Patrick E Shea
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 2158901 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Patrick E Shea |
| PRENOMES | Patrick E |
| SOBRENOME | Shea |
| ASSINATURA | SHEA P E |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Houston |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5051-4443 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 24 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 141 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 24 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2014 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 5 |
An examination of trade liberalization as a gendered foreign policy instrument
Research on women and trade policy presents mixed findings: Public opinion studies consistently found women more protectionist than men; yet, legislative research found women sometimes support higher tariffs and sometimes support liberalization. We argue these inconsistencies reflect how trade is framed. When trade is presented as a foreign policy and development tool benefiting women in developing countries, women are more likely to support libe…
Crises and Consequences
Sovereign default should theoretically lead to creditor punishment through higher borrowing costs or market exclusion. However, empirical evidence shows that punishment is inconsistent across defaulters. We argue that this disconnect can be explained by examining the role of geopolitical relationships, particularly with the United States. US support conditions expectations of both borrowers and creditors by providing a fiscal cushion and subsidiz…
Global Finance, Political Business Cycles, and the Politics of Foreign Reserves
Foreign reserves provide developing countries with resources for managing the effects of economic shocks and crises. Why do reserve levels vary across the developing world? Political business cycles (PBCs) have been associated with reserve level decreases, as incumbents draw them down to fund policies that provide voters with material benefits before elections. But governments can also obtain capital by borrowing on bond markets, getting the reso…
China Lending and the Political Economy of Leader Survival
What are the political implications of Chinese loans to borrowing countries? Our argument is that similar to other forms of international finance, loans from China provide leaders with additional resources to maintain their power. The nature of China’s lending practices—characterized by an absence of good governance conditions—offers a unique advantage to political leaders, allowing corrupt leaders who receive loans from China to stay in power fo…
Information, Uncertainty, and Public Support for Brinkmanship During the 2023 Debt Limit Negotiations
Why do US voters allow politicians to hold the country’s economy hostage during debt ceiling negotiations? In this research note, we argue that ignorance and uncertainty over the consequences of a debt ceiling breach play a nontrivial role in public support for hard-line negotiating positions. In a pre-registered survey experiment, two weeks before the June 2023 deadline to raise the US debt ceiling, we show that providing credible information ab…
Information, Uncertainty, and Public Support for Brinkmanship During the 2023 Debt Limit Negotiations – Corrigendum
Why cronies don’t cry? IMF programs, Chinese lending, and leader survival
Many countries in the Global South have increased their exposure to Chinese debt in recent years. With the COVID-19 pandemic and the US interest rate hike, many countries have struggled to meet their debt repayment obligations. As a result, they have turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for emergency assistance. We argue that the involvement of the Fund wipes out much of the political benefits of China loans for executive leaders of bo…
Ethnic politics and sovereign credit risk
How does domestic politics affect sovereign credit risk? To date, scholars have largely focused on how economic interests along class-cleavages influence sovereign default risk and borrowing costs. Ethnic dynamics are another important political factor that explains governments’ creditworthiness, yet are understudied. We investigate how ethnic politics shape governments’ credit access and argue that the fiscal incentives generated by ethnic coali…
External Threats, Capacity, and Repression
How do external threats affect leaders' incentives to repress? We argue that external threats both increase and decrease state repression, but through different causal pathways. Directly, external threats provide leaders with political cover to use repression against political opponents. Indirectly, threats incentivize leaders to augment state capacity, which decreases the likelihood of state repression. To test this argument, we develop a new la…
US Patronage, State Capacity, and Civil Conflict
Leaders need resources to maintain power. To secure these resources, states can develop their own extractive capacity or seek external support to help subsidize their costs. In this study, we argue that extractive capacity and external support are not always alternatives. We focus on how US support can foster local property rights, which subsequently builds extractive capacity. We then argue that states with more capacity are better able to eithe…
Re-examining women leaders and military spending
