H A Prichard
Biographic Data
| ID | 2126904 |
|---|---|
| NAME | H A Prichard |
| GIVEN NAMES | H A |
| FAMILY NAME | Prichard |
| SIGNATURE | PRICHARD H A |
| AFFILIATIONS | (1871-1947) White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1909 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Acting, Willing, Desiring
To the question ‘What does it mean to act or to do something?’, replies that it is not easy to identify a common character in actions. Begins by examining the position of Cook Wilson, who maintains that ‘to do something’ means to originate, cause, or bring into existence, either directly or indirectly, some not yet existing state either in oneself or some other body. Although Prichard agrees that usually action involves causing something, he obse…
Moral Writings
Develops Prichard's intuitionist position on moral philosophy. As a realist, he maintains that through direct perception in particular cases, we come to have knowledge of universals. To questions about moral obligation, he argues that no single principle explains why right acts are right, that is to say, why certain acts are obligatory. Prichard rejects any link between ‘the right’ and ‘the good’, maintaining that the rightness of action depends …
Knowledge and Perception
Book Reviews Get access Knowledge and Perception. By H. A. Prichard. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1950. Pp. 215. Price 15s). A. D. Woozley A. D. Woozley Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 1, Issue 2, January 1951, Pages 172–173, https://doi.org/10.2307/2216732 Published: 01 January 1951
The Meaning of άγαθόν in the Ethics of Aristotle
I have for some time found it increasingly difficult to resist a conclusion so heretical that the mere acceptance of it may seem a proof of lunacy. Yet the failure of a recent attempt to resist it has led me to want to confess the heresy. And at any rate a statement of my reasons may provoke a refutation.
Ii.—does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake ?
II.—DOES MORAL PHILOSOPHY REST ON A MISTAKE ? Get access H. A. PRICHARD H. A. PRICHARD Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XXI, Issue 81, 1912, Pages 21–37, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XXI.81.21 Published: 01 January 1912
Kant's Theory of Knowledge
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Kant's Theory of Knowledge
Ii.—does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake ?
II.—DOES MORAL PHILOSOPHY REST ON A MISTAKE ? Get access H. A. PRICHARD H. A. PRICHARD Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume XXI, Issue 81, 1912, Pages 21–37, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XXI.81.21 Published: 01 January 1912
The Meaning of άγαθόν in the Ethics of Aristotle
I have for some time found it increasingly difficult to resist a conclusion so heretical that the mere acceptance of it may seem a proof of lunacy. Yet the failure of a recent attempt to resist it has led me to want to confess the heresy. And at any rate a statement of my reasons may provoke a refutation.
Knowledge and Perception
Book Reviews Get access Knowledge and Perception. By H. A. Prichard. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1950. Pp. 215. Price 15s). A. D. Woozley A. D. Woozley Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 1, Issue 2, January 1951, Pages 172–173, https://doi.org/10.2307/2216732 Published: 01 January 1951
Acting, Willing, Desiring
To the question ‘What does it mean to act or to do something?’, replies that it is not easy to identify a common character in actions. Begins by examining the position of Cook Wilson, who maintains that ‘to do something’ means to originate, cause, or bring into existence, either directly or indirectly, some not yet existing state either in oneself or some other body. Although Prichard agrees that usually action involves causing something, he obse…
Moral Writings
Develops Prichard's intuitionist position on moral philosophy. As a realist, he maintains that through direct perception in particular cases, we come to have knowledge of universals. To questions about moral obligation, he argues that no single principle explains why right acts are right, that is to say, why certain acts are obligatory. Prichard rejects any link between ‘the right’ and ‘the good’, maintaining that the rightness of action depends …
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Aesthetics (1 works) · Analytic philosophy (1 works)