William B Moul
Biographic Data
| ID | 2152160 |
|---|---|
| NAME | William B Moul |
| GIVEN NAMES | William B |
| FAMILY NAME | Moul |
| SIGNATURE | MOUL W B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Waterloo |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 16 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 74 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 16 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1973 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Balances Without Great Powers: Some Evidence on War and Peace in the Americas, 1816–1989
Did disputes between non-great powers in the New World, 1816–1989, escalate to war if the disputes involved roughly equal sides or not? Metaphorically and practically, “balances of power” are about measurement, but many of the usual measures prove to be incorrect. Proper assessments of the balances of fighting power qualify counts of the material resources by considering the political-organizational capacity of the state to employ what is counted…
Counting the Seven Weeks War: Dyads, Disputes and Balances of Power
The usual quantitative study of inter-state war and peace tallies observations on hundreds, sometimes thousands, of dyads or pairs of states. These observations miss elementary features of inter-state relations that should be examined when testing Realist explanations of war and peace. The way in which three prominent studies (Bremer, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita, 1981; 1985) chose to count the Seven Weeks War dramatically reveals the theoretical diff…
Power Parity, Preponderance, and War between Great Powers, 1816-1989
Empirical study has worn essential theoretical edges from the power transition theory and rival balance-of-power theories, leaving a misshapen question: does parity in quantitative power capabilities of opposing individual states discourage or encourage war between those two states? Distortions of both theory and evidence—mixing balances of power with balances of terror; overlooking political geography, political incapacity, and alliance formatio…
Dangerous balances, 1816–1989: A simple theory with longitudinal evidence
To be explained are the Great Power versus Great Power wars, 1816–1989. Familiar strands of ‘realist’ thinking are twisted into a good simple balances of power theory to explain peace, war and the extent of war. The evidence, quantitative and qualitative, is that non-separated approximate equals in power capabilities formed dangerous balances. Generally, would-be-combatant great powers used alliances to restrain stronger third parties and to add …
Stopping Wars Defining the Obstacles to Cease-Fire
Introduction: the long and winding road to peace. Part 1 Belligerents during war: power and the willingness to settle - Why stop now? the avoidance of weakness and the search for strength - will look weak political and cognitive dissonance - WE'd never get away with it making the decision to stop - didn't consider it, THEY wouldn't listen, WE couldn't agree unbridgeable divides and uncontrollable armies - the inability to cease fire - can't give …
Polarization, Polynomials, and War
Michael Wallace reports a very pronounced curvilinear relationship between a new measure of the polarization of the state system and warfare during 1815-1964. He suggests considerable caution when interpreting the results and urges replication. This is a replication. Given the original cautions, the additional ones made here, and the results of a reanalysis, the conclusion is clear. There is no relationship—linear, monotonic, or nonmonotonic—betw…
The Onset of World War
The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems
Measuring the ‘balances of power’: A look at some numbers
Approximate parity in power capabilities between states creates uncertainty of victory if war were to occur. Whether, therefore, decisional uncertainty inhibits war between states or makes a breaking of the peace likely, is a central question in the host of ‘balance of power’ theories of interstate conflict. Some argue one way; others a different way; and some appear to argue one way, then the other. For along time each found support in armchair …
Great power Nondefense alliances and the escalation to war of conflicts between unequals, 1815–1939
Estimates of how other great powers would act if war were to occur are fundamental to a decision by a predatory great power to wage war against a much weaker state. An entente or neutrality agreement with a rival great power is means to reduce decisional uncertainty concerning the scope of the conflict with a nongreat power. The firmness of the alliance of restraint (neutrality pact; entente; no alliance) varies with geopolitical location of the …
Crisis and WarPatrick James Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988, pp. x, 192
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
A catch to the war trap: Great powers in conflict with one another appear not to act as expected‐utility maximizers
According to calculations marshalled to support Bueno de Mequita's expected‐utility model of interstate conflict, and contrary to its basic proposition, great powers in conflict with one another during 1815–1974 do not appear to have acted as expected‐utility maximizers
Balances of Power and European Great Power War, 1815–1939: A Suggestion and Some Evidence
Three contrary theories of great power war are examined. The first is the common balance of power argument that parity preserves peace. The second is Organski's oft-cited alternative, “the power transition.” The third is a conflation of the first and second. Like the first, the inherent inability to measure power precisely is the basis of the conflated balance of power theory. Like the second, the conclusion is that parity encourages war. Unlike …
Colouring by numbers: Comments on a quantitative study of quantitative studies of international politics