Do women leaders enact more hawkish foreign policies? Some research argues women leaders are more likely to adopt aggressive and masculine characteristics to obtain national office. As a result, women leaders should exhibit more hawkish behavior than men. In this study we re-examine the relationship between the women leaders and foreign policy by focusing on military spending behavior. We argue that conventional empirical methods, such as linear …
Legislative Transparency and Credit Risk
Open governance requirements are designed to improve accountability, which implies that transparent governments are more trustworthy stewards of their publicly invested power. However, transparency may also reduce institutional effectiveness and inhibit political compromise, diminishing the capacity to manage resources responsibly. We assess empirical support for these competing perspectives in the context of American state legislatures, many of …
Alliances, signals of support, and military effort
Do alliances allow states to share defense burdens and reduce military spending? Despite expectations that alliances should lead to decreased military spending, the empirical record offers mixed findings. We argue that not all alliances are reliable; thus, only allies that receive signals of reassurance will rely on the external security of allies and subsequently reduce their military spending. Compared to states that do not receive additional s…
Money Talks
Finance is often considered a constraining or compelling force in war. This article examines an alternative role of finance in war, asserting that investors can inform states about adversarial intentions and resolve under certain conditions. This signaling mechanism can reduce information asymmetry between states and decrease the probability of conflict. In the context of these theoretical expectations, I examine the case of Austria and the Roths…
Leaders and Default
Sovereign default is a political decision. While previous research on sovereign credit markets focuses on economic causes, domestic constraints, or international reputation to explain why states default, we focus on leaders. We argue that leaders who come to power under irregular circumstances are more likely to default. Irregular leaders are themselves more vulnerable to turnover and therefore prioritize the short-term benefits of default rather…
The Devil’s Haircut
When do private creditors versus debtor states accept a greater burden in resolving sovereign debt crises? In this study, we argue that distributive politics helps explain the “haircut”—or losses—private creditors take in debt restructuring cases. Despite the expected convergence of partisan policies in a globalized economy, we argue that right and left leaders extract different settlements in debt negotiations. Left governments, representing con…
War and Default
Sovereign borrowing is often used to cover the costs of war. This borrowing, coupled with war’s economic disruptions, strains states’ ability to honor debt promises. Contrary to conventional expectations, however, we find that default is not common after wars. To explain the relationship between war and sovereign default, this article lays out a selection effect argument: war participants are unlikely to default in the first place, while states l…
The Financial Crisis, Fiscal Federalism, and the Creditworthiness of US State Governments
This study examines why credit rating agencies offered optimistic assessments of some US states during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Focusing on the creditworthiness of state governments, we argue that because states are procyclic spenders, growth in a state’s economy is actually harmful to that state’s ability to maintain its fiscal promises. As the federal government spends more heavily in a state, however, the procyclic tendencies of that st…
Leaders, Tenure, and the Politics of Sovereign Credit
Sovereign creditworthiness is as much a function of politics as economic fundamentals. Previous research has focused on the relationship between creditworthiness and political factors such as regime type, regional effects, and international organization membership. These factors, while important, often change slowly and do not always capture the more dynamic political determinants of creditworthiness. As an alternative, this study focuses on the …
The Impact of Women Legislators on Humanitarian Military Interventions
In this article, we contend that the current gender and conflict literature ignores the context of military decisions and thus underestimates the support of women for certain types of military interventions. We argue that the issues related to humanitarian crises are likely to provoke support from women. Consequently, as more women enter elected positions in state legislatures, the more likely a state will become involved in a humanitarian milita…
Borrowing Trouble
Changes in relative military power in the international system are seen as an impediment to peace. This article will focus on one particular avenue for states to increase their relative military power: sovereign borrowing. States’ ability to borrow inexpensive credit can undermine credible commitments in international relations, but only for those states that habitually use credit for military purposes. I argue that military regimes are more like…
Sovereign Credit and the Fate of Leaders
