Daylian M Cain
Biographic Data
| ID | 206188 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daylian M Cain |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daylian M |
| FAMILY NAME | Cain |
| SIGNATURE | CAIN D M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Yale University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 13 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Do Conflict of Interest Disclosures Facilitate Public Trust
Lab experiments disagree on the efficacy of disclosure as a remedy to conflicts of interest (COIs). Some experiments suggest that disclosure has perverse effects, although others suggest these are mitigated by real-world factors (eg, feedback, sanctions, norms). This article argues that experiments reporting positive effects of disclosure often lack external validity: disclosure works best in lab experiments that make it unrealistically clear tha…
Tainted Altruism: When Doing Some Good Is Evaluated as Worse Than Doing No Good at All
In four experiments, we found that the presence of self-interest in the charitable domain was seen as tainting: People evaluated efforts that realized both charitable and personal benefits as worse than analogous behaviors that produced no charitable benefit. This tainted-altruism effect was observed in a variety of contexts and extended to both moral evaluations of other agents and participants’ own behavioral intentions (e.g., reported willingn…
The burden of disclosure: Increased compliance with distrusted advice
Professionals often face conflicts of interest that give them an incentive to provide biased advice, and disclosure (informing advisees about the conflict) is frequently proposed as a solution to the problem. We present 6 experiments that reveal a previously unrecognized perverse effect of disclosure: Although disclosure can decrease advisees' trust in the advice, it can also increase pressure to comply with that advice if advisees feel obliged t…
When Sunlight Fails to Disinfect: Understanding the Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest
Disclosure is often proposed as a remedy for conflicts of interest, but it can backfire, hurting those whom it is intended to protect. Building on our prior research, we introduce a conceptual model of disclosure’s effects on advisors and advice recipients that helps to explain when and why it backfires. Studies 1 and 2 examine psychological mechanisms (strategic exaggeration, moral licensing) by which disclosure can lead advisors to give more-bi…
Conflicts of Interest: Challenges and Solutions in Business, Law, Medicine, and Public Policy
What you don’t know won’t hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games
The burden of disclosure: Increased compliance with distrusted advice
Professionals often face conflicts of interest that give them an incentive to provide biased advice, and disclosure (informing advisees about the conflict) is frequently proposed as a solution to the problem. We present 6 experiments that reveal a previously unrecognized perverse effect of disclosure: Although disclosure can decrease advisees' trust in the advice, it can also increase pressure to comply with that advice if advisees feel obliged t…
When Sunlight Fails to Disinfect: Understanding the Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest
Disclosure is often proposed as a remedy for conflicts of interest, but it can backfire, hurting those whom it is intended to protect. Building on our prior research, we introduce a conceptual model of disclosure’s effects on advisors and advice recipients that helps to explain when and why it backfires. Studies 1 and 2 examine psychological mechanisms (strategic exaggeration, moral licensing) by which disclosure can lead advisors to give more-bi…
What you don’t know won’t hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games
Conflicts of Interest: Challenges and Solutions in Business, Law, Medicine, and Public Policy
When Sunlight Fails to Disinfect: Understanding the Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest
Disclosure is often proposed as a remedy for conflicts of interest, but it can backfire, hurting those whom it is intended to protect. Building on our prior research, we introduce a conceptual model of disclosure’s effects on advisors and advice recipients that helps to explain when and why it backfires. Studies 1 and 2 examine psychological mechanisms (strategic exaggeration, moral licensing) by which disclosure can lead advisors to give more-bi…
The burden of disclosure: Increased compliance with distrusted advice
Professionals often face conflicts of interest that give them an incentive to provide biased advice, and disclosure (informing advisees about the conflict) is frequently proposed as a solution to the problem. We present 6 experiments that reveal a previously unrecognized perverse effect of disclosure: Although disclosure can decrease advisees' trust in the advice, it can also increase pressure to comply with that advice if advisees feel obliged t…
Tainted Altruism: When Doing Some Good Is Evaluated as Worse Than Doing No Good at All
In four experiments, we found that the presence of self-interest in the charitable domain was seen as tainting: People evaluated efforts that realized both charitable and personal benefits as worse than analogous behaviors that produced no charitable benefit. This tainted-altruism effect was observed in a variety of contexts and extended to both moral evaluations of other agents and participants’ own behavioral intentions (e.g., reported willingn…
Do Conflict of Interest Disclosures Facilitate Public Trust
Lab experiments disagree on the efficacy of disclosure as a remedy to conflicts of interest (COIs). Some experiments suggest that disclosure has perverse effects, although others suggest these are mitigated by real-world factors (eg, feedback, sanctions, norms). This article argues that experiments reporting positive effects of disclosure often lack external validity: disclosure works best in lab experiments that make it unrealistically clear tha…
Psychology (5 works) · Business (3 works) · Conflict of interest (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Ethics in Business and Education (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (2 works)