Rabia Nessah
Biographic Data
| ID | 2144080 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Rabia Nessah |
| GIVEN NAMES | Rabia |
| FAMILY NAME | Nessah |
| SIGNATURE | NESSAH R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5193-7272 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 11 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 10 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games
Revolutions and rational choice
Weakly continuous security and nash equilibrium
On the strong hybrid solution of an n-person game
The Game Is Afoot
In this article, we are interested in exploring the history of game theory in France, and particularly the way it was received and was diffused in the 1950s. It will be shown that France was the most fertile soil in continental Europe for a multidisciplinary welcoming to game theory. Reviewing certain aspects of the intellectual trajectory of the mathematician Guilbaud, the ethnologist Lévi-Strauss and the psychanalyst Lacan, we show how each of …
On the existence of unilateral support equilibrium
How to Play Games? Nash Versus Berge Behaviour Rules
Assuming that in order to best achieve their goal, individuals adapt their behaviour to the game situation, this paper examines the appropriateness of the Berge behaviour rule and equilibrium as a complement to Nash. We define a Berge equilibrium and explain what it means to play in this fashion. We analyse the rationale of individuals playing in a situational manner, and establish an operational approach that describes the circumstances under wh…
Le paradoxe du vote
Pourquoi les citoyens votent-ils ? N’est-il pas irrationnel pour un individu agissant selon son propre intérêt de se déplacer aux urnes quand les bénéfices qu’il peut en escompter sont indépendants de sa contribution ? En effet, l’arbitrage coût-bénéfice montre qu’il est préférable pour un citoyen de s’abstenir afin de profiter des avantages de l’élection sans en supporter le coût associé. C’est ce qui est communément appelé le paradoxe du vote. …
Les théories du choix révolutionnaire
Pourquoi se révolte-t-on ? Bien que l’on dispose de suffisamment d’informations sur les diverses révolutions qui ont eu lieu, les motivations de l’engagement révolutionnaire restent encore aujourd’hui une énigme. Cet engagement est d’autant plus difficile à cerner que, en s’y prêtant, les individus prennent des risques énormes. Il paraît donc beaucoup plus avantageux de laisser les autres s’engager et de profiter des gains de la révolution sans e…
A note on the existence of Berge and Berge–Nash equilibria
A note on the existence of Berge and Berge–Nash equilibria
On the strong hybrid solution of an n-person game
The Game Is Afoot
In this article, we are interested in exploring the history of game theory in France, and particularly the way it was received and was diffused in the 1950s. It will be shown that France was the most fertile soil in continental Europe for a multidisciplinary welcoming to game theory. Reviewing certain aspects of the intellectual trajectory of the mathematician Guilbaud, the ethnologist Lévi-Strauss and the psychanalyst Lacan, we show how each of …
On the existence of unilateral support equilibrium
Revolutions and rational choice
Les théories du choix révolutionnaire
Pourquoi se révolte-t-on ? Bien que l’on dispose de suffisamment d’informations sur les diverses révolutions qui ont eu lieu, les motivations de l’engagement révolutionnaire restent encore aujourd’hui une énigme. Cet engagement est d’autant plus difficile à cerner que, en s’y prêtant, les individus prennent des risques énormes. Il paraît donc beaucoup plus avantageux de laisser les autres s’engager et de profiter des gains de la révolution sans e…
A note on the existence of Berge and Berge–Nash equilibria
Le paradoxe du vote
Pourquoi les citoyens votent-ils ? N’est-il pas irrationnel pour un individu agissant selon son propre intérêt de se déplacer aux urnes quand les bénéfices qu’il peut en escompter sont indépendants de sa contribution ? En effet, l’arbitrage coût-bénéfice montre qu’il est préférable pour un citoyen de s’abstenir afin de profiter des avantages de l’élection sans en supporter le coût associé. C’est ce qui est communément appelé le paradoxe du vote. …
How to Play Games? Nash Versus Berge Behaviour Rules
Assuming that in order to best achieve their goal, individuals adapt their behaviour to the game situation, this paper examines the appropriateness of the Berge behaviour rule and equilibrium as a complement to Nash. We define a Berge equilibrium and explain what it means to play in this fashion. We analyse the rationale of individuals playing in a situational manner, and establish an operational approach that describes the circumstances under wh…
On the existence of unilateral support equilibrium
The Game Is Afoot
In this article, we are interested in exploring the history of game theory in France, and particularly the way it was received and was diffused in the 1950s. It will be shown that France was the most fertile soil in continental Europe for a multidisciplinary welcoming to game theory. Reviewing certain aspects of the intellectual trajectory of the mathematician Guilbaud, the ethnologist Lévi-Strauss and the psychanalyst Lacan, we show how each of …
Weakly continuous security and nash equilibrium
On the strong hybrid solution of an n-person game
Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games
Revolutions and rational choice
Mathematical economics (7 works) · Mathematics (7 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (5 works) · Nash equilibrium (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Game Theory and Applications (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Best response (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works)