In this article, we contend that the "democratic advantage" literature (i) exaggerates the potential political backlash from credit downgrades in democracies; and (ii) overlooks the importance of sovereign credit to nondemocratic leaders. We argue that nondemocratic regimes receive a higher marginal political benefit from credit compared to democratic regimes. Consequently, changes in credit prices or credit access affect nondemocratic leaders' t…
Financing Victory
With access to inexpensive credit, states can finance wars without overburdening their constituents, and face relatively small short-term costs compared to states with poor credit access. As a result of these economic benefits, states with lower credit costs will be more likely to win their wars, ceteris paribus. However, lower borrowing costs provide states domestic political benefits, which I argue are more important for democracies than nondem…
Opposition Politics and International Crises
Democratic foreign policy choices are a function of expected international outcomes and the preferences, power, and information of domestic actors. Studies of domestic political competition and international crisis bargaining have argued that an opposition's policy positions send credible signals of the government's intentions to adversarial target states. This paper contends that while opposition behavior may send informative signals, it can als…
Sovereign Credit and the Fate of Leaders
In this article, we contend that the "democratic advantage" literature (i) exaggerates the potential political backlash from credit downgrades in democracies; and (ii) overlooks the importance of sovereign credit to nondemocratic leaders. We argue that nondemocratic regimes receive a higher marginal political benefit from credit compared to democratic regimes. Consequently, changes in credit prices or credit access affect nondemocratic leaders' t…
Financing Victory
With access to inexpensive credit, states can finance wars without overburdening their constituents, and face relatively small short-term costs compared to states with poor credit access. As a result of these economic benefits, states with lower credit costs will be more likely to win their wars, ceteris paribus. However, lower borrowing costs provide states domestic political benefits, which I argue are more important for democracies than nondem…
War and Default
Sovereign borrowing is often used to cover the costs of war. This borrowing, coupled with war’s economic disruptions, strains states’ ability to honor debt promises. Contrary to conventional expectations, however, we find that default is not common after wars. To explain the relationship between war and sovereign default, this article lays out a selection effect argument: war participants are unlikely to default in the first place, while states l…
The Impact of Women Legislators on Humanitarian Military Interventions
In this article, we contend that the current gender and conflict literature ignores the context of military decisions and thus underestimates the support of women for certain types of military interventions. We argue that the issues related to humanitarian crises are likely to provoke support from women. Consequently, as more women enter elected positions in state legislatures, the more likely a state will become involved in a humanitarian milita…
The Devil’s Haircut
When do private creditors versus debtor states accept a greater burden in resolving sovereign debt crises? In this study, we argue that distributive politics helps explain the “haircut”—or losses—private creditors take in debt restructuring cases. Despite the expected convergence of partisan policies in a globalized economy, we argue that right and left leaders extract different settlements in debt negotiations. Left governments, representing con…
Leaders and Default
Sovereign default is a political decision. While previous research on sovereign credit markets focuses on economic causes, domestic constraints, or international reputation to explain why states default, we focus on leaders. We argue that leaders who come to power under irregular circumstances are more likely to default. Irregular leaders are themselves more vulnerable to turnover and therefore prioritize the short-term benefits of default rather…
Leaders, Tenure, and the Politics of Sovereign Credit
Sovereign creditworthiness is as much a function of politics as economic fundamentals. Previous research has focused on the relationship between creditworthiness and political factors such as regime type, regional effects, and international organization membership. These factors, while important, often change slowly and do not always capture the more dynamic political determinants of creditworthiness. As an alternative, this study focuses on the …
Borrowing Trouble
Changes in relative military power in the international system are seen as an impediment to peace. This article will focus on one particular avenue for states to increase their relative military power: sovereign borrowing. States’ ability to borrow inexpensive credit can undermine credible commitments in international relations, but only for those states that habitually use credit for military purposes. I argue that military regimes are more like…
Alliances, signals of support, and military effort
Do alliances allow states to share defense burdens and reduce military spending? Despite expectations that alliances should lead to decreased military spending, the empirical record offers mixed findings. We argue that not all alliances are reliable; thus, only allies that receive signals of reassurance will rely on the external security of allies and subsequently reduce their military spending. Compared to states that do not receive additional s…