John Vasquez, in a recent number of the Review , attempts to document the two-part ‘claim that the Realist paradigm has dominated quantitative international relations and has to this time (1979) failed.to explain (state) behaviour adequately’. He labels this the ‘colour it Morgenthau thesis’
On Getting Nothing for Something: A Note on Causal Models of Political Development
The Level of Analysis Problem Revisited
Le problème du plan analytique a trait au choix et aux limites des unités d'analyse. En relations internationales, c'est là un secteur fort confus. L'article bien connu de Singer contient la seule discussion des implications méthodologiques de ce problème. Bien qu'il pose le problème en termes de « composantes » et de « systèmes », Singer le transforme en une comparaison des utilités de deux modèles du comportement de l'Etat. Plutôt que d'éclairc…
The Level of Analysis Problem Revisited
Le problème du plan analytique a trait au choix et aux limites des unités d'analyse. En relations internationales, c'est là un secteur fort confus. L'article bien connu de Singer contient la seule discussion des implications méthodologiques de ce problème. Bien qu'il pose le problème en termes de « composantes » et de « systèmes », Singer le transforme en une comparaison des utilités de deux modèles du comportement de l'Etat. Plutôt que d'éclairc…
Power Parity, Preponderance, and War between Great Powers, 1816-1989
Empirical study has worn essential theoretical edges from the power transition theory and rival balance-of-power theories, leaving a misshapen question: does parity in quantitative power capabilities of opposing individual states discourage or encourage war between those two states? Distortions of both theory and evidence—mixing balances of power with balances of terror; overlooking political geography, political incapacity, and alliance formatio…
Stopping Wars Defining the Obstacles to Cease-Fire
Introduction: the long and winding road to peace. Part 1 Belligerents during war: power and the willingness to settle - Why stop now? the avoidance of weakness and the search for strength - will look weak political and cognitive dissonance - WE'd never get away with it making the decision to stop - didn't consider it, THEY wouldn't listen, WE couldn't agree unbridgeable divides and uncontrollable armies - the inability to cease fire - can't give …
On Getting Nothing for Something: A Note on Causal Models of Political Development
Measuring the ‘balances of power’: A look at some numbers
Approximate parity in power capabilities between states creates uncertainty of victory if war were to occur. Whether, therefore, decisional uncertainty inhibits war between states or makes a breaking of the peace likely, is a central question in the host of ‘balance of power’ theories of interstate conflict. Some argue one way; others a different way; and some appear to argue one way, then the other. For along time each found support in armchair …
Great power Nondefense alliances and the escalation to war of conflicts between unequals, 1815–1939
Estimates of how other great powers would act if war were to occur are fundamental to a decision by a predatory great power to wage war against a much weaker state. An entente or neutrality agreement with a rival great power is means to reduce decisional uncertainty concerning the scope of the conflict with a nongreat power. The firmness of the alliance of restraint (neutrality pact; entente; no alliance) varies with geopolitical location of the …
Balances of Power and European Great Power War, 1815–1939: A Suggestion and Some Evidence
Three contrary theories of great power war are examined. The first is the common balance of power argument that parity preserves peace. The second is Organski's oft-cited alternative, “the power transition.” The third is a conflation of the first and second. Like the first, the inherent inability to measure power precisely is the basis of the conflated balance of power theory. Like the second, the conclusion is that parity encourages war. Unlike …
Counting the Seven Weeks War: Dyads, Disputes and Balances of Power
The usual quantitative study of inter-state war and peace tallies observations on hundreds, sometimes thousands, of dyads or pairs of states. These observations miss elementary features of inter-state relations that should be examined when testing Realist explanations of war and peace. The way in which three prominent studies (Bremer, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita, 1981; 1985) chose to count the Seven Weeks War dramatically reveals the theoretical diff…
Dangerous balances, 1816–1989: A simple theory with longitudinal evidence
To be explained are the Great Power versus Great Power wars, 1816–1989. Familiar strands of ‘realist’ thinking are twisted into a good simple balances of power theory to explain peace, war and the extent of war. The evidence, quantitative and qualitative, is that non-separated approximate equals in power capabilities formed dangerous balances. Generally, would-be-combatant great powers used alliances to restrain stronger third parties and to add …
The Onset of World War
A catch to the war trap: Great powers in conflict with one another appear not to act as expected‐utility maximizers
According to calculations marshalled to support Bueno de Mequita's expected‐utility model of interstate conflict, and contrary to its basic proposition, great powers in conflict with one another during 1815–1974 do not appear to have acted as expected‐utility maximizers
The Level of Analysis Problem Revisited
Le problème du plan analytique a trait au choix et aux limites des unités d'analyse. En relations internationales, c'est là un secteur fort confus. L'article bien connu de Singer contient la seule discussion des implications méthodologiques de ce problème. Bien qu'il pose le problème en termes de « composantes » et de « systèmes », Singer le transforme en une comparaison des utilités de deux modèles du comportement de l'Etat. Plutôt que d'éclairc…
On Getting Nothing for Something: A Note on Causal Models of Political Development
