David Mcadams
Biographic Data
| ID | 2095050 |
|---|---|
| NAME | David Mcadams |
| GIVEN NAMES | David |
| FAMILY NAME | Mcadams |
| SIGNATURE | MCADAMS D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Duke University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0997-3071 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Incentivising wealthy nations to participate in the Covid-19 Vaccine Global Access Facility (Covax)
box Progress in developing COVID-19 vaccines has been rapid: the first clinical trial of a vaccine candidate began in Seattle, USA on 16 March 2020—just 63 days after China shared the genetic sequence of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19. As of 12 November 2020, there were 48 candidate vaccines in clinical trials.1 Given standard attrition rates, we can expect at least a handful of COVID-19 vaccines to eventually be launched. However, de…
Supply, Demand, and Uncertainty
Mechanism Choice and Strategic Bidding in Divisible Good Auctions
We propose an estimation method to bound bidders' marginal valuations in discriminatory auctions using individual bid-level data and apply the method to data from the Turkish Treasury auction market. Using estimated bounds on marginal values, we compute an upper bound on the inefficiency of realized allocations as well as bounds on how much additional revenue could have been realized in a counterfactual uniform price or Vickrey auction. We conclu…
Mechanism Choice and Strategic Bidding in Divisible Good Auctions
We propose an estimation method to bound bidders' marginal valuations in discriminatory auctions using individual bid-level data and apply the method to data from the Turkish Treasury auction market. Using estimated bounds on marginal values, we compute an upper bound on the inefficiency of realized allocations as well as bounds on how much additional revenue could have been realized in a counterfactual uniform price or Vickrey auction. We conclu…
Mechanism Choice and Strategic Bidding in Divisible Good Auctions
We propose an estimation method to bound bidders' marginal valuations in discriminatory auctions using individual bid-level data and apply the method to data from the Turkish Treasury auction market. Using estimated bounds on marginal values, we compute an upper bound on the inefficiency of realized allocations as well as bounds on how much additional revenue could have been realized in a counterfactual uniform price or Vickrey auction. We conclu…
Supply, Demand, and Uncertainty
Incentivising wealthy nations to participate in the Covid-19 Vaccine Global Access Facility (Covax)
box Progress in developing COVID-19 vaccines has been rapid: the first clinical trial of a vaccine candidate began in Seattle, USA on 16 March 2020—just 63 days after China shared the genetic sequence of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19. As of 12 November 2020, there were 48 candidate vaccines in clinical trials.1 Given standard attrition rates, we can expect at least a handful of COVID-19 vaccines to eventually be launched. However, de…
Economics (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Auction theory (1 work) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 work) · Bidding (1 work) · Biology (1 work) · Common value auction (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing (1 work)