Why cronies don’t cry? IMF programs, Chinese lending, and leader survival
Many countries in the Global South have increased their exposure to Chinese debt in recent years. With the COVID-19 pandemic and the US interest rate hike, many countries have struggled to meet their debt repayment obligations. As a result, they have turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for emergency assistance. We argue that the involvement of the Fund wipes out much of the political benefits of China loans for executive leaders of bo…
External Threats, Capacity, and Repression
How do external threats affect leaders' incentives to repress? We argue that external threats both increase and decrease state repression, but through different causal pathways. Directly, external threats provide leaders with political cover to use repression against political opponents. Indirectly, threats incentivize leaders to augment state capacity, which decreases the likelihood of state repression. To test this argument, we develop a new la…
US Patronage, State Capacity, and Civil Conflict
Leaders need resources to maintain power. To secure these resources, states can develop their own extractive capacity or seek external support to help subsidize their costs. In this study, we argue that extractive capacity and external support are not always alternatives. We focus on how US support can foster local property rights, which subsequently builds extractive capacity. We then argue that states with more capacity are better able to eithe…
Re-examining women leaders and military spending
Do women leaders enact more hawkish foreign policies? Some research argues women leaders are more likely to adopt aggressive and masculine characteristics to obtain national office. As a result, women leaders should exhibit more hawkish behavior than men. In this study we re-examine the relationship between the women leaders and foreign policy by focusing on military spending behavior. We argue that conventional empirical methods, such as linear …
Legislative Transparency and Credit Risk
Open governance requirements are designed to improve accountability, which implies that transparent governments are more trustworthy stewards of their publicly invested power. However, transparency may also reduce institutional effectiveness and inhibit political compromise, diminishing the capacity to manage resources responsibly. We assess empirical support for these competing perspectives in the context of American state legislatures, many of …
Opposition Politics and International Crises
Democratic foreign policy choices are a function of expected international outcomes and the preferences, power, and information of domestic actors. Studies of domestic political competition and international crisis bargaining have argued that an opposition's policy positions send credible signals of the government's intentions to adversarial target states. This paper contends that while opposition behavior may send informative signals, it can als…
China Lending and the Political Economy of Leader Survival
What are the political implications of Chinese loans to borrowing countries? Our argument is that similar to other forms of international finance, loans from China provide leaders with additional resources to maintain their power. The nature of China’s lending practices—characterized by an absence of good governance conditions—offers a unique advantage to political leaders, allowing corrupt leaders who receive loans from China to stay in power fo…
Information, Uncertainty, and Public Support for Brinkmanship During the 2023 Debt Limit Negotiations
Why do US voters allow politicians to hold the country’s economy hostage during debt ceiling negotiations? In this research note, we argue that ignorance and uncertainty over the consequences of a debt ceiling breach play a nontrivial role in public support for hard-line negotiating positions. In a pre-registered survey experiment, two weeks before the June 2023 deadline to raise the US debt ceiling, we show that providing credible information ab…
The Financial Crisis, Fiscal Federalism, and the Creditworthiness of US State Governments
This study examines why credit rating agencies offered optimistic assessments of some US states during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Focusing on the creditworthiness of state governments, we argue that because states are procyclic spenders, growth in a state’s economy is actually harmful to that state’s ability to maintain its fiscal promises. As the federal government spends more heavily in a state, however, the procyclic tendencies of that st…
Financing Victory
With access to inexpensive credit, states can finance wars without overburdening their constituents, and face relatively small short-term costs compared to states with poor credit access. As a result of these economic benefits, states with lower credit costs will be more likely to win their wars, ceteris paribus. However, lower borrowing costs provide states domestic political benefits, which I argue are more important for democracies than nondem…
Opposition Politics and International Crises
Democratic foreign policy choices are a function of expected international outcomes and the preferences, power, and information of domestic actors. Studies of domestic political competition and international crisis bargaining have argued that an opposition's policy positions send credible signals of the government's intentions to adversarial target states. This paper contends that while opposition behavior may send informative signals, it can als…