Colouring by numbers: Comments on a quantitative study of quantitative studies of international politics
John Vasquez, in a recent number of the Review , attempts to document the two-part ‘claim that the Realist paradigm has dominated quantitative international relations and has to this time (1979) failed.to explain (state) behaviour adequately’. He labels this the ‘colour it Morgenthau thesis’
Balances of Power and European Great Power War, 1815–1939: A Suggestion and Some Evidence
Three contrary theories of great power war are examined. The first is the common balance of power argument that parity preserves peace. The second is Organski's oft-cited alternative, “the power transition.” The third is a conflation of the first and second. Like the first, the inherent inability to measure power precisely is the basis of the conflated balance of power theory. Like the second, the conclusion is that parity encourages war. Unlike …
A catch to the war trap: Great powers in conflict with one another appear not to act as expected‐utility maximizers
According to calculations marshalled to support Bueno de Mequita's expected‐utility model of interstate conflict, and contrary to its basic proposition, great powers in conflict with one another during 1815–1974 do not appear to have acted as expected‐utility maximizers
Great power Nondefense alliances and the escalation to war of conflicts between unequals, 1815–1939
Estimates of how other great powers would act if war were to occur are fundamental to a decision by a predatory great power to wage war against a much weaker state. An entente or neutrality agreement with a rival great power is means to reduce decisional uncertainty concerning the scope of the conflict with a nongreat power. The firmness of the alliance of restraint (neutrality pact; entente; no alliance) varies with geopolitical location of the …
Crisis and WarPatrick James Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988, pp. x, 192
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Measuring the ‘balances of power’: A look at some numbers
Approximate parity in power capabilities between states creates uncertainty of victory if war were to occur. Whether, therefore, decisional uncertainty inhibits war between states or makes a breaking of the peace likely, is a central question in the host of ‘balance of power’ theories of interstate conflict. Some argue one way; others a different way; and some appear to argue one way, then the other. For along time each found support in armchair …
The Onset of World War
The Balance of Power: Stability in International Systems
Polarization, Polynomials, and War
Michael Wallace reports a very pronounced curvilinear relationship between a new measure of the polarization of the state system and warfare during 1815-1964. He suggests considerable caution when interpreting the results and urges replication. This is a replication. Given the original cautions, the additional ones made here, and the results of a reanalysis, the conclusion is clear. There is no relationship—linear, monotonic, or nonmonotonic—betw…
Stopping Wars Defining the Obstacles to Cease-Fire
Introduction: the long and winding road to peace. Part 1 Belligerents during war: power and the willingness to settle - Why stop now? the avoidance of weakness and the search for strength - will look weak political and cognitive dissonance - WE'd never get away with it making the decision to stop - didn't consider it, THEY wouldn't listen, WE couldn't agree unbridgeable divides and uncontrollable armies - the inability to cease fire - can't give …
Dangerous balances, 1816–1989: A simple theory with longitudinal evidence
To be explained are the Great Power versus Great Power wars, 1816–1989. Familiar strands of ‘realist’ thinking are twisted into a good simple balances of power theory to explain peace, war and the extent of war. The evidence, quantitative and qualitative, is that non-separated approximate equals in power capabilities formed dangerous balances. Generally, would-be-combatant great powers used alliances to restrain stronger third parties and to add …
Power Parity, Preponderance, and War between Great Powers, 1816-1989
Empirical study has worn essential theoretical edges from the power transition theory and rival balance-of-power theories, leaving a misshapen question: does parity in quantitative power capabilities of opposing individual states discourage or encourage war between those two states? Distortions of both theory and evidence—mixing balances of power with balances of terror; overlooking political geography, political incapacity, and alliance formatio…
Counting the Seven Weeks War: Dyads, Disputes and Balances of Power
The usual quantitative study of inter-state war and peace tallies observations on hundreds, sometimes thousands, of dyads or pairs of states. These observations miss elementary features of inter-state relations that should be examined when testing Realist explanations of war and peace. The way in which three prominent studies (Bremer, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita, 1981; 1985) chose to count the Seven Weeks War dramatically reveals the theoretical diff…
Balances Without Great Powers: Some Evidence on War and Peace in the Americas, 1816–1989
Did disputes between non-great powers in the New World, 1816–1989, escalate to war if the disputes involved roughly equal sides or not? Metaphorically and practically, “balances of power” are about measurement, but many of the usual measures prove to be incorrect. Proper assessments of the balances of fighting power qualify counts of the material resources by considering the political-organizational capacity of the state to employ what is counted…
Political science (16 works) · Economics (12 works) · International Relations and Foreign Policy (10 works) · Law (10 works) · Law (10 works) · Physics (8 works) · Politics (8 works) · Positive economics (8 works) · Power (physics (8 works) · Epistemology (7 works)