Isabel Schnabel
Biographic Data
| ID | 2107359 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Isabel Schnabel |
| GIVEN NAMES | Isabel |
| FAMILY NAME | Schnabel |
| SIGNATURE | SCHNABEL I |
| AFFILIATIONS | Max Planck Society |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 15 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The Threat of Capital Drain
This paper yields a rationale for why subsidized public banks may increase regional welfare in a financially integrated economy. We present a model with credit rationing and heterogeneous regions in which public banks prevent a capital drain from poorer to richer regions by subsidizing local depositors, for example, through public guarantees. Under some conditions, cooperative banks can perform the same function without any subsidies; however, th…
Reply to Thomas Ferguson and Peter Temin's “Comment on ‘The German Twin Crisis of 1931”’
Ferguson and Temin criticize my article for only paying lip service to the notion of a twin crisis while providing a story of a pure banking crisis. In fact, I have never claimed that the crisis was a pure banking crisis. The question is whether and to what extent banks contributed to the crisis. Ferguson and Temin take the position that the crisis was a pure currency crisis. I argue that weaknesses in the banking sector existed, which interacted…
The German Twin Crisis of 1931
Using information on banks' balance sheets, I analyze the causal links between the banking and currency problems in the German crisis of 1931. I find that the crisis had two independent causes: Political shocks triggered a run on the Reichsmark; and the excessive risk-taking by banks that were "too big to fail" led to a run on banks. Due to the high level of foreign debt in the banking system, the run on the currency and the deposit withdrawals r…
The German Twin Crisis of 1931
Using information on banks' balance sheets, I analyze the causal links between the banking and currency problems in the German crisis of 1931. I find that the crisis had two independent causes: Political shocks triggered a run on the Reichsmark; and the excessive risk-taking by banks that were "too big to fail" led to a run on banks. Due to the high level of foreign debt in the banking system, the run on the currency and the deposit withdrawals r…
Reply to Thomas Ferguson and Peter Temin's “Comment on ‘The German Twin Crisis of 1931”’
Ferguson and Temin criticize my article for only paying lip service to the notion of a twin crisis while providing a story of a pure banking crisis. In fact, I have never claimed that the crisis was a pure banking crisis. The question is whether and to what extent banks contributed to the crisis. Ferguson and Temin take the position that the crisis was a pure currency crisis. I argue that weaknesses in the banking sector existed, which interacted…
Reply to Thomas Ferguson and Peter Temin's “Comment on ‘The German Twin Crisis of 1931”’
Ferguson and Temin criticize my article for only paying lip service to the notion of a twin crisis while providing a story of a pure banking crisis. In fact, I have never claimed that the crisis was a pure banking crisis. The question is whether and to what extent banks contributed to the crisis. Ferguson and Temin take the position that the crisis was a pure currency crisis. I argue that weaknesses in the banking sector existed, which interacted…
The German Twin Crisis of 1931
Using information on banks' balance sheets, I analyze the causal links between the banking and currency problems in the German crisis of 1931. I find that the crisis had two independent causes: Political shocks triggered a run on the Reichsmark; and the excessive risk-taking by banks that were "too big to fail" led to a run on banks. Due to the high level of foreign debt in the banking system, the run on the currency and the deposit withdrawals r…
The Threat of Capital Drain
This paper yields a rationale for why subsidized public banks may increase regional welfare in a financially integrated economy. We present a model with credit rationing and heterogeneous regions in which public banks prevent a capital drain from poorer to richer regions by subsidizing local depositors, for example, through public guarantees. Under some conditions, cooperative banks can perform the same function without any subsidies; however, th…
Economics (3 works) · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (2 works) · Business (2 works) · Currency (2 works) · Currency crisis (2 works) · European Monetary and Fiscal Policies (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Financial crisis (2 works) · German (2 works)