Sovereign Credit and the Fate of Leaders
In this article, we contend that the "democratic advantage" literature (i) exaggerates the potential political backlash from credit downgrades in democracies; and (ii) overlooks the importance of sovereign credit to nondemocratic leaders. We argue that nondemocratic regimes receive a higher marginal political benefit from credit compared to democratic regimes. Consequently, changes in credit prices or credit access affect nondemocratic leaders' t…
Borrowing Trouble
Changes in relative military power in the international system are seen as an impediment to peace. This article will focus on one particular avenue for states to increase their relative military power: sovereign borrowing. States’ ability to borrow inexpensive credit can undermine credible commitments in international relations, but only for those states that habitually use credit for military purposes. I argue that military regimes are more like…
Leaders, Tenure, and the Politics of Sovereign Credit
Sovereign creditworthiness is as much a function of politics as economic fundamentals. Previous research has focused on the relationship between creditworthiness and political factors such as regime type, regional effects, and international organization membership. These factors, while important, often change slowly and do not always capture the more dynamic political determinants of creditworthiness. As an alternative, this study focuses on the …
The Impact of Women Legislators on Humanitarian Military Interventions
In this article, we contend that the current gender and conflict literature ignores the context of military decisions and thus underestimates the support of women for certain types of military interventions. We argue that the issues related to humanitarian crises are likely to provoke support from women. Consequently, as more women enter elected positions in state legislatures, the more likely a state will become involved in a humanitarian milita…
War and Default
Sovereign borrowing is often used to cover the costs of war. This borrowing, coupled with war’s economic disruptions, strains states’ ability to honor debt promises. Contrary to conventional expectations, however, we find that default is not common after wars. To explain the relationship between war and sovereign default, this article lays out a selection effect argument: war participants are unlikely to default in the first place, while states l…
The Financial Crisis, Fiscal Federalism, and the Creditworthiness of US State Governments
This study examines why credit rating agencies offered optimistic assessments of some US states during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Focusing on the creditworthiness of state governments, we argue that because states are procyclic spenders, growth in a state’s economy is actually harmful to that state’s ability to maintain its fiscal promises. As the federal government spends more heavily in a state, however, the procyclic tendencies of that st…
The Devil’s Haircut
When do private creditors versus debtor states accept a greater burden in resolving sovereign debt crises? In this study, we argue that distributive politics helps explain the “haircut”—or losses—private creditors take in debt restructuring cases. Despite the expected convergence of partisan policies in a globalized economy, we argue that right and left leaders extract different settlements in debt negotiations. Left governments, representing con…
Money Talks
Finance is often considered a constraining or compelling force in war. This article examines an alternative role of finance in war, asserting that investors can inform states about adversarial intentions and resolve under certain conditions. This signaling mechanism can reduce information asymmetry between states and decrease the probability of conflict. In the context of these theoretical expectations, I examine the case of Austria and the Roths…
Leaders and Default
Sovereign default is a political decision. While previous research on sovereign credit markets focuses on economic causes, domestic constraints, or international reputation to explain why states default, we focus on leaders. We argue that leaders who come to power under irregular circumstances are more likely to default. Irregular leaders are themselves more vulnerable to turnover and therefore prioritize the short-term benefits of default rather…
Legislative Transparency and Credit Risk
Open governance requirements are designed to improve accountability, which implies that transparent governments are more trustworthy stewards of their publicly invested power. However, transparency may also reduce institutional effectiveness and inhibit political compromise, diminishing the capacity to manage resources responsibly. We assess empirical support for these competing perspectives in the context of American state legislatures, many of …
Alliances, signals of support, and military effort
Do alliances allow states to share defense burdens and reduce military spending? Despite expectations that alliances should lead to decreased military spending, the empirical record offers mixed findings. We argue that not all alliances are reliable; thus, only allies that receive signals of reassurance will rely on the external security of allies and subsequently reduce their military spending. Compared to states that do not receive additional s…
