investigate the epistemic role of coherence in scientific reasoning, focusing on its use as a heuristic for filtering evidence. Using a novel computational model based on Bayesian networks, we simulate agents who update their beliefs under varying levels of noise and bias. Some agents treat reductions in coherence as higher-order evidence and interpret such drops as signals that something has gone epistemically awry, even when the source of er…
The Mix Matters
What is the rational response to a scientific disagreement? Many epistemologists argue that disagreement with an epistemic peer should generally lead to conciliation by lowering confidence in the disputed belief or even suspending judgment altogether. Although this conciliatory approach is widely regarded as a norm of individual rationality, its value in the context of collective scientific inquiry is less clear. Some have even raised concerns th…
Coherence-based measures of explanatory power
Recent critiques have cast doubt on the viability of probabilistic measures of explanatory power. We respond by developing a coherence-based family of measures that sidesteps these challenges. Rather than assessing explanatory power solely by how well a hypothesis accounts for the evidence, these measures evaluate how well the entire explanatory package, including multiple explanantia, coheres with the explanandum compared to how well it coheres …
Why Coherence Matters in advance
Explicating the concept of coherence and establishing a measure for assessing the coherence of an information set are two of the most important tasks of coherentist epistemology. To this end, several principles have been proposed to guide the specification of a measure of coherence. We depart from this prevailing path by challenging two well-established and prima facie plausible principles: Agreement and Dependence. Instead, we propose a new prob…
Epistemology (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy of science (2 works) · Sociology (2 works)