Christian Oesterheld
Biographic Data
| ID | 214207 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Christian Oesterheld |
| GIVEN NAMES | Christian |
| FAMILY NAME | Oesterheld |
| SIGNATURE | OESTERHELD C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Duke University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4222-7855 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The Evidentialist's Wager
Suppose that an altruistic agent who is uncertain between evidential and causal decision theory finds herself in a situation where these theories give conflicting verdicts. We argue that even if she has significantly higher credence in CDT, she should nevertheless act in accordance with EDT. First, we claim that the appropriate response to normative uncertainty is to hedge one's bets. That is, if the stakes are much higher on one theory than anot…
Approval-directed agency and the decision theory of Newcomb-like problems
Decision theorists disagree about how instrumentally rational agents, i.e., agents trying to achieve some goal, should behave in so-called Newcomb-like problems, with the main contenders being causal and evidential decision theory. Since the main goal of artificial intelligence research is to create machines that make instrumentally rational decisions, the disagreement pertains to this field. In addition to the more philosophical question of what…
Extracting Money from Causal Decision Theorists
Newcomb’s problem has spawned a debate about which variant of expected utility maximisation (if any) should guide rational choice. In this paper, we provide a new argument against what is probably the most popular variant: causal decision theory (CDT). In particular, we provide two scenarios in which CDT voluntarily loses money. In the first, an agent faces a single choice and following CDT’s recommendation yields a loss of money in expectation. …
Geleitwort
No abstract available
Formalizing preference utilitarianism in physical world models
Most ethical work is done at a low level of formality. This makes practical moral questions inaccessible to formal and natural sciences and can lead to misunderstandings in ethical discussion. In this paper, we use Bayesian inference to introduce a formalization of preference utilitarianism in physical world models, specifically cellular automata. Even though our formalization is not immediately applicable, it is a first step in providing ethics …
(Un)becoming Dayak
Much of the ethnographic literature on East Kalimantan has assumed relatively stable group identities. Intermarriage between different Dayak groups has been frequent, but is usually perceived as leading to swift cultural assimilation of the in-marrying party. Similarly, Dayak-Malay intermarriages have been understood in terms of socio-religious assimilation (masuk Islam). This article suggests that a number of socio-historical developments, inclu…
(Un)becoming Dayak
Much of the ethnographic literature on East Kalimantan has assumed relatively stable group identities. Intermarriage between different Dayak groups has been frequent, but is usually perceived as leading to swift cultural assimilation of the in-marrying party. Similarly, Dayak-Malay intermarriages have been understood in terms of socio-religious assimilation (masuk Islam). This article suggests that a number of socio-historical developments, inclu…
Formalizing preference utilitarianism in physical world models
Most ethical work is done at a low level of formality. This makes practical moral questions inaccessible to formal and natural sciences and can lead to misunderstandings in ethical discussion. In this paper, we use Bayesian inference to introduce a formalization of preference utilitarianism in physical world models, specifically cellular automata. Even though our formalization is not immediately applicable, it is a first step in providing ethics …
(Un)becoming Dayak
Much of the ethnographic literature on East Kalimantan has assumed relatively stable group identities. Intermarriage between different Dayak groups has been frequent, but is usually perceived as leading to swift cultural assimilation of the in-marrying party. Similarly, Dayak-Malay intermarriages have been understood in terms of socio-religious assimilation (masuk Islam). This article suggests that a number of socio-historical developments, inclu…
Geleitwort
No abstract available
Extracting Money from Causal Decision Theorists
Newcomb’s problem has spawned a debate about which variant of expected utility maximisation (if any) should guide rational choice. In this paper, we provide a new argument against what is probably the most popular variant: causal decision theory (CDT). In particular, we provide two scenarios in which CDT voluntarily loses money. In the first, an agent faces a single choice and following CDT’s recommendation yields a loss of money in expectation. …
The Evidentialist's Wager
Suppose that an altruistic agent who is uncertain between evidential and causal decision theory finds herself in a situation where these theories give conflicting verdicts. We argue that even if she has significantly higher credence in CDT, she should nevertheless act in accordance with EDT. First, we claim that the appropriate response to normative uncertainty is to hedge one's bets. That is, if the stakes are much higher on one theory than anot…
Approval-directed agency and the decision theory of Newcomb-like problems
Decision theorists disagree about how instrumentally rational agents, i.e., agents trying to achieve some goal, should behave in so-called Newcomb-like problems, with the main contenders being causal and evidential decision theory. Since the main goal of artificial intelligence research is to create machines that make instrumentally rational decisions, the disagreement pertains to this field. In addition to the more philosophical question of what…
Computer Science (3 works) · Decision theory (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Action (physics) (1 work) · Altruism (biology) (1 work)