US Patronage, State Capacity, and Civil Conflict
Leaders need resources to maintain power. To secure these resources, states can develop their own extractive capacity or seek external support to help subsidize their costs. In this study, we argue that extractive capacity and external support are not always alternatives. We focus on how US support can foster local property rights, which subsequently builds extractive capacity. We then argue that states with more capacity are better able to eithe…
Re-examining women leaders and military spending
Do women leaders enact more hawkish foreign policies? Some research argues women leaders are more likely to adopt aggressive and masculine characteristics to obtain national office. As a result, women leaders should exhibit more hawkish behavior than men. In this study we re-examine the relationship between the women leaders and foreign policy by focusing on military spending behavior. We argue that conventional empirical methods, such as linear …
Ethnic politics and sovereign credit risk
How does domestic politics affect sovereign credit risk? To date, scholars have largely focused on how economic interests along class-cleavages influence sovereign default risk and borrowing costs. Ethnic dynamics are another important political factor that explains governments’ creditworthiness, yet are understudied. We investigate how ethnic politics shape governments’ credit access and argue that the fiscal incentives generated by ethnic coali…
External Threats, Capacity, and Repression
How do external threats affect leaders' incentives to repress? We argue that external threats both increase and decrease state repression, but through different causal pathways. Directly, external threats provide leaders with political cover to use repression against political opponents. Indirectly, threats incentivize leaders to augment state capacity, which decreases the likelihood of state repression. To test this argument, we develop a new la…
Why cronies don’t cry? IMF programs, Chinese lending, and leader survival
Many countries in the Global South have increased their exposure to Chinese debt in recent years. With the COVID-19 pandemic and the US interest rate hike, many countries have struggled to meet their debt repayment obligations. As a result, they have turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for emergency assistance. We argue that the involvement of the Fund wipes out much of the political benefits of China loans for executive leaders of bo…
Crises and Consequences
Sovereign default should theoretically lead to creditor punishment through higher borrowing costs or market exclusion. However, empirical evidence shows that punishment is inconsistent across defaulters. We argue that this disconnect can be explained by examining the role of geopolitical relationships, particularly with the United States. US support conditions expectations of both borrowers and creditors by providing a fiscal cushion and subsidiz…
Global Finance, Political Business Cycles, and the Politics of Foreign Reserves
Foreign reserves provide developing countries with resources for managing the effects of economic shocks and crises. Why do reserve levels vary across the developing world? Political business cycles (PBCs) have been associated with reserve level decreases, as incumbents draw them down to fund policies that provide voters with material benefits before elections. But governments can also obtain capital by borrowing on bond markets, getting the reso…
China Lending and the Political Economy of Leader Survival
What are the political implications of Chinese loans to borrowing countries? Our argument is that similar to other forms of international finance, loans from China provide leaders with additional resources to maintain their power. The nature of China’s lending practices—characterized by an absence of good governance conditions—offers a unique advantage to political leaders, allowing corrupt leaders who receive loans from China to stay in power fo…
Information, Uncertainty, and Public Support for Brinkmanship During the 2023 Debt Limit Negotiations
Why do US voters allow politicians to hold the country’s economy hostage during debt ceiling negotiations? In this research note, we argue that ignorance and uncertainty over the consequences of a debt ceiling breach play a nontrivial role in public support for hard-line negotiating positions. In a pre-registered survey experiment, two weeks before the June 2023 deadline to raise the US debt ceiling, we show that providing credible information ab…
Information, Uncertainty, and Public Support for Brinkmanship During the 2023 Debt Limit Negotiations – Corrigendum
An examination of trade liberalization as a gendered foreign policy instrument
Research on women and trade policy presents mixed findings: Public opinion studies consistently found women more protectionist than men; yet, legislative research found women sometimes support higher tariffs and sometimes support liberalization. We argue these inconsistencies reflect how trade is framed. When trade is presented as a foreign policy and development tool benefiting women in developing countries, women are more likely to support libe…
Political science (21 obras) · Economics (20 obras) · Law (18 obras) · Law (16 obras) · Politics (16 obras) · Finance (12 obras) · International Development and Aid (10 obras) · Business (9 obras) · Finance (9 obras) · Political economy (8